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91 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following: You are at the airport returning from a trip abroad. Part of the
reason you went on the trip was because you were interested in buying some local artifacts.
However, before leaving you did not check whether it was actually allowed to import
them. As you proceed to get your luggage off the belt, you notice a billboard indicating
that it is forbidden to bring cultural goods into your country without an export license
from the country of departure. You did not get such a license, which means you are now
faced with the choice of declaring the artifacts you bought and have them confiscated or
taking your chances and not declaring them. By not declaring them you risk not only the
confiscation of your new items but a hefty fine as well.
If you would find yourself in this situation, would you consider ‘forgetting’ to declare
your new items? And do you think that your choice in this case would be guided more by
rational-instrumental considerations or more by how you feel about the situation?
Additionally, can your reliance on either thinking or feeling when deciding on whether or
not to get declare the items be influenced? That is, could it be that on one moment you
would rely more on how you think about the situation when making your decision,
whereas at another moment you would rely more on how you actually feel about it?
Furthermore, do you think that interpersonal differences play a role in the sense that
people with different personalities would evaluate the risks involved differently? And, do
the answers to these questions also have practical implications? In other words, can the ‘so
what?’ question be answered confidently?
In conjunction, the individual responses to these questions will serve to answer the
broader research question underlying this dissertation: Can a so-called ‘dual-process’
perspective that incorporates both thinking and feeling better explain and predict criminal
decisions than the existing single-process perspectives that currently dominate criminal
decision making research and theorizing?
In the remainder of this introduction, I will discuss the main concepts that are used
in the dissertation as well as review theory and empirical research pertinent to the
phenomena under study. As the central concepts and theoretical perspectives reappear in
the different chapters, their discussion here will be limited in scope to avoid being
redundant. Subsequently, I discuss the aims and hypotheses of the dissertation followed by
a chapter overview. Below, I start the discussion of the main concepts by briefly touching
upon the historical context of what is likely to be one of the most persistent dualisms in
human history.
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PASSION VERSUS REASON
The central distinction in this dissertation is that between feeling and thinking at they
apply to decisions of a risky or criminal nature. This division is a classic one, early
references to it date back more than two millennia, and one that has resurfaced time and
again in different guises, such as emotion versus ratio, affect versus cognition, and passion
versus reason. The ancient Greek philosophers, for instance, chronicled how people’s
short-sighted passions got them into trouble when obscuring reason and lead them to
engage in behavior that ran counter to their best interest. For Descartes (1649/1989),
passions too could contradict deliberation and, if intense enough, be self-defeating by
overpowering the minds’ countervailing efforts. In a similar vein, Adam Smith (1790)
described human behavior as the outcome of a struggle between the ‘passions’, i.e.
emotions and drives such as hunger and desire, and the ‘impartial spectator’, which he
envisioned as an internal voice of reason able to moderate the passions. Hume (1739-
40/1985) also referred to the dualism but reversed the primacy of reason over passion
arguing that “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them”. More recently, Freud
(1923/1962) expressed the inner tension as a conflict between an ego, which represents
the rational and conscious self and obeys a reality principle, and a pleasure-seeking id.
However, as the 20th century wore on, the notion that feelings can be important
drivers of behavior got somewhat lost to social scientists and psychologists who
increasingly came to rely on strictly cognitive information processing models, thereby
excluding from consideration the potential influence of affect on our choices and actions.
Similarly, economists, and in their wake criminologists, reverted to rational choice and
utility models to explain behavior, which were also restricted to that part of our mental
operations which pertains to thinking, i.e. cognition (Haidt, 2006). This has led to a rather
limited, and one-sided, view of decision processes under risk and uncertainty. As
Loewenstein et al. (2001, p. 267) argue: “Many choice theorists are deliberately agnostic
about the psychological processes underlying the patterns of choice that their models
predict”.
Recently, in line with some of the insights from the classical theorists alluded to
earlier, social psychologists, behavioral economists and neuroscientists have come to
realize that there may actually be two systems or modes of information processing in the
human mind. Consequently, our behavior may be guided not by one but instead by two
systems that function relatively independent from each other. One of these systems is
under volitional control, largely cognitive in nature, and the seat of reasoning and
conscious behavior. The other system is automatic, strongly related to affect and often
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operating below the level of consciousness (Frankish & Evans, 2009). This view on
cognition and affect, which is generally captured under the term ‘dual-processing’, can for
example elucidate why the way we feel about something may differ from how we think
about it, and explain the familiar ambivalent feeling of ‘being in two minds’ (Loewenstein
& O’Donoghue, 2004). It will be argued throughout this dissertation that this view can
also teach us much about how people make criminal choices.
TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS
Affect and cognition
Before elaborating further on the dual-process view, a brief note on terminology is in
order. As some concepts have been variously used over a period of centuries, it begs their
characterization and delineation to avoid misunderstanding. In this dissertation, feelings,
passions and emotions are captured under the term ‘affect’. This general term refers to the
subjective experience of feelings, which includes moods and emotions, and may extend to
visceral drive states, such as pain, drug craving and sexual arousal (cf. Loewenstein, 1996).
Moods and emotions are closely related, but nevertheless distinct, phenomena (Beedie,
Terry & Lane, 2005). Moods are low-intensity, diffuse (i.e. unfocused), and relatively
enduring affective states without a clear antecedent cause and therefore have little
cognitive content (e.g. feeling good or feeling bad) (Forgas, 1995, p. 41). Emotions, on the
other hand, are more intense, focused, short-lived and usually do have a definite cause
(e.g., being angry at, or fearful of, something) (Forgas, 1995, p. 41; see also Schwarz &
Clore, 2007).
The terms reason, ratio and cognition have been, and continue to be, used in
different ways and for different purposes, but have in common that they refer to thinking
states. In terms of risk and decision making, traditional approaches, such as the well-
known rational choice paradigm in criminology and expected utility models in economics
are based on these states and for that reason subsumed under the heading ‘cognitive’. This
term is preferred over the term ‘rational’, which lacks clarity regarding its meaning and
often carries normative connotations (Hammond, 2007). Finally, it is important to note
that when referring to rational choice in the subsequent chapters, unless otherwise
indicated, we refer to descriptive models, not prescriptive or normative ones.1
1
 A fundamental distinction in decision theory is that between normative or prescriptive theories
and descriptive theories. The former regard how people ought to make decisions, while the latter
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Risk and criminal risk
Signing an armistice, leaving your house without an umbrella, squatting a property,
cheating on your taxes or spouse, or going base jumping share (at least) one common
feature and that is that they all incur a possibility of loss. In other words, each of these
activities entails risk, which is generally conceived as consisting of two components: the
likelihood of negative outcomes, or ‘losses’, and the severity of these outcomes (Yates &
Stone, 1992). In criminology, this distinction generally plays out in the probability of
sanction and its severity, which together with punishment celerity, i.e. the imminence of
punishment, form the core of traditional deterrence models (cf. Beccaria, 1764/1963).
When referring to risk in this dissertation, we are not primarily interested in the perils
of leaving one’s house without an umbrella or signing armistices. Instead, we examine risks
with presumably greater and more relevant consequences than the former, and with a
more personal nature than the latter; societal risks are beyond its scope. Furthermore,
although not exclusively, the main focus of this dissertation is on risks of a criminal nature.
Nagin and Pogarsky (2001, p. 885) note that “in decision making parlance, the criminal
opportunity presents a choice between a sure thing (restraint from the criminal act), and a
gamble that arises because the contemplated conduct can produce a gain with some
probability and a loss with complementary probability.” In other words, a criminal
decision is a kind of risky decision. Obviously, criminal decisions do constitute a particular
kind of risk and hence findings from this behavioral risk domain cannot automatically be
assumed to apply to other domains, and vice versa. I will return to this issue later in this
introduction.
Research on decision making under risk and uncertainty
The study of risk and judgment and decision making research have long been strictly
cognitive enterprises employing notions such as expected utility, maximization, and value
functions as the principal instruments in the toolkit. The dominant behavioral model in
these fields has been that of man as a maximizer who weighs costs against benefits in
order to arrive at an optimal decision. Furthermore, most research in this tradition is
experimental in nature. Typical experiments involve presenting participants monetary
gambles in which they are required to choose between two or more options with different
levels of probability and payoff.
describe how people actually make choices. The so-called ‘rational choice perspective’ developed
by Cornish and Clarke (1986; Clarke & Cornish, 1985) is an example of a descriptive model.
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In the 1970s and 1980s, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky demonstrated in a
series of papers that judgment processes were of a different quality than that described by
rational choice models. One of their main findings was that choice behavior is often prone
to a set of heuristics and biases (cf. Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982) and that people
generally satisficed, i.e. settled for a satisfactory solution, rather than maximized (see also
Simon, 1957). However, these deviations from optimality were regarded as cognitive in
nature; feelings continued to be viewed as epiphenomenal to the decision making process
(Loewenstein et al., 2001).
The strictly cognitive and experimental take on risky decision making has been
criticized on the grounds that it is too far removed from the real world risks that people
face. The use of monetary gambles that serve as surrogates for complicated real-world
situations often require large doses of conjecture or leaps of faith (Fischhoff, 1996). As
Lopes (1987, p. 263) summarizes “after all the study and clever theorizing, we are left with
a theory of risk taking that fails to mention risk”. Furthermore, many researchers
continued to view risk behavior in much the same way as any other type of behavior; at
least planful and reasoned, if not always rational (Gerrard et al., 2007, p. 29). Only in the
last two decades have decision researchers started to address the role of feelings in how
people perceive and deal with risk in what I see as an attempt to bring the study of human
decision making closer to how people actually make and take decisions in the real-world.
Of course, if risk-related feelings and cognitive evaluations had identical determinants
as well as consequences for behavior, the application of a dual-process perspective to the
study of (criminal) risk would be little more than an alternative description of the
psychological processes underlying decision making, and feelings would not be required as
an intervening construct (Loewenstein et al., 2001). In this case, a dissertation dedicated to
the interplay of cognition and affect would amount to little more than an inane academic
endeavor. However, as will be explained in detail in the next chapter, feelings and
cognitions related to choice and risk do have different determinants and it is precisely for
this reason that both need to be taken up in theoretical perspectives dealing with risk and,
by analogy, criminal decision making.
THE DUAL-PROCESSING HYPOTHESIS
In a sense, the ancient dualism between reason and passion reemerged in social
psychology, and related areas such as social cognition and behavioral economics, under the
heading of dual-process models. These theories assume that the way we go about making
judgments, engage in problem solving, acquire new skills, value items, or decide on a
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certain course of action is influenced by different modes of mental processing. Some of
these models go beyond information processing and behavior in a specific domain and
argue for two mental faculties or systems that guide behavior in general (Deutsch & Strack,
2004). These all-encompassing models are known as dual-system models. However, ‘dual-
process theory’ is often adopted as an umbrella term for both types of models and I will
adhere to this practice.
As such, the dual-processing hypothesis does not refer to one specific theory or
model, but instead denotes a set or class of theoretical models. The central assumption of
all duality process models is that human behavior is guided by more than one underlying
process (Gilbert, 1999). Or, as Evans and Frankish (2009, p. 1) phrase it: “These theories
come in different forms, but all agree in positing two distinct processing mechanisms for a
given task, which employ different procedures, and may yield different, and sometimes
conflicting, results”.
The next chapter discusses the dual-process hypothesis in detail, but it can at this
point already be remarked that if the hypothesis is correct, traditional models of human
decision making, whatever their precise nature, come up short almost by default as they
only portray a one-sided view of decision processes.2
INTEGRATING TRAITS AND STATES
Beyond going from single-processing to dual-processing, this dissertation adds another
extension to traditional models of criminal decision making by also looking at individual
dispositions. One common division in both the psychological literature and in
criminological research is that between proximal factors that operate in the moment of
choice (e.g. costs and benefits) versus more distal individual dispositions related to
criminal behavior (e.g. self-control, sensation-seeking). This distinction is known in the
criminological literature as theories on crime versus theories on criminality (Gottfredson &
Hirschi, 1990). In social psychological terms, proximal factors are labeled ‘states’, whereas
individual dispositions are referred to as ‘traits’.
2 Note that research may regard how both modes influence the quality of decision making, i.e.
making sound or flawed decisions, but this is not a central concern in this dissertation. Rather, I
examine how both thinking and feeling are related to risky and criminal decision making, without
making normative claims even though, arguably, making a criminal decision implies making a
‘wrong’ decision.
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While there is ample evidence that both ‘traits’ and ‘states’ are important predictors
of decision making, few studies have sought to examine them in conjunction. Hence, little
is known about how traits and states are interrelated and how they operate on criminal
choice in conjunction. Developing an integral perspective that includes both perspectives
is relevant as it constitutes a more comprehensive view of criminal choice. Therefore, as a
subsidiary goal, I will also examine personality traits as predictors of crime and the
particular pathways, i.e. affective and cognitive, through which they operate.
To operationalize the trait perspective, the recently proposed HEXACO model of
personality (Ashton et al., 2004; Ashton & Lee, 2008; De Vries, Ashton, & Lee, 2009) is
used. This structural model of personality builds on the well-known Big Five and Five-
Factor models, but contains an additional personality trait, Honesty-Humility, that is of
particular relevance to crime research. Honesty-Humility refers to individual differences in
the tendency to be interpersonally genuine, to be unwilling to take advantage of others, to
avoid fraud and corruption, to be uninterested in status and wealth, and to be modest and
unassuming (Lee & Ashton, 2004). In other words, an individual’s score on the Honesty-
Humility dimension is reflective of his/her dispositional morality, which is an under-
researched yet fundamental correlate of criminal behaviour (Antonaccio & Tittle, 2008).
Indeed, due to the inclusion of the Honesty-Humility dimension, the HEXACO
model has been shown to outperform five factor solutions on a number of important
behavioral criteria related to rule violating behavior and delinquency such as psychopathy,
Machiavellianism, egoism, immorality, pretentiousness, unethical decision making, and
employee integrity (Ashton & Lee, 2005; De Vries, De Vries, De Hoogh, & Feij, 2009; de
Vries & van Kampen, 2010; Lee & Ashton, 2004). The fact that the HEXACO model has
not yet been applied to criminal behavior, makes it of particular interest for the current
purposes.
AIMS AND SCOPE: DUAL-PROCESSING RISK& CRIME
The previous discussion on states reveals an interesting parallel between social psychology
and the field of judgment and decision making. Both fields came to rely on strictly
cognitive models to explain human behavior in the second half of the 20th century only to
gradually come to the conclusion that a central explanatory element was missing in their
analyses. Hence researchers in both fields have increasingly started to address the potential
role of feelings as a predictor of behavior in their research.
In spite of these emerging insights in its sister disciplines, criminology has so far been
successful in turning a blind eye to them and is still being dominated (either implicitly or
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explicitly) by cognitive considerations. As De Haan and Loader (2002, p. 243) eloquently
phrase it, many established modes of criminological thought proceed in ways that ignore
entirely, or at best gesture towards, the impact of emotions on their subject matter. While
attention in crime research has been devoted to the role of affect, it has not –in my
opinion– received its fair share and most approaches to this end have remained confined
to narrative and interpretative studies or have treated affect as an enduring individual
disposition (Nagin, 2007). However, although it may generally be acknowledged that affect
influences criminal acts such as (expressive) violence, vigilantism, and crimes of passion, all
of which are widely associated with lapses in self-control, its influence is likely to stretch
beyond these examples and to influence criminal decisions in more subtle and as yet little
understood ways. Furthermore, both in criminal justice contexts and by public opinion,
emotions are generally associated with extreme and/or relatively rare crimes such as crimes
of passion (hence the name). Due to disproportionate media coverage of these kinds of
crime their occurrence tends to be overestimated (Felson, 1994). However, as will be
shown, affect plays an important role too in seemingly calculating and everyday offenses
(e.g. insurance fraud, illegal downloading, tax evasion).
This dissertation proposes and tests a new way of approaching criminal decision
making and addressing the role of affect. It draws from other academic fields of human
decision making because, as Nagin (2007, p. 262) notes, “research on choice in problem
domains that seemingly have little connection to crime provide the basis for making
fundamental advances in our knowledge and understanding of crime.” In turn, in social
psychology and related disciplines, increasing attention is being devoted to the role of
affect in different domains, but criminal decision making has mostly fallen outside the
scope of this research. Perhaps because researchers in these areas feel that this behavioral
criterion falls outside their field of expertise or because they think the matter should be
addressed by criminologists. Whatever the reason, this implies that insights from research
on criminal choice such as that written up in this dissertation may also prove valuable to
social psychology and judgment and decision making research.
Drawing from psychology to shed new light on a topic that is (also) pertinent to
crime research and delinquent behavior is not new to criminology. Nor is conceiving of
criminal decision making as a particular kind of risky decision making. In 1985, Clarke and
Cornish noted that a “considerable body of recent psychological research on information
processing and decision making has passed largely unnoticed by criminologists”. This led
them to draw out a cognitive framework of criminal decision making based on this
research, the so-called rational choice perspective. Since its publication 25 years ago, the
psychological research on information processing and decision-making alluded to by
Clarke and Cornish has much progressed. Indeed, this literature seems to form a
17
systematic body of research that can contribute much to our understanding of delinquent
behavior and criminal decision processes and also to provide a much needed update for
the standard criminological decision making perspectives that currently dominate the field.
CHAPTER OVERVIEW
Below, I present an overview of the chapters, each of which represents an independent
research article that has either been published, awaits publication, or is currently under
review. This overview will briefly discuss each chapter in terms of type (theoretical versus
empirical), goal, research approach and results. A schematic overview of the chapters
appears in Table 1.1.
Chapter 2 is intended to set the theoretical stage for the remainder of the
dissertation. The article on which it is based was written with the goal of introducing dual-
process theory to criminology and it proposes a hot/cool perspective on criminal decision
making based on this theory. It reviews the literature and prior research on dual processing
and makes the case for applying the dual-process hypothesis to the study of criminal
behavior, and is the first in criminology to do so. The goal of this chapter is demonstrating
how the hot/cool framework extends rationalist accounts of human decision making that
currently dominate criminological decision making research.
The hot/cool perspective elucidates how affect is likely to influence criminal
decisions alongside cognitive considerations, such as the perceived costs and benefits of
crime. It is furthermore shown how the hot/cool perspective offers a more realistic
account of criminal decision making processes than existing models and approaches and
also allows for the explanation of a variety of criminal behaviors that are difficult, if not
impossible, to explain in terms of rational choice or expected utility, such as offenses
committed in states of sexual arousal or intense rage, and which seem to be impervious to
deterrence. This chapter also explains how the hot/cool perspective provides important
input for practice, for example by explaining that a failure on the part of offenders to
recognize the influence of affect on their (criminal) decisions is likely to lead to a
subsequent failure to take measures to avoid certain situations conducive to offending or
to deal with intense affective states in non-criminal ways.
Chapter 3 empirically tests the dual-process hypothesis in a non-criminal context. I
thought it necessary to first examine risk in general prior to applying it to a specific risk
domain such as criminal choice. The reason is that even though various researchers have
argued for a dual-process view in the context of risky decision making (e.g. Slovic et al.,
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2005), no study has actually tested it and hence empirical evidence for such a model was
lacking.
In three different studies presented in this chapter it is shown how both cognition
and affect are related to risky choice and belong to different domains of mental processing.
In the first study, I use vignettes describing risky situations to test a model that includes
both perceived risk, which is a cognitive measure, and negative affect, i.e. feelings of fear
and worry evoked by the situation, as predictors of risky choice. The results indicate that
both are significant predictors. These findings are replicated in Studies 2 and 3. However,
in addition in Study 2, cognition and affect are made salient by adding cognitive
information or affective information to the vignettes which leads to respective increases in
the strength of perceived risk or negative affect as predictors of risky choice. In Study 3,
using an experimental priming manipulation, I induce either a ‘hot’, affective, or ‘cool’,
cognitive processing mode with participants prior to presenting them the vignettes. The
results show that activating a cognitive processing mode strengthens the relation between
perceived risk and risky choice, whereas inducing an affective processing mode strengthens
the relation between negative affect and risky choice. Together these findings provide
empirical support for a dual-process model of risky choice.
In Chapter 4, the cognition/affect distinction that underlies the hot/cool perspective
is tested with respect to criminal choice in a representative sample of the Dutch
population. However, besides the ‘state’ variables perceived risk and negative affect, this
chapter also examines personality dimensions, ‘traits’, as predictors of criminal choice
hypothesizing that the state variables mediate the relationship between personality and
criminal choice. By examining the state factors of the hot/cool framework in conjunction
with personality traits this chapter aims to arrive at a more comprehensive view of criminal
decision making that incorporates both the distal and proximal levels. As hypothesized, we
find both negative affect and perceived risk of sanction to be predictive of criminal choice,
and both to mediate the relationship between personality and criminal choice.
In Chapter 5, I empirically test the hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making.
Equal to Chapter 3, it is shown that the hot and cool processing modes can be
independently activated using a priming task. Furthermore, this chapter replicates the
findings of Chapter 4 by showing how perceived risk and negative affect mediate the
relations between personality and criminal choice. The first study in this chapter examines
the relations between personality traits and criminal choice with perceived risk and
negative affect as mediating variables of this relation. In the second study, participants are
made to rely more on either their thoughts or their feelings when deciding on whether or
not to take illegal action using a priming task that is administered prior to the vignettes.
19
The results provide evidence for the mediating role of perceived risk and negative affect
and support for the hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making.
Table 1.1 Chapter overview
Chapter Topic Approach
1 General introduction
2
Introducing the dual-process
hypothesis to the study of criminal
decision making
Theoretical analysis
3 Testing a dual-process model of(non-criminal) risky choice
Three experimental
studies
4
Testing perceived risk and negative
affect as mediators of the
personality-crime relation
One study among a
representative
community sample
5 Testing the integrative hot/coolperspective on criminal decision
making
Two experimental
studies
6 Discussion
Chapter 6, finally, concludes the dissertation by discussing the findings in the light of their
contributions to criminology, judgment and decision making research and social
psychology. Strengths and limitations are discussed and potentially productive avenues for
future research identified. The chapter concludes with practical implications and
recommendations for policy makers.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As each chapter was written as a separate article, the reader will find that there is some
overlap in content. This carries the advantage that each of the different chapters is
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comprehensible in isolation, without the necessity of reading preceding or subsequent
chapters. The reader is therefore encouraged to read the chapters by interest instead of in
their order of presentation.
Furthermore, as the articles were written at different points in time, and my ideas
developed throughout the process of doing the research for this dissertation, this has led
to some changes in terminology over the course of the chapters. For example, whereas
Chapter 3 distinguishes an affective or affect-based mode of information processing from
a cognitive processing mode, the other chapters denote these modes as ‘hot’ and ‘cool’
respectively. As these changes are minor in nature, I assume that they are self-explanatory
and will therefore not elaborate further on them.
21
2 BEYOND RATIONAL CHOICE: THE HOT/COOL
PERSPECTIVE OF CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING3
Abstract
This chapter proposes a general framework of criminal decision making that assumes both
‘cool’ cognition and ‘hot’ affect, i.e. feelings, to influence criminal choice. Drawing from
judgment and decision making research and social psychology, the hot/cool perspective
extends rational choice and deterrence theories by explaining how affect is likely to
influence criminal decisions alongside cognitive considerations, such as the perceived costs
and benefits of crime. It is shown how the hot/cool perspective offers a more realistic
account of criminal decision making processes than existing decision models and
approaches and also allows for the explanation of criminal behaviors that are difficult to
explain in terms of rational choice.
3 Based on Van Gelder (2012)
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INTRODUCTION
Even though decision making models restricted to rational choice considerations have
often been challenged as being limited and unrealistic in their portrayal of criminal decision
processes (e.g. Akers & Sellers, 2009; De Haan & Vos, 2003), few satisfactory alternatives
have so far been developed. References to the role of feelings are not uncommon in
narrative and interpretative approaches (e.g. Athens, 2005, 1997; Katz, 1988; Wright &
Decker, 1997, 1994), and in theories that conceive of affect as an enduring disposition (e.g.
Agnew, 1992; Wikström, 2006), but rarely make it into choice models of offending. This
chapter proposes an alternative account of criminal decision making based on dual-process
theories in social psychology and related fields, such as behavioral economics and
neuroscience. As will become clear, the proposed hot/cool perspective of criminal
decision making does not argue against the idea of rationality, but offers a more complete
explanation of criminal behavior by considering the influence of affect, i.e. feelings,
alongside rational considerations, such as the perceived costs and benefits, and shows how
they are related.
On rationality and rational choice
Over time, many different meanings have been bestowed upon the term ‘rationality’.
Hammond, writes that ‘‘rationality remains a concept whose interpretation is susceptible to
personal preference, idiosyncratic explication, and popular misunderstanding, and,
therefore, has produced countless varieties of meaning. As a result, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, there is no universal agreement on what it means to be rational’’
(2007, p. xiii). The meaning the term is generally given in criminological texts has its roots
in decision theory and economics. In these disciplines it traditionally refers to individuals
who maximize expected utility according to a prescribed set of mathematical axioms for
balancing costs, benefits and preferences.
According to Akers and Sellers (2009, p. 27), deterrence researchers in criminology
began to refer to economic rational choice theory to expand the deterrence doctrine
beyond legal punishment. The basic idea underlying classical deterrence theory is that
crime is a deliberate choice that people make from a range of behavioral options. In this
way, people make those choices that they perceive to be in their best interests (Henry,
Lanier & Lanier, 2006).
In a seminal paper, the economist Becker (1968) introduced economic rational
choice theory to the study of crime and argued that crime, or better said, the choice to
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offend, should be examined using the same principles of cost-benefit analysis people use
when selecting legal behaviors. According to Becker (1986), beyond punishment, the
monetary or psychic gain from offending and other variables representing the willingness
to offend should also be included in the analysis.
However, even though traditional rational choice-based theories may remain faithful
to the utilitarian notion that individuals tend to behave in ways that maximize benefits and
minimize cost, it is often acknowledged that they do not engage in elaborate assessments
of all the pros and cons of various alternative courses of action. Instead, people exhibit
‘bounded rationality’ and tend to opt for a solution that is satisfactory instead of optimal
(Simon, 1957). In other words, for decisions to be rational, extensive computing is not
required. The minimal condition is some form of rudimentary cognitive processing of pros
and cons. This idea stands at the basis of the rational choice perspective that was
developed by Cornish and Clarke (1986).
According to Cornish and Clarke (1986, p. 1) the starting point of their rational
choice perspective ‘‘was an assumption that offenders seek to benefit themselves by their
criminal behavior; that this involves the making of decisions and of choices, however
rudimentary on occasion these processes might be; and that these processes exhibit a
measure of rationality, albeit constrained by limits of time and ability and the availability of
relevant information.’’ Cornish and Clarke’s rational choice perspective thus departs from
the more traditional economic rational choice conceptions in that for decisions to be
‘rational’, utility maximization is not essential. Instead, it coincides with the view of Simon
(1957) that the decision making behavior of individuals is characterized by bounded
rationality (Cornish & Clarke, 2006).
While some rational choice notions assume decision making to be boundedly rational
whereas others see it as unbounded, and while some assume rudimentary processing of
pros and cons, whereas others may claim elaborate assessments, all notions of the concept
in criminology agree that offending is a choice process in which individuals, when faced
with several possible courses of action, will reason their way towards the option they
believe is most beneficial to them at a given moment. Furthermore, all rational choice-
based models used in criminology are essentially cognitive, i.e. thinking-based, choice
models that pay little or no regard the role of feelings in criminal decisions.4
4
 Situational theories. such as situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1997) and routine activities
theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), are also perspectives premised on the notion of a reasoning
offender who engages in a cost-benefit analysis when making his decision to engage in crime or
not. In other words, these are also rational choice based approaches to crime.
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The Role of Feelings in Criminal Decisions
In rational choice and deterrence models, feelings are seen as unrelated to the decision-
making process. However, as Shover (1991, p. 103) argued: ‘‘Whereas the model criminal
decision maker is never angry, desperate, or defiant, the moods of real-life decision makers
can distort the criminal calculus severely and make offenders unconcerned about risk’’.
Impulsive or ‘spur of the moment’ decisions that result in crime offer illustrative examples
of how criminal decisions may actually be heavily infused with affect.
In a study on shoplifting, Cromwell, Parker and Mobley (2003) found that more than
20% of the interviewed offenders gave explanations that directly implicated their feelings
(e.g. stress, thrill, impulsivity) as the primary motivation for their offending behavior. Many
of the offenders who cited instrumental reasons (e.g. ‘I didn’t want to pay for the item’) as
their primary motivation, also reported secondary motivations that implicated their feelings.
Similarly, De Haan and Vos (2003), write that impulsivity, release of tension and emotions
were reported as equally important motivations by street robbers as getting the money (see
also Shover, 1996). With respect to violent crime, references to the influence of emotions
such as anger, shame, contempt, outrage and frustration in its onset and its continuation
are abound in the literature (e.g. Athens, 2005, Collins, 2008; Tedeschi & Felson, 1994).
Besides stressing the role of feelings in criminal decisions, various studies also
question the notion of a calculating offender, as assumed by rational choice-based
accounts. Feeney (1986), for example, found that robbers frequently embarked upon their
offenses seemingly without a plan and with an apparent lack of deliberation; over half of
the robbers he interviewed said they did no planning at all, and over 60% said that before
the robbery the idea of getting caught hadn’t crossed their minds. Comparable findings are
reported by Gill (2000), Shover and Honaker (1992), Tunnell (1990) and Wright and
Decker (1997). Shover and Hochstetler (2002, p. 12) conclude that there is remarkable
consistency in the results of studies: ‘‘Burglars, armed robbers and other street criminals
are anything but the careful calculating actors sketched in classical criminological theory’’.
There is likely to be variation among different types of crime with respect to the
extent to which feelings play a role. According to Shover and Hochstetler (2005), white-
collar criminals operate more in conformity with the assumptions of rational choice theory
than street offenders who operate in hedonistic contexts which cloud judgment and
eschew rationality and long-range planning. In contrast, many white-collar workers live
and work in worlds that promote and reward prudent behavior (Shover & Hochstetler,
2005). By implication, they should be more prone to commit their crimes after carefully
weighing costs against benefits and, consequently, operate more in conformity with the
assumptions of deterrence and rational choice. Yet, as Akers and Sellers (2009) note, this
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remains an untested assumption because empirical evidence as to how strictly rational the
decision process for white-collar criminals actually is, and to what extent it is more rational
than for other offenders, is lacking. Furthermore, white-collar crimes may also implicate
feelings such as fear, thrill and excitement (Bouffard, Exum & Paternoster, 2000).
Considering the above, it seems plausible that extending models of criminal decision
making by incorporating affect is likely to increase their explanatory scope. As noted by
Ward and Nee (2009, p. 173), affect is often treated as separate from cognition, but there
are strong reasons to believe that the role of affect is central to and inextricable from
decision-making processes and it makes sense that this development is taken on board
when studying offending. The approach taken in this chapter differs from most previous
crime research that has alluded to the role of feelings. Instead of examining emotion as a
relatively enduring state or taking a narrative or interpretative approach, it draws form
recent social psychological and judgment and decision-making research, risky decision
making in particular, to study the actual choice process and the principles guiding it.5
Cognitive and Affective Appraisals of Risk
Differentiating between cognitive and affective responses to risk is important because
feelings operate according to a different logic than cognitive risk estimates. People have,
for example, been found to dread certain risks more than others that are more likely to
occur and/or are more severe in nature (e.g. Slovic, 1987). In these cases, feelings about
risk are influenced by considerations orthogonal to its probability and severity, such as the
extent to which it is controllable. The classic example in this respect is that most people
experience little fear driving a car, yet dread flying even though acknowledging the fact that
driving is much more hazardous than flying (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee & Welch, 2001).
As will be argued in more detail later in this chapter, the divergence of cognitive
appraisals from emotional reactions can occur because the latter have determinants that
differ from those that drive cognitive evaluations. Emotions respond differently to
probabilities and outcomes, the two central input variables of rational choice and
deterrence models, than cognitive evaluations of riskiness (see Loewenstein et al., 2001).
As Frijda (1988, p. 355) notes ‘‘emotions know no probabilities. They do not weigh
5 Nagin and Pogarsky (2001, p. 885) note that “in decision making parlance, the criminal
opportunity presents a choice between a sure thing (restraint from the criminal act), and a gamble
that arises because the contemplated conduct can produce a gain with some probability and a loss
with complementary probability.” In other words, a criminal decision is a kind of risky decision.
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likelihoods. What they know, they know for sure.’’ Emotions are, however, influenced by
variables that play only a minor role in cognitive evaluations, such as the time interval
between the decision and the realization of outcomes, and the degree to which a risk is
known or controllable (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
Emotions, moods and visceral drive states
Besides distinguishing affect from cognition, it is also important to differentiate between
different types of affect. Affect is a general term that refers to the experience of feelings,
which encompasses moods and emotions, and may extend to visceral drive states, such as
pain, drug craving and sexual arousal. Moods and emotions, even though closely related,
are nevertheless distinct phenomena (see previous chapter).
Various experimental studies have documented the influence moods can have on
unrelated judgments. Johnson and Tversky (1983), for example, showed that people who
were induced to experience positive affect tended to make more optimistic risk estimates
than people who were made to experience negative affect. Additionally, individuals in
anxious moods are likely to evaluate risks as more threatening and severe in comparison to
individuals who feel elated (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Furthermore, individuals may use
their mood as a source of information about their own state (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). It is
therefore a plausible, yet untested, assumption that mood serves as an important cue for
judgment related to certain offenses. Happy or elated moods may lead people to
underestimate risks and engage in reckless activities, such as speeding or unwanted sexual
overtures. Anxious moods do the reverse and prompt cautious behavior.
The potential effect of mood on crime also operates in a different way. According to
Shover and Honaker (1992), crime provides an offender the opportunity to establish
himself as a competent individual and (re)gain a sense of control over his life. Offenders
may consequently try to alleviate a negative mood, such as feelings of frustration born out
of failure at legitimate activities, through crime (Wright & Decker, 1994). The link between
negative mood alleviation and risky behavior is supported by experimental research. Leith
and Baumeister (1996) found that people’s negative moods were related to lower self-
control, which in turn led to riskier behavior. They explain this finding by arguing that
‘‘[p]eople who are upset seem merely to seek out the best possible outcome and grab for it,
without being deterred by rational cost-benefit calculations or even by the prospect of
possible unpleasant consequences’’ (Leith & Baumeister, 1996, p. 1264).
Different from moods, emotions have a definite antecedent cause and are associated
with an evaluative judgment, or appraisal, of an event and its significance for our well-
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being. Emotions, therefore, carry information about ourselves and the state of the world
around us. An appraisal triggers certain specific tendencies to respond to the eliciting
stimulus (Frijda, 2007, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 2003). Angry individuals, for
example, are likely to assess a situation as more controllable and certain and, consequently,
perceive it as less risky than fearful individuals do (see e.g. Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Anger, consequently, can facilitate criminal action, while fear is
likely to inhibit it. Furthermore, emotions can influence the quality and depth of
information processing of decision outcomes and the prediction of consequences (e.g.
Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003).
Because emotions are adaptive responses to the environment geared to help
individuals respond to the challenges facing them (Frijda, 1986, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth,
1985; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), they can also assist in making the right choices rather
than just interfering with sound decision making (Damasio, 1994). In a sense, emotions
save cognitive processing by triggering time-tested responses to universal problems such as
loss, threat or injustice (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003, p. 628). Indeed, as Ward and Nee
(2009, p. 174) note, research on the role of emotion on judgment suggests that it can have
both positive and disruptive effects as a lack of emotional competence can also mean that
individuals struggle to deal adaptively with their problems.
Anticipated versus immediate affect
Besides distinguishing moods from emotions it is essential to differentiate between the
various ways in which affect can influence decision processes. One fundamental
distinction is that between anticipated, i.e. post-decision, and immediate affect.6 The
former is a component of the anticipated consequences of a decision and refers to
emotions expected to occur when outcomes are experienced, such as regret,
disappointment or feelings of shame, rather than emotions experienced at the time of
decision. Immediate affect, on the other hand, is experienced at the time of decision. It can
arise from contemplating consequences, such as feelings of fear and dread when
visualizing potential negative outcomes, so-called anticipatory emotions, or it can be the
result of incidental influences unrelated to the decision itself, such as the mood of an
individual at the moment of decision making. In the latter case we can speak of concurrent
or incidental immediate affect.
6
 The distinction between anticipatory and immediate affect presented in this section is largely
drawn from Loewenstein et al. (2001) and Loewenstein and Lerner (2003).
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Various studies of decision making have shown that people are motivated to avoid
feeling regret and disappointment and therefore opt for courses of action that minimize
the likelihood of these emotions occurring (e.g. Bell, 1985; Mellers, Schwarz, Ho & Ritov,
1999). When affect is considered in rational choice and deterrence models, it concerns this
type of post-decision emotions, (e.g. Bachman, Paternoster & Ward, 1992; Nagin &
Paternoster, 1993; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996). For example, when presented with an
opportunity to steel, an individual might refrain from thievery thinking, ‘‘If I steel this
now, I’ll regret it later’’. The desire to avoid feeling regret functions as a deterrent to
performing such action. A similar point applies to the ‘‘sneaky thrills’’ that are expected to
result from minor property crime (see Katz, 1988), which also refers to anticipated
consequences of conduct, and not emotions experienced at the moment of the decision
itself (Bouffard, 2002).
Even though anticipated affect can be and has been incorporated in rational choice-
based models, the decision process remains modeled as the implicitly cognitive task of
predicting future emotions and weighing them in terms of the expected utility of the
different possible courses of action (Loewenstein et al., 2001). In other words, as far as
rational choice and deterrence models have addressed the role of emotions, they have
done so to a limited extent because the influence of immediate affect has been disregarded.
Furthermore, note the fundamentally different nature of anticipated emotions that
have been associated with offending compared to anticipatory emotions and moods likely
to influence it. Regret, guilt and shame share a certain moral character (Frijda, 1986;
Marshall, Marshall, Serran, & O’Brien, 2009; Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 2004), that
anticipatory emotions (e.g. fear, anger) lack. Additionally, they do not occur without a
social context. Instead, they are self-conscious and directly involve (self-)reflection and
evaluation (Tangney, 2003). Anticipatory emotions can have a social source, but this is not
necessary. We can be angry at the policeman that gave us a fine, but also because our flight
is delayed.
As mentioned earlier, immediate affect can regard emotions which arise from
contemplating the consequences of a decision, i.e. be anticipatory in nature, or they can be
incidental and therefore unrelated to the decision at hand, such as the mood of an
individual, i.e. be concurrent. The distinction between anticipatory and concurrent affect
may turn out relevant for criminologists because certain criminal actions cannot be
realistically represented as one-off discrete choices between alternatives, but seem to be
the outcome of a sequence of events in which offenders flow from one situation into the
next. Wright and Decker (1994, p. 60), for example, note that ‘‘[c]rime often appears to
happen almost automatically, the crime occurring with minimal calculation as part of a
more general path of action’’. This implies that an offender’s affective state at one moment
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is likely to influence his/her actions in a subsequent one (see also Chapter 6). Note that
rational choice-based accounts, which model crimes as individual cases of discrete choice,
have trouble not only accommodating the influence of feelings triggered by a specific
situation, but also feelings that are unrelated to the decision at hand.
MODELING COGNITION AND AFFECT: THE DUAL-PROCESS
HYPOTHESIS
The idea that affective reactions can take place virtually independent of cognitive input, led
Zajonc (1980, p. 151) to conclude that ‘‘affect and cognition are under the control of
separate and partially independent systems that can influence each other in a variety of
ways, and that both constitute independent sources of effects in information processing.’’
The notion of two different and partially independent systems of information processing
stands at the basis of dual-process and –system theories, which have become common
currency in social psychology, social cognition in particular, and are also common in other
fields that study human decision making, such as behavioral economics and neuroscience.
Dual-process theories revolve around the idea that when people engage in activities
as diverse as making attributions, solving problems, evaluating risks, or deciding on a
certain course of action, two qualitatively different modes of mental processing are
simultaneously operative (e.g. Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman, 2003; Van Gelder, De
Vries & Van der Pligt, 2009). Whereas dual-process models tend to describe two modes
information processing in a specific domain, dual-system models posit two mental systems
that guide behavior in general, each operating according to different principles (e.g.
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Sloman, 1996; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
The various duality models that have been proposed differ somewhat in content and
also in terms of terminology. Some pit a controlled (or rule-based) against an automatic (or
associative) mode (e.g. Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), while others refer to the
distinction as reflective versus impulsive (e.g. Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Still others make a
more direct reference to the fact that one of the modes is essentially cognitive in character,
whereas the other is affect-based (e.g. Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Hsee &
Rottenstreich, 2004; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999;
Mukherjee, 2010; Van Gelder et al., 2009; Van Gelder & De Vries, 2012a). Metcalfe and
Mischel (1999), for example, differentiate between an emotional ‘hot’ system, which is
under stimulus control, and a cognitive ‘cool’ system, which is the seat of self-control.
In spite of differences between the various models, a significant number of them
share a set of common assumptions (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). The most distinguishing
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characteristic of all models is that behavior, instead of being the result of mere calculation,
habit, drive or motivation, is guided by more than one underlying process (Strack &
Deutsch, 2004).7 Furthermore, one of the modes of processing –the hot, affective,
impulsive or heuristic, mode– is fast, requires little or no cognitive effort, employs
heuristic judgments, and has a low threshold for processing incoming information. The
opposite holds for the other, cool, cognitive, rule-based, systematic- mode of processing,
which is associated with effortful, systematic judgments and decisions based on extensive
thinking.
While processing in the former mode is not necessarily conscious, it is in the latter
which also allows for abstract and hypothetical reasoning (Evans, 2003). Additionally,
while the cool, cognitive mode is controlled and volitional, influences from the hot,
affective mode are automatic in nature and can be hard to suppress. Finally, both modes
influence decision making behavior to varying degrees, depending not only on the nature
of decision outcomes and the way a situation is framed but also on individual differences
(Mukherjee, 2010). Van Gelder and De Vries (2012a), for example, found personality traits
to relate differentially to the cognitive characteristics perceived sanction severity and
probability and the negative affect that was evoked by the prospect.
The notion of two systems that guide information processing and behavior lends
itself well for studying and describing criminal decision making and, as will become clear,
allows for the explanation of crimes that are hard to accommodate by strictly cognitive
perspectives. Below, we take the dual-process notion as the basis for developing a
hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making drawing mainly from models that adhere
to the cognitive/affective distinction which, it should be noted, does not necessarily map
perfectly onto all the other dual-process models that have been suggested.
A HOT/COOL PERSPECTIVE OF CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING
The central explanatory element of the hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making
regards the potential discrepancy between cognitive appraisals of a criminogenic situation
and affective reactions to it, which is the result of two qualitatively distinct modes of
7
 Gilbert (1999) notes that because there are no tangible referents for the processes as specified in
dual-process models, there is generally no proper way to count them and rule out the possibility
that there may in fact be more than two processes. It is however clear to most psychologists that
there is more than one (Gilbert, 1999). Deutsch and Strack (2006) add that the assumption that
there are exactly two processes is not implied by duality theories. Systems are regularly
interacting groups of processes that share the same computations. Accordingly, the two systems
entail multiple processes.
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mental processing that guide behavior. The cool, cognitive, mode is sensitive to
considerations such as probabilities and extralegal costs such as anticipated guilt and social
disapproval, and is therefore likely to respond to notions of sanction severity and certainty,
as suggested by deterrence theorists. The cool mode is also responsible for weighing costs
against benefits and making projections about the long-term consequences of decisions
and, consequently, functions much in accordance with the logic assumed by rational
choice models of offending.
The hot mode, however evaluates in a more intuitive way and responds to different
situational characteristics, such as the temporal and spatial immediacy of decision
outcomes, their controllability and the vividness with which they can be imagined, but
remains largely unresponsive to probabilities and outcomes themselves. Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue (2004), for example, note that as an uncertain averse event approaches in
time, people’s fear tends to increase even when the probability or severity remains
constant. Rather than self-regulating like the cool mode, the hot mode’s operation is
triggered by external stimuli. It is under stimulus control and therefore largely non-
volitional in nature. The fact that the hot mode is insensitive to the input variables of
rational choice models explains why an individual’s (criminal) behavior can deviate from or
even directly contradict what would be a beneficial course of action in terms of perceived
utility and long-term considerations.
Beyond rational choice
The idea of two separate modes of mental processing that guide behavior can elucidate a
number of fundamental issues pertaining to criminal decision making that existing theories
have not been able to satisfactorily address. For one thing, it shows why anticipated
emotions such as regret and shame can be incorporated in rational choice models, but
immediate affect, such as anger and fear or negative moods, cannot. As predictions about
future emotional states, regret and shame are essentially costs that are incorporated in the
cognitive calculus. In terms of the dual-process approach, the consideration of potential
future regret, guilt and shame, like estimates of probability and severity, belong to the
domain of the cool, cognitive, mode as they, at the time of decision, primarily regard
thoughts about feelings rather than feelings themselves.
Direct visceral reactions to risk, such as anger, fear and sexual arousal, on the other
hand, implicate the hot mode and are difficult, if not impossible, to plausibly model as
costs or benefits; they are simply there. This is perhaps best evidenced by the many
affective processes that occur below the level of our awareness and that are hence not
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consciously experienced (LeDoux, 1996). In a similar vein, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
(2004) give the example that people can become fear conditioned to subliminal stimuli
which, they argue, may actually be powerful precisely because the conscious, cool system is
unaware of them and is therefore less likely to engage in efforts to override it. Additionally,
even if an actor is aware of the influence of affect on his/her behavior, it may still only be
partially subject to cognitive control. For instance, the cool system may be perfectly aware
that it makes no sense to take out frustrations from work on one’s spouse; but if the
negative feelings generated at work carry over into the home, such cognitive awareness
may make little difference (Loewenstein & Lerner 2003). In short, as these immediate
emotions fall outside the explanatory scope of a cost-benefit analysis, however extensive
this analysis may be, while exerting an influence on (criminal) behavior, a major limitation
of strictly cognitive decision making models emerges.
Note again that the hot/cool perspective does not assume that rational, i.e. cognitive,
considerations do not play a role in decisions to offend. Instead it argues that feelings play
an important role in determining criminal choice behavior alongside these considerations
and that it is important to consider both. The hot/cool perspective assumes behavior to
(generally) be the result of both cognitive and affective processes, in which the latter can
influence the former and vice versa. The cool mode influences the decisions of the hot
mode by exerting restraint or self-control, whereas the hot mode influences the cool mode
for example by alerting it that something needs our attention. Many environmental stimuli
will activate both the hot and the cool mode and the resulting ‘bilateral’ influences are
mutually reinforcing such as when the sight of food activates the affective state of hunger
and the cognition ‘‘What shall I cook for dinner tonight?’’ (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue,
2004).
Most behavior therefore results from an interaction between the cool mode and the
hot mode. Evidence for this interaction comes from neuroscience as neural pathways run
both from the more primitive brain sections associated with hot affective processing, such
as the limbic system and the amygdala, to the prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for
cool deliberative processing, and vice versa (LeDoux, 1996, 2003). However, the hard-
wiring of the brain allows for an emotional reaction without the participation of a
cognitive appraisal, though not the other way around (LeDoux, 1996; Zajonc, 1998, 1980).
This means that if the cool system is not activated, behavior is entirely driven by the hot
system and affective motivations (LeDoux, 1996; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004;
Zajonc, 1980). This explains that in situations that trigger strong affect, for instance
situations giving rise to impulsive crimes of passion or road rage, offenders may not weigh
the pros and cons of alternative courses of action at all.
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Competition for Control
Due to their parallel operations, the two systems can compete for the control of overt
responses. For example, when the hedonic properties of immediate and long-term
consequences are negatively correlated, which is often the case with crime, the hot system
will cue a different behavioral response than the cool system (Pham, 2007). The cool
system may, for example, try to prevent the execution of a behavior that was impulsively
activated by the hot system. In other words, this potential divergence in responses explains
why we can think about something one way, e.g. ‘‘I really shouldn’t do it because it is too
risky’’, but feel about it differently, e.g. ‘‘I really want it, so I’ll just take my chances’’. In
addition, the fact that the hot mode is under stimulus control and therefore non-volitional
in nature explains why offenders may report having little control over their criminal
behavior (cf. Katz, 1988).
In short, if the cool system is unable to override the (antagonistic) response of the
hot system, the latter dominates and impulsive behavior ensues. Therefore, if the triggered
response of the hot system is intense enough, it leads to lapses in self-control, which has
been found to be an important correlate of crime, and even its defining element according
to some (e.g. Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). The assumption is that lapses in self-control
occur when the hot system temporarily takes over which leads behavior to be determined
by the immediate associations generated by stimuli and their hedonic properties, rather
than the assessed valence and probability of future consequences. Note that this implies
that individual differences in the ability to exert self-control are at least partially rooted in
the strength of the cool and hot modes (see Van Gelder & De Vries, 2012a).
Time-Perspective
Another, related, insight of the hot/cool framework is the difference in time-orientation of
the two systems, and their (in)ability to envisage future events. The cool mode can
mentally represent future events and generate a time perspective, which allows for an
understanding and evaluation of different alternative courses of action and developments
over time. As the cool system can take into account both short-term and long-term
payoffs, it enables individuals to resist immediate rewards and strive for more valuable
future outcomes.
As was mentioned before, the hot system is stimulus-oriented and triggered by
perceptual input. Its time horizon is restricted to the immediate present. The hot mode is,
consequently, set in motion by external stimuli, tied to the here-and-now and relatively
(long-term) goal independent. It lacks the capacity to represent the future and
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consequently the ability to evaluate the hypothetical consequences of behavior, such as the
legal or social sanctions that may follow a crime. When a behavioral response is generated
by the hot system, it may therefore appear reckless and impulsive. This sheds light on the
finding that people who commit crimes often engage in action that even though offering
immediate rewards, simultaneously entail the risk of costs greatly exceeding the benefits
(Hirschi, 2004). Because affective rules of valuation are geared to the here-and-now, it is
not difficult to see how this can lead to impulsive and self-defeating behavior in domains
where present and long-term hedonic consequences are negatively correlated.8 Or, in the
words of Bouffard et al. (2000), while the benefits of self-destructive conduct are generally
immediate, its costs are more remote.
In sum, in situations where intense emotions are at stake, decision behavior is likely
to violate the assumptions of rational choice and other strictly cognitive models of
decision making in different ways. The inability of the cool system to correct a self-
defeating response of the hot system explains the finding that people may act in ways that
run counter to their best interest. The shortening of one’s time horizon under the
influence of emotional arousal in which short term benefits are weighed disproportionately
in comparison to long-term considerations also contradicts rational choice theory, as the
costs of the action may fully outweigh the (long-term) benefits and individuals fail to make
informed trade-offs, or don’t succeed to act on them.
To sum up, the hot/cool perspective can explain why an individual may be perfectly
able to make informed trade-offs between immediate benefits and delayed costs of
behavior in one, emotionally-neutral, situation, but fails to do so in a subsequent one that
is affect-laden. Inconsistency in preferences over time, or even their reversal, leads to
behavior that is seemingly ‘irrational’, but cognitive decision making models have to stop
short of identifying the conditions that brought these inconsistencies about and why they
occur, while they make perfect ‘sense’ from a hot/cool perspective.
8
 It could be argued that the tendency to let short-term benefits prevail over long-term costs can be
brought under the explanatory scope of strictly cognitive models through the notion of hyperbolic
time discounting, i.e. the finding that people care more about the same time delay if it occurs
earlier than if it occurs at a later time. In other words, the value of a later reward is discounted by
a factor that increases with the length of the delay. That is, even though people normally choose
options that give substantial weight to long-term costs and benefits, when making decisions with
immediate consequences, they will tend to be place disproportionate weight on immediate costs
and benefits. However, Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) note that hyperbolic discounting has
significant limitations as an explanation for impulsivity for two reasons. First, it does not explain
why people display impulsive behavior in certain situations (e.g. when they are hungry, sexually
aroused, angry or frightened) but not in others. Thus, the hyperbolic discounting perspective has
difficulty accounting for situation- and reward-specific variations in impulsivity. Second,
hyperbolic discounting cannot explain why many situational features other than time, such as
physical proximity and sensory contact with the desired object commonly lead to impulsive
behavior (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003, p. 625).
35
Intense Arousal and Influence of Affective Drive States
LeDoux (1996) notes that emotions can flood consciousness because the hardwiring of the
brain is such that connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are
stronger than vice versa. Intense emotions may therefore overwhelm cognitive processing
and deliberative decision making (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). This influence can be so
pervasive that people can act against their self-interest even in full knowledge they are
doing so (Loewenstein, 1996). This conflict between emotional impulse and reasoned
cognition and the former overriding the behavioral response of the latter explains why
individuals can become unruly and impulsive when experiencing strong emotions, which
may result in criminal behavior. Expressive violence forms an apt illustration of this
process. Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) note that violence typically results when
someone becomes angry at a pressing stimulus. The anger, which implicates the hot mode,
keeps attention confined to the immediate, provoking situation and so efforts to restrain
violent impulses and consider the long-term, i.e. a corrective response by the cool mode,
becomes difficult. Mischel, Cantor and Feldman (1996), for example, observe that
physically abusive men typically are intensely invested in their intimate relationships.
Following a violent outburst, it is common for them to beg their partner for forgiveness
and, in extreme cases, go so far as to threaten with suicide in case the partner intends to
leave them. In other words, these men’s repetitive violent outbursts are clearly self-
defeating (Mischel, Cantor and Feldman, 1996).
In a similar vein, Collins (2008) relates about crimes that follow prolonged periods of
built up tension, such as police officers that severely beat up their victims after high-speed
chases and atrocities of soldiers committed against civilians. These crimes are committed
in an emotional rush that seems unstoppable and uncontrollable. After the outburst
follows the realization that the behavior was excessive: ‘‘It is like an altered state of
consciousness, from which the perpetrators often emerge at the end as if returning from
an alien self’’ (Collins, 2008, p. 100).
Findings from research into the influence of intense affect on behavior also apply to
visceral drive states such as drug craving (Loewenstein, 1996). A drug addict, for example,
when relapsing into addiction knows that ‘‘taking the drug is the wrong course of action,
but is unable to translate this belief into action’’ (Loewenstein, 1996, p. 272). Indeed, there
is no dearth of evidence that many crimes, such as robberies, burglaries and other types of
street crime, are drug-related, either committed under the influence of drugs and/or with
the goal of obtaining drugs (e.g. Cromwell et al., 2003; Gill, 2000; Shover & Honaker,
1992; Wright & Decker, 1994, 1997).
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Sexual arousal is another example of an affective state that exerts a strong influence
on behavior and that may result in criminal behavior (Bouffard, 2002; Loewenstein, Nagin
& Paternoster, 1997; Ariely & Loewenstein 2006). In an experimental study using a date
rape scenario, Loewenstein et al. (1997) found that sexually aroused participants were
more likely to imagine that they would behave in a sexually forcefully manner on a date
than did non-aroused participants. The effect of arousal on predicted behavior was not
mediated by a wide range of cost and benefit variables. Arousal, therefore, not only
influenced the way costs and benefits were processed, but also exerted a direct effect on
behavior. This finding is consistent with the assumption of the hot/cool perspective that
affect and cognition pertain to separate paths of mental processing that influence behavior,
and that feelings not only influence behavior indirectly, but can also exert a direct effect on
behavior.
Failure to Acknowledge the Influence of Affect on Behavior: Implications for
practice
An important characteristic of affect and other drive states is that people are often
oblivious of their influence. More specifically, individuals in an emotionally neutral, or
‘cold’, state tend to systematically underestimate the effect intense affect, the ‘hot’ state,
can have on their future behavior and preferences, and the influence it has had on their
past behavior (Loewenstein, 1996). The inability of individuals to appreciate the
motivational force of affect can lead them to overestimate their capacity to control
temptation (Loewenstein, 2005; Nordgren, Van der Pligt & Van Harreveld, 2009). This
finding has important implications for practice.
A failure to acknowledge the influence of affect on previous behavior and unrealistic
optimism regarding one’s ability to control impulses in future situations, may imply that
convicted offenders fail to optimally utilize their possibilities to protect themselves against
the temptations of crime and may return to situations that contributed to their initial
offenses, even if they are committed to abstain from offending (Dhami et al., 2006). In
other words, for crimes committed in states of intense arousal, not only is (anticipated)
punishment less likely to achieve the desired deterrent effects, even offenders motivated to
abstain from criminal behavior are likely to underestimate the influence their feelings have
on their behavior. Therefore, they may fail to take the necessary measures to avoid certain
situations or deal with intense affective states when these emerge. In a similar vein, for
treatment to be successful, it may be crucial to strengthen the offender’s awareness of the
processes in the onset of negative affect (Day, 2009). Indeed, Howells and Day (2006)
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have argued that successfully engaging in treatment requires (violent) offenders to
experience and accurately label their emotional states (see also: Howells, Day & Wright,
2004).9
This implies that impulsive or hot (state) crimes may require a fundamentally
different response from the criminal justice system to prevent offenders from reoffending,
than cognitive, calculated offenses. For offenders motivated to abstain from future
offending, it is more useful to create awareness of the influence of affect and people’s
inability to resist impulses, rather than placing faith in the unlikely assumption that in the
future, after punishment, adequate cost-benefit calculations will be made in similar
situations. If people are made aware of how their decisions are being influenced by their
own affective state, they could (be trained to) compensate for such influences, which
requires the cool mode to inhibit the response cued by the hot mode. Indeed cognitive
behavioral interventions often promote emotional regulation skills through effortful
overriding impulsive and automatic response tendencies (Mischel, 2004). Relatedly, anger
management programs generally attempt to increase inhibitory processes and control angry
responses (Davey, Day & Howells, 2005).
To take the example of anger, Davey et al. (2005) note that ‘reappraisal’ of an anger-
inducing event is a cognitive strategy of re-construing it in less hostile terms such that the
anger is not experienced. In this case the reinterpretation of the event will avoid triggering
a strong response from the hot mode by changing the meaning of the eliciting event and
hence the appraisal tendencies associated with anger. An alternative strategy is suppression
of the anger (e.g. biting one’s lip) to inhibit angry behavior (Davey et el., 2005). Here the
idea is to directly suppress the response of the hot mode instead of attempting to avoid its
activation. Both strategies are compatible with the hot/cool perspective laid out in this
chapter. Whereas emotion regulation regards the inhibition of the hot mode, thinking in
more logical and objective ways implies strengthening the cool mode. In sum, self-
regulatory competencies and ‘cooling’ strategies can help enable crime-prone individuals to
overcome diverse momentary ‘hot’ situational pressures and prevent impulsive responding
(e.g., LeDoux, 1996; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). In
spite of the fact that many offender treatment programs are sensitive to the influence of
emotions on offending behavior, others are still based on the assumption that offenders
make essentially rational choices about their offending (Day, 2009, p. 119; Ward, 1999).
9
 Note that this points towards individuals differences in the strength of the hot and the cool mode
in individuals.
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DISCUSSION&CONCLUSION
Earlier work on emotions and offending has remained largely confined to narrative or
interpretative approaches or has addressed affect as an enduring individual disposition.
Studies relying on self-reports by offenders are highly informative for our understanding
of crime but are unlikely to give full insight into the mechanisms of affect influencing
choice as people are often not even aware of this influence, not to mention other
problems associated with recall and self-report methods. Theories that address the role of
affect as an enduring characteristic tell us a lot about stable differences in individual
disposition but are not able shed light on the actual choice process. Previous studies have
therefore been somewhat restricted in their ability to explain this behavior and give little
insight into the psychological states of offenders.
This chapter introduced an alternative perspective that extends the dominant choice
paradigms in criminology. By drawing from other fields of human decision making such as
social psychology, behavioral economics and neuroscience, an alternative framework that
is able to incorporate rational choice-based perspectives and addresses the role of
emotions was developed. It was shown that this hot/cool perspective is able to explain
delinquent behaviors that cannot be accommodated in terms of rational choices and
provides a more realistic account of the criminal decision process.
The hot/cool approach illuminates why notions such as sanction severity and celerity
often have little or no effect on crime rates and why the effect of punishment certainty is
only modest (see Nagin, 1998). As was argued in this chapter, feelings about risk are largely
insensitive to changes in probability and (severity of) outcomes or social costs, implying
that deterrence is unlikely to be effective when transgressions are intimately associated
with affect. In these cases, short-term considerations outweigh or obscure long-term
consequences in the mind of the offender as the influence of affect ties his/her focus to
the immediate present, and as such encourage making the (criminal) choice that yields
immediate benefit. Even in cases in which individuals display a general motivation to
abstain from offending, the only thing required to (re-)offend may be a ‘weak moment’
and rational considerations to be temporarily overridden by affects’ desires.
Ironically, while absent in contemporary choice models of criminal decision making,
the distinction between hot affect and cool cognition is not alien to our criminal justice
systems and has had implications for the way crimes are punished. The classic distinction
is that between premeditated and impulsive crime, which implies that hot-blooded crimes
of passion resulting in death are viewed as fundamentally different from, and therefore
deservant of less harsh punishment, than cold-blooded murder. For the criminal justice
system to classify an intentional killing as voluntary manslaughter, instead of murder, what
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is required is a reasonable provocation, that a reasonable person so provoked would not
have cooled off in the time interval between the provocation and the delivery of the fatal
blow, and that the defendant must not in fact have cooled off during that interval (LaFave
& Scott, 1986, p. 654). The parallels with the hot/cool perspective are striking. The first
condition refers to an external stimulus eliciting the behavior (recall the hot mode being
non-volitional and under stimulus control), whereas the second and third conditions refer
to the (in)ability of the cool system to inhibit the response cued by the hot system. In
other words, the idea that emotional arousal can inhibit rational thinking and the ability to
act willfully, has been intuitively grasped and accepted by our criminal justice systems.
The hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making implies a significant advance
over rational choice and deterrence models as it offers a more complete and plausible
explanation of criminal choice behavior and the psychological mechanisms at stake. It is
able to explain many types of crime and how people actually go about making criminal
choices without having to resort to rather artificial or farfetched constructions that force
classification into a rational versus irrational dichotomy or continuum.
Nevertheless, the hot/cool perspective is still general in nature and requires empirical
testing. Finding out how the two systems actually interact with respect to different
situations, personality types, and kinds of crime is the next big empirical challenge for
research in criminal decision making. While much work within social psychology,
neuroscience and behavioral economics supports the dual-process idea for different
domains of human behavior, it still requires testing in research on crime and delinquency.
Criminal behavior cannot simply be equated with risky behavior in other domains if only
because the former contains a strong moral dimension that the latter lacks and crimes vary
in terms of the degree to which they implicate risk. Furthermore, the fact that criminal acts
carry significant consequences for others, e.g. victims, implies they are related to individual
differences in empathy, which is often not the case in other risk domains. It is interesting
to remark here that empathy too has both a cognitive and an affective component, the
former expressed in individuals’ ability to recognize and understand the feelings of others
and the latter in the ability to actually experience these feelings imaginatively. Future
research should therefore focus on individual differences in the ability to which people are
susceptible to be led by their feelings. This begs the question as to what extent volitional
processes in the cool mode can actually be used to inhibit or channel impulses from a hot
mode that seeks immediate satisfaction, and whether, and to what extent, people can be
trained to compensate for influences of their hot mode. Hopefully, the hot/cool
perspective can function as a point of departure for research that addresses these and
other issues.
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3 EVALUATING A DUAL-PROCESS MODEL OF RISK:
AFFECT AND COGNITION AS DETERMINANTS OF
RISKY CHOICE10
Abstract
In three studies we addressed the impact of perceived risk and negative affect on risky
choice. In Study 1, we tested a model that included both perceived risk and negative affect
as predictors of risky choice. Study 2 and Study 3 replicated these findings and examined
the impact of affective versus cognitive processing modes. In all three studies both
perceived risk and negative affect were shown to be significant predictors of risky choice.
Furthermore, Study 2 and Study 3 showed that an affective processing mode strengthened
the relation between negative affect and risky choice and that a cognitive processing mode
strengthened the relation between perceived risk and risky choice. Together, these findings
show support for the idea of a dual-process model of risky choice.
10 Based on Van Gelder, De Vries & Van der Pligt (2009)
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INTRODUCTION
When informing about a risk, how likely is the appeal to ‘use one’s head’ to succeed when
the evaluation of that risk appears to be more of a ‘feeling thing’? Is information about the
low probability of risks that trigger strong affective reactions (e.g. flying, terrorist attack)
likely to have a comforting effect? Conversely, is it likely that probabilistic information is
discomforting enough to persuade individuals not to engage in certain risky behaviour (i.e.
drinking and driving, unprotected intercourse)? Or are appeals better directed at
influencing feelings in these cases? In this chapter we address the effects of both cognition
and affect as determinants of risky choice and examine how and to what extent ‘cool’
cognitive considerations of and ‘hot’ feeling-based reactions to risky choice can influence
the way we process risk.
Standard decision theories have generally assumed people to decide on a certain
course of action by making a mental calculation that incorporates the probability of the
outcomes of a decision together with an evaluation of these outcomes. In the case of risky
choice, people are supposed to combine the perceived severity of the outcomes of a
choice with the perceived probability of their occurrence (e.g. Yates & Stone, 1992;
Hendrickx, Vlek & Oppewal, 1989; Vlek & Stallen, 1981). Deviations from these
normative approaches have traditionally been accommodated in terms of cognitive biases,
errors or the use of heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Simon, 1957; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). More recent literature has also started addressing the possible role of
affect as a determinant of risky choice.
One example is research that focused on the role of anticipated emotions such as
disappointment and regret arising from the counterfactual comparisons of potential
decision outcomes (Bell, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; 1986; Mellers, Schwarz, Ho &
Ritov, 1999). However, the regret perspective focuses on anticipated emotions that come
into play only after a choice has been made, rather than emotions present at the time of
the decision and “(…) the decision-making process in these theories is still modeled as the
implicitly cognitive task of predicting the nature and strength of future emotions in
response to possible decision outcomes and weighing them according to their likelihood of
occurring” (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee & Welch, 2001, p. 268).
Other research has addressed the direct influence of affect on how we evaluate risks.
Johnson and Tversky (1983), for example, found that mood can influence individuals’ risk
judgments. People who were induced to feel positive affect made more optimistic risk
estimates than people who were made to experience negative affect (Johnson & Tversky,
1983). Lerner and Keltner (2001) studied the influence of discrete emotions on risk
perception and found fear and anger, both negatively valenced emotions, to have opposite
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effects. Angry people expressed more optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices
than did fearful individuals.
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & Johnson (2000) provide evidence for an ‘affect
heuristic’, which refers to the tendency to use an overall affective impression when making
decisions. This, in their view, can be more efficient than weighing the different pros and
cons of the situation because the reliance on affect helps to respond quickly and effectively
in many decision situations, in particular when a judgment or decision is complex and
mental resources are limited (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic, Peters, Finucane & MacGregor,
2005). The notion that individuals often rely on their feelings when faced with a decision
and that affective reactions come prior to decisions and judgments was earlier proposed by
Zajonc, who argued that “feeling accompanies all cognitions” (1980, p. 154).
The possible interplay between cognition and affect has been prominent in dual-
process theories of information processing (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994;
Sloman, 1996), which revolve around the idea that when people make judgments and
decisions or engage in problem solving, two qualitatively different modes of processing are
operative. Some of these theories make the distinction between automatic versus more
controlled modes of processing, whereas others argue for a more cognition-based versus a
more affect-based processing mode (e.g. Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994).  Epstein
(1994), for example, distinguishes an experiential system which is intimately associated
with affect, “but not to the exclusion of all non-affective cognitions” (p. 713), from a
rational system which is “relatively affect free” (p. 711).
Recent theorizing on risky decision making draws from dual-process theories by
arguing that there are two different modes in which risks are evaluated, one based more on
deliberate and analytical considerations (as supposed by cognitive decision making
perspectives), the other based on intuitive, relatively fast, and affect-based reasoning (e.g.
Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Slovic, Peters, Finucane & MacGregor,
2005). In a recent paper, Slovic and collaborators termed these two ways in which risks are
perceived and acted on as ‘risk-as-analysis’ and ‘risk-as-feelings’ respectively (Slovic, et al.,
2005). The dual-process approaches to risky choice thus share the idea of two modes of
processing that interact and that are continually active, but respond to different
characteristics of a situation. The cognitive mode is supposed to be sensitive to risk
considerations such as outcomes and probabilities, whereas the feeling-based mode
responds to affective considerations, and is not responsive to probabilities (Slovic et al.,
2005). The fact that the different processing modes respond to different characteristics of
a situation also illuminates why affective reactions to risky situations and decisions can
diverge from cognitive considerations: “People can experience powerful fears about things
that they recognize as highly unlikely (such as airplane crashes) or not objectively terrible
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(such as public speaking); in contrast, many experience little fear about hazards that are
both more likely and probably more severe (such as car accidents)” (Loewenstein et al.,
2001, p. 269).
The dual-process notion of risky choice is compatible with the ‘risk-as-feelings’
hypothesis by Loewenstein and collaborators, which also acknowledges the role of affect
as well as probability and outcome valences in the decision making process, and argues
that affect influences decision making amongst others through the interaction with
cognition where the former influences the latter and vice versa (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
One of the principal assumptions of the risk-as-feelings hypothesis is that “[t]he impact of
cognitive evaluations on behaviour is mediated, at least in part, by affective responses
(cognitive evaluation gives rise to feelings that in turn affect behaviour)” (p. 271).
In sum, studies have shown that both cognitive considerations and affective
reactions can influence risk perception and risky choice. Furthermore, there is empirical
support for the idea of two parallel modes of information processing in a variety of
domains, including judgment and decision making. However, 1) the case for the dual-
process approach applied to risky choice has been made, but not tested. Additionally, 2)
little is known as to what extent people can be induced to rely more on either their feelings
or their thoughts when faced with a risky choice. Both of these two issues form the
objectives of the present chapter. We present a model that includes and simultaneously
tests cognitive considerations and negative affect as predictors of risky choice and examine
how the two are related by manipulating them separately.
In Study 1, we investigated the role of perceived risk and negative affect as predictors
of risky choice using vignettes in which risky situations are described. We expected both
perceived risk and negative affect to be significant predictors of risky choice.
STUDY 1
METHOD
Participants and procedure
Participants were 231 undergraduate students (68 males, 163 females) with a mean age of
22.5 years (SD=6.1 years) from the University of Amsterdam who participated for course
credit. Participants were randomly presented one of two booklet versions, each containing
two vignettes and two questionnaires. Within each booklet the order in which the vignettes
were presented was counterbalanced. The booklets started with a short introduction in
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which the participants were told they would read about two risky choice situations, and
asked to answer the questions pertaining to the descriptions.
Materials
The vignettes contained a description of a personally relevant risky situation of about 8-10
lines (see Appendix). The topics of the vignettes ranged from riding in a car with a driver
who has been drinking (Drink ‘n Drive), flying with an airline that has been warned for the
bad maintenance of their aircraft (Airplane), biking on slippery streets (Exams) and
running the risk of being fined for not carrying an ID (Going Out). An attempt was made
to design vignettes that were personally relevant for the participants and that varied both
in terms of the nature of the risk and the severity of its consequences (e.g. getting a fine,
suffering severe injuries). The ‘Drink ‘n Drive’ scenario, for example, read:
“Imagine the following: You are at a birthday party an hour’s drive from your
home. You agreed with a friend, with whom you are at the party, that he/she
would drive you back home since you don’t have a drivers licence. When the
party is over, you notice that your friend is quite drunk. There is nobody at the
party from your hometown who can give you a ride, and there is no public
transport. You deliberately stayed sober because you have an important job
interview in the morning”.
Each vignette was followed by eight items measuring perceived risk, negative affect and
the dependent variable, risky choice. In all cases bipolar 9-point scales were used. Two
items measured perceived risk. One item pertained to risk probability: “How big are the
chances of X happening (e.g. having an accident)?” (very small - very big). The other item
concerned risk magnitude: “How serious are the possible consequences of X (e.g. getting
into the car with your friend driving)?” (not serious at all – very serious). The perceived risk
score was obtained by multiplying these two items in correspondence with the formal
definition of risk (Loewenstein, et al.,2001; Yates, 1992).
Four items measured negative affect: “Would you be worried in this situation?”,
“Does the situation make you feel uncertain?”, “Does the situation evoke feelings of fear?”
and “Does the situation evoke negative feelings in general?” (not at all – very much).
Cronbach’s alpha for the different negative affect scales ranged from .83 to .92. The
outcome variable, risky choice, was measured with two items.
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Table 3.1 Descriptives of perceived risk, negative affect and risky choice (Study 1)
Airplane Exams Drink ‘n Drive Going Out
Variables M (SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD)
1. Perceived risk 32.05 (19.13) 31.46  (17.36) 42.78(19.15) 39.28(19.28)
2. Negative affect 6.26 (1.98) 4.80 (1.74) 6.81(1.51) 5.37(1.56)
3. Risky choice 5.19 (17.06) 19.41 (14.14) -9.39(18.29) 7.29(17.52)
Note: The labels “Airplane”, “Exams”, “Drink ‘n Drive”, and “Going Out” refer to the vignettes used. The
possible range of the different scales is explained in the text.
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The first item inquired about the likelihood that the participant would engage in the risky
behaviour: “How likely is it that you would go for option/do X (e.g. get into the car with
your friend driving)?” (very unlikely – very likely). The second item measured certainty: “How
certain are you about this?” (not at all - completely). The likelihood item was recoded to a
scale that ranged from -4 to +4 and the risky choice score was computed by multiplying
the recoded likelihood item with the certainty item, so that the scores could range from -36
to +36.
Table 3.2 Correlations of perceived risk, negative affect and risky choice
(Study 1)
Airplane Drink ‘n Drive
Variables 1 2 3 1 2 3
1. Perceived risk -- --
2. Negative affect .66** -- .66** --
3. Risky choice -.50** -.53** -- -.51** -.50** --
Exams Going Out
1. Perceived risk -- --
2. Negative affect .59** -- .56** --
3. Risky choice -.51** -.49** -- -.45** -.51** --
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
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RESULTS
In Table 3.1, the means and standard deviations of perceived risk, negative affect and the
outcome variable risky choice for each of the four vignettes are displayed. In Table 3.2, the
correlations between the predictor variables and the risky choice are shown. All of the
correlations in each of the four vignettes are significant at p<.01.
To test for the relations between perceived risk and negative affect on the one hand
and risky choice on the other, in all four vignettes at once we conducted multigroup
structural equation modeling (SEM) using AMOS 7.0 (Arbuckle, 2006). We constructed
three latent variables, of which negative affect was measured using four indicators,
perceived risk was measured using one indicator based on the probability x magnitude
multiplication, and risky choice likewise was measured using one indicator based on the
likelihood x certainty multiplication (see method section). Because no reliability
information was available for the two multiplicative indicators, we fixed the measurement
weights linking perceived risk and risky choice to their respective indicators to be equal to
one.
We compared 8 different SEM models (see Table 3.3): 1) a model in which none
of the variables were related to each other (the independent model), 2) a model in which
the hypothesized relations between the variables (see Figure 3.1) were allowed to vary
between the four vignettes (the unconstrained model), 3) a model in which the
measurement weights were fixed to be equal across the four vignettes, but the rest of the
parameters were free across the four vignettes (the measurement weights model (3a)), 4) a
model in which both the measurement weights and the structural paths connecting the
latent exogenous variables to the latent endogenous variable were fixed to be equal across
the four vignettes (the structural weights model (3b)), 5) a model in which all previous
weights and all structural variances and covariance were fixed to be equal across the four
vignettes (the structural (co)variances model (3c)), 6) a model in which all previous weights
and (co)variances and the structural residual (ζ1) were fixed to be equal across the four
vignettes (the structural residuals model (3d)), and 7) a model in which all parameters (i.e.,
including the measurement residuals (δ and ε)) were fixed to be equal across the four
vignettes (the measurement residuals model (3e)).
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Figure 3.1 Standardized estimates in the structural residuals model of relations between perceived risk, negative
affect, and risky choice in Study 1 (see text for explanation)
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Table 3.3 Comparison of Fit Indices of different models in Study 1
χ2 df p TLI RMSEA 90% CI p-close PCFI
1. Independent 1538.79 60 .00 .00 .232 .222-.242 .00 .00
2. Unconstrained 73.55 32 .00 .95 .053 .037-.069 .35 .52
3. Constrained
  a) Measurement weights (λ’s) 84.45 41 .00 .96 .048 .033-.063 .57 .66
  b) 3a + Structural weights (γ’s) 92.73 47 .00 .96 .046 .032-.060 .66 .76
  c) 3b + Structural (co)variances (Φ) 108.83 56 .00 .96 .045 .032-.058 .71 .90
  d) 3c + Structural residuals (Ψ) 117.67 59 .00 .96 .047 .034-.059 .66 .94
  e) 3d + Measurement residuals (Θδ) 209.14 71 .00 .92 .065 .055-.075 .01 1.07
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In Table 3.3, the results of the analyses on the seven models are described. Based
on the fit indices, we selected a model with a Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) of .90 or above, a
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of .05 or below, or if not possible, a
p-close value of .01 or higher, and preferably a Parsimony Comparative Fit Index (PCFI)
of .90 or above. Furthermore, we compared the different models described above using a
significance test of the increase in χ2 when additional parameters were fixed. A significant
increase in χ2 signifies that constrained (nested) models are significantly worse.
Considering the parsimony of nested models, we used a somewhat conservative value of
p<.01 for the significance test. Applied to the nested models in Table 3.3, we found that
model 3a was not significantly worse than model 2 (Δχ2(df=9)=10.91, p=.28), model 3b was
not significantly worse than model 3a (Δχ2(df=6)=8.28, p=.22), model 3c was not
significantly worse than model 3b (Δχ2(df=9)=16.10, p=.07), model 3d was not significantly
worse at the p<.01 level than model 3c (Δχ2(df=3)=8.84, p=.03), but model 3e was
significantly worse than model 3d (Δχ2(df=12)=91.47, p<.01).
On grounds of parsimony combined with the other fit indices, the structural
residuals model (model 3d, see Table 3.3) appears to be the ‘best’ model. This model is
shown in Figure 3.1. Because the measurement residuals were not equal across vignettes,
the range (instead of the exact values) of the measurement weights (λ's) linking negative
affect with its indicators are shown. However, differences in measurement residuals across
groups do not affect the structural paths from the latent exogenous variables to the latent
endogenous variable. The standardized structural coefficient linking negative affect and
risky choice (γ=-.36) and the standardized structural coefficient linking perceived risk and
risky choice (γ=-.26) were found to be significant at p<.01. Additionally, there was a
significant relation between negative affect and perceived risk (φ=.64, p<.01).
CONCLUSION
Study 1 examined the influence of negative affect and perceived risk on risky choice in a
straightforward manner. In all four vignettes, perceived risk and negative affect were found
to be significantly negatively related to risky choice. However, Study 1 did not include any
manipulations of cognitions or affect, and consequently, it is therefore yet unclear under
what circumstances the effects of cognitions and affect can be strengthened or reduced. In
Study 2, we aimed to replicate these findings and to provide further support for a
distinction between affect and cognition by experimentally manipulating the salience of
affective versus more cognitive information.
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STUDY 2
According to Higgins (1996), activated knowledge affects our judgments when that
knowledge is related to the stimulus information because it has become more accessible.
When knowledge is activated, it increases the likelihood that this knowledge will be used in
some way and therefore influences subsequent responses to stimuli (Higgins, 1996;
Higgins, Rholes & Jones, 1977). An interesting question in this respect regards the extent
to which it is possible to render cognition or affect more salient through the description of
a risky situation and whether this could influence the evaluation of the situation reflecting
the salience of either the affective or the cognitive component. Sunstein (2003), for
instance, found that people were willing to pay more for the elimination of a certain risk
(i.e. risk of cancer due to arsenic in drinking water) when having read a description of the
risk that contained an added sentence with vivid terms, than people who just read the
‘plain’ description. This implies that the way in which risks are described can influence the
judgment of risks. Furthermore, Hendrickx, Vlek & Oppewal (1989) found that people
judged risks as more probable and were also less inclined to make risky choices when
presented with information on how a future loss or accident might occur than when
presented with information about the relative frequency of similar accidents in the past.
The explanation for this effect according to Loewenstein et al. (2001) is that the vividness
of the imagery evoked by the description of potential future losses, as opposed to ‘cold’
frequency estimates, is an important determinant of emotional reactions and is therefore
likely to also trigger changes in risk perception and decisions.
In a recent study, Berndsen & Van der Pligt (2005) studied the impact of an affective
focus versus a cognitive focus on risk perception and acceptance of meat consumption by
presenting participants with risk descriptions in bogus newspaper articles phrased in either
more affective or more cognitive terms. Based on the ideas put forward by Higgins et al.
(1977), they expected that exposure to cognitive or affective stimulus information would
affect perceptions of health risks and found that an affective focus had a stronger impact
than a more cognitive focus.
In Study 2, we investigated whether adding cognitive versus affective information to
a description of a risk can make this information more predictive of risky choice. We
expected a stronger relation between negative affect and risky choice in the affect
condition, and a stronger relation between perceived risk and risky choice in the cognition
condition.
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METHOD
Participants and procedure
A total of 193 undergraduate students, 56 men and 137 women, from the University of
Amsterdam with a mean age of 20.6 years (SD=2.9 years) participated for course credit.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the cognition or the affect condition and
received a booklet with two vignettes, the order of which was again counterbalanced.
Participants were randomly assigned to an individual cubicle where the booklets were
included in a set of unrelated questionnaires.
Materials
We used two of the vignettes (Drink ‘n Drive and Going Out) from Study 1. The two
vignettes were supplemented with two sentences of extra information that were intended
to render either cognition or affect salient. The sentences were almost identical except for
two references to either cognition-related words (e.g. references to frequencies or
probabilities) or affect-laden words (e.g. references to feelings and emotions). This
information contained no references to either the likelihood or the severity of the risk
itself and the added text was related to the risk description, but purposefully ambiguous.
For the ‘Drink ‘n Drive’ vignette presented earlier the added information in the cognition
condition read:
The number of people that drive with a too high blood alcohol
concentration has decreased in recent years. The reason for this is not so
much the possibility of getting a fine, but rather the chance of having an
accident.
In the affect condition it read:
The anxiety of people for driving with a too high blood alcohol
concentration has increased in recent years. The reason for this is not so
much the possibility of getting a fine, but rather people’s worries about
having an accident.
The items and scales for the predictor and outcome variables were identical to the ones
used in Study 1. Cronbach’s alpha for the negative affect scales was .87 for Drink ‘n Drive,
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and .96 for Going Out. Finally, in order to assess the perceived strength of the cognitive
and affective manipulations, participants were asked how convincing they found the
vignettes and to what extent they could imagine themselves being in the described
situation.
RESULTS
One participant indicated not to have participated seriously and was excluded from further
analyses. The strength of the manipulations was measured with t-tests. No differences
were found between the conditions for either the item measuring the extent to which the
vignette was convincing or the item pertaining to the extent to which the risky situation
was imaginable. From this we conclude that the intensity of the manipulations was equal
for both the affect and cognition conditions and the results therefore cannot be attributed
to differences in intensity of the cognition or affect manipulation. Furthermore, as can be
seen in Table 3.4, there were no significant differences in means between conditions for
the predictor variables and the outcome variable for either vignette. In Table 3.4, moderate
to strong correlations are shown between the predictor variables, negative affect and
perceived risk and the outcome variable risky choice for both vignettes.
We predicted that in the cognition condition, perceived risk would be more strongly
related to risky choice relative to the affect condition, whereas negative affect would be
more strongly related to risky choice in the affect condition, relative to the cognition
condition. As in Study 1, to test this prediction we used multigroup structural equation
modelling (SEM) using AMOS 7.0 (Arbuckle, 2006).
We again considered eight different models. In some of these models we freed up the
structural paths linking the exogenous latent variables negative affect and perceived risk
with the endogenous latent variable risky choice across the two experimental conditions to
check whether these models fared better than models in which these paths were
constrained to be equal across the two experimental conditions to check whether these
models fared better than models in which these paths were constrained to be equal across
the two experimental conditions.
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Table 3.4 Descriptives and correlations of perceived risk, negative affect and risky choice for Drink ‘n Drive and
Going Out (Study 2)
Variables
Drink ‘n Drive
M(SD)
Going Out
M(SD)
Cognition1 Affect2 Cognition1 Affect2 1 2 3
1. Perceived risk 41.95(18.83) 44.88(18.24) 40.69(18.66) 42.21(20.31) -- .59** -.60**
2. Negative affect 6.89(1.60) 7.19(1.55) 5.56(1.73) 5.83(1.77)  .42** -- -.61**
4. Risky choice -8.7(17.79) -12.73(18.00) 5.20(15.59) 2.28(19.49) -.51** -.49** --
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01; 1= cognition condition, 2 = affect condition; correlations of both conditions in the Drink ‘n Drive sample
are shown above the diagonal; those of both conditions in the Going Out sample are shown below the diagonal. The possible range
of the different scales is explained in the text.
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The first three SEM models we considered (models 1, 2, and 3a, see Table 5) are the same
as the SEM models considered in Table 3.3 of Study 1. However, in the fourth model
(model 3b) we allowed the structural paths in the affect condition to be different from the
structural paths in the cognition condition. Note that the structural paths between the
vignettes in the same condition were fixed to be equal. The fifth (3b) and sixth (3c) models
were similar to model 3b but now with additional structural (co)variances (3b) or structural
(co)variances plus structural residuals (3c) fixed to be equal across the vignettes. The
seventh (3d) model was equal to model 3d, but now the two parameters which were freed
up across the two conditions in model 3b, 3c, and 3d were fixed to be equal. In model
eight (3f), all parameters were constrained to be equal across vignettes similar to model 3e
in study 1 (Table 3.3). The results are reported in Table 3.5. Similar fit indices and cut-off
points were used as in Study 1, i.e., TLI >.90, RMSEA<.05 or p-close>.01, and a
PCFI>.90.
Additionally, we checked whether consecutive models in Table 5 were not less worse
(i.e., ‘better’ because more parsimonious) than the previous models. This resulted in the
following model improvements/deteriorations. Model 3a was not significantly worse than
model 2 (Δχ2(df=9)=15.77, p=.07), model 3b was not significantly worse than model 3a
(Δχ2(df=4)=2.44, p=.66), model 3c was not significantly worse than model 3b
(Δχ2(df=9)=10.55, p=.31), model 3d was not significantly worse than model 3c
(Δχ2(df=3)=3.56, p=.31), but model 3e was significantly worse than model 3d
(Δχ2(df=2)=12.23, p<.01), and model 3f was significantly worse than model 3e
(Δχ2(df=12)=146.28, p<.01). Based on these model comparisons, the fit indices and
parsimony, the structural residuals model with the structural paths freed across the two
(cognition and affect) conditions (model 3d, see Table 3.5) appears to be the ‘best’ model.
This model is represented in Figure 3.2.
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Table 3.5 Comparison of Fit Indices of different models in Study 2
χ2 df p TLI RMSEA 90% CI p-close PCFI
1. Independent 1420.15 60 .00 .00 .244 .233-.255 .00 .00
2. Unconstrained 49.39 32 .03 .98 .038 .014-.058 .83 .53
3. Constrained
  a) Measurement weights (λ’s) 65.17 41 .01 .97 .039 .020-.057 .83 .67
  b) 3a + Structural weights (2 γ’s free: see text) 67.60 45 .02 .98 .036 .016-.053 .90 .74
  c) 3b + Structural (co)variances (Φ) 78.15 54 .02 .98 .034 .015-.050 .95 .88
  d) 3c + Structural residuals (Ψ) 81.70 57 .02 .98 .034 .015-.049 .96 .93
  e) 3d + 2 γ’s constrained 93.93 59 .00 .97 .039 .024-.054 .88 .96
  f) 3e + Measurement residuals (Θδ) 240.21 71 .00 .89 .079 .068-.090 .00 1.04
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Figure 3.2 Standardized estimates in the structural residuals model of relations between perceived risk, negative
affect, and risky choice in Study 2 (see text for explanation)
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Again, as in Study 1, because the measurement residuals were not found to be equal across
vignettes, we report the range of values of the measurement weights (λ's) linking negative
affect with its indicators. In Figure 3.2, the values of the standardized structural paths in
the two conditions are also shown. The leftmost value of the standardized structural paths
is associated with the cognitive condition, the rightmost value with the affect condition.
All of the values reported are significant at p<.01. As can be seen, in the cognitive
condition the standardized path coefficient linking perceived risk and risky choice (γ=-.46)
was stronger than in the affect condition (γ=-.27). Additionally, in the cognitive condition
the standardized path coefficient linking negative affect and risky choice (γ=-.20) was
weaker than in the affect condition (γ=-.51). Because this model (3d, see Table 3.5) was
significantly better than a model in which these parameters were constrained to be equal
(model 3e), we can conclude that our expectations were confirmed.
CONCLUSION
The results again showed both negative affect and perceived risk to be significantly related
to risky choice. Furthermore, in line with our expectations, it was shown that in the
cognition condition, perceived risk was more strongly related to risky choice relative to the
affect condition, whereas negative affect was more strongly related to risky choice in the
affect condition, relative to the cognition condition, thereby providing further support for
a dual-process model of risky choice. However, Study 2 contained an obtrusive
manipulation of cognitive and affective modes. In Study 3, we investigated whether it is
possible to get similar results using an unobtrusive manipulation.
STUDY 3
In Study 3 we examined whether activating a cognitive or affective processing mode by
means of a priming task also leads to risk evaluation primarily based on cognition or affect.
Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) primed a cognitive processing mode (‘valuation by
calculation) by asking participants to answer questions that required conscious and
deliberate calculation and an affective processing mode (‘valuation by feeling’) by
presenting participants questions that required them to examine and report their feelings.
They found that valuation by calculation made people sensitive to variations in scope,
whereas valuation by feeling made people insensitive to scope, but sensitive to the
presence or absence of a stimulus instead.
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In another recent study, the impact of affect and cognition was investigated in the
context of attitudes (Van den Berg, Manstead, Van der Pligt & Wigboldus, 2006). They
attempted to activate either a cognitive or affective processing mode in an unobtrusive
manner by priming words related to affect (e.g. the word ‘feeling’) or cognition (e.g. the
word ‘thinking’). In Study 3, we adopted this approach and investigated whether this less
obtrusive manipulation of processing mode results in risk evaluations on either a more
cognitive or more affective basis. Finding evidence for this assumption lends further
support to the risk-as-feelings versus risk-as-analysis distinction and is also in line with
other dual-process approaches, providing additional evidence for the two suggested ways
in which risks can be evaluated.
To prime processing mode, participants were asked to solve a word-search puzzle
that contained words that were related to either affect or to cognition. Subsequently, in a
supposedly unrelated experiment, participants were presented two of the vignettes used in
Study 1 (Airplane and Exams). The expectations were similar to those of Study 2. Negative
Affect was expected to be a better predictor of risky choice when participants are induced
to use a more affective processing mode. Similar expectations apply to the cognitive
processing mode; in this mode we expected cognitive appraisal of risk to more strongly
predict risky choice relative to affective appraisal of risk. In sum, primed processing mode
should enhance the relations between the appraisal of risk in that mode and risky choice.
METHOD
Participants and procedure
A total of 201 undergraduate students, 58 male and 143 female, with an average age of
20.2 years (SD=2.1 years) from the University of Amsterdam participated for course
credit. Participants were randomly assigned to either the cognition or affect condition.
Within these conditions, participants were again randomly presented one of two booklet
versions containing two vignettes in counterbalanced order. The puzzle and the risk
vignettes were included in a set of questionnaires that, aside from the materials used in the
present study, were unrelated.
Materials
To prime processing mode and make either affect or cognition salient, participants worked
for five minutes on a word-search puzzle developed by Van den Berg, Manstead, Van der
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Pligt, and Wigboldus (2005). The puzzle consisted of a 15 by 15 letter matrix in which
participants searched for hidden words. Words could be hidden from top to bottom, from
bottom to top, from left to right, from right to left, or diagonally. Participants were asked
to mark the words they found. In order to make the puzzle and vignettes seem unrelated,
the instructions read that the goal of the puzzle task was to see which words were found
first by the participants and that they therefore had to also indicate the order in which they
found the different words. The seven words that had to be found were listed next to the
puzzle. In the affect condition, participants searched for the (Dutch translations of the)
following words; ‘feeling,’ ‘emotion,’ ‘sensation,’ ‘state of mind,’ ‘intuition,’ ‘impression,’
and ‘experiencing’. In the cognition condition, participants searched for ‘thinking,’ ‘logic,’
‘analyzing,’ ‘rational,’ ‘knowing,’ ‘mind,’ and ‘reasoning’.
The items and scales of the predictors and the dependent variable were identical to
those used in the previous studies. Cronbach’s alpha for the negative affect scales was .92
for the Airplane vignette and .86 for the Exams vignette.
RESULTS
Two participants indicated not to have participated seriously and were excluded from
further analyses. Three other participants only found five or less of the seven words that
were hidden in the puzzle. Because it was unclear whether they had skipped the remainder
of the puzzle or were indeed unable to find the words, it was decided to exclude them
from the analyses as well. In Table 3.6, the means, standard deviations, and correlations for
the predictors and the outcome variable for both conditions are displayed. For the Exams
vignette, there was a significant difference for perceived risk as participants scored higher
on this variable in the affect condition. There were no other significant differences in the
means between conditions. In correspondence with Studies 1 and 2, the results showed
moderate to strong correlations between the predictor variables, negative affect and
perceived risk and the outcome variable risky choice for both vignettes.
As in Study 2, we tested the prediction that in the affect condition risky choice is
more strongly related to negative affect relative to the cognition condition, whereas in the
latter condition, risky choice is better predicted by perceived risk compared to the affect
condition. Similar to Study 2, we formulated a number of structural equation models
(SEM’s), in which parameters were either freed up or constrained across the different
vignettes and conditions. The models, which are the same as the ones explained in Study 2,
are presented in Table 3.7. Again, we used the following cut-off values and model
comparison statistics to select our final model. The cut-off values for the fit indices were:
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TLI >.90, RMSEA<.05 or p-close>.01, and PCFI>.90. When comparing the models
represented in Table 3.7, we found model 3a not to be significantly worse (at p<.01) than
the unconstrained model 2 (Δχ2(df=9)=22.08, p=.01). However, model 3b was significantly
worse than model 3a (Δχ2(df=4)=23.28, p<.01). Model 3c fared better, it was not significantly
worse (at p<.01) than model 3b (Δχ2(df=9)=18.48, p=.03). Model 3d was not significantly
worse than model 3c (Δχ2(df=3)=3.93, p=.12), but model 3e was significantly worse than
model 3d (Δχ2(df=2)=14.54, p<.01), and model 3f was significantly worse than model 3e
(Δχ2(df=12)=58.04, p<.01).
In contrast to Study 1 and Study 2, in this study we were unable to unambiguously
assign a ‘best’ model based on the fit criteria and model comparison statistics. Based on
model comparison, we should have selected the measurement weights model. This model
also performed slightly better in terms of the TLI and RMSEA criteria. However, it
performed much worse on the parsimony fit index PCFI. When we compared models that
were more parsimonious, the structural residuals model with 2 free structural paths (model
3d) performed best. The consecutive models 3e and 3f, in which the two parameters were
constrained to be equal across the two experimental conditions fared significantly worse
than model 3d in which these two parameters were allowed to be free. Because the TLI
and RMSEA/p-close values were not much worse, and because the PCFI approached the
value of .90, we opted for this model, which is displayed in Figure 3.3.
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Table 3.6 Descriptives and correlations of perceived risk, negative affect and risky choice (Study 3)
Variables
Airplane
M (SD)
Exams
M (SD)
Cognition1 Affect2 Cognition Affect 1 2 3
1. Perceived risk 32.03(17.78) 32.18(16.83) 28.51(13.27) 33.76(17.72)† -- .59** -.64**
2. Negative affect 6.25(1.75) 6.62(1.73) 4.75(1.50) 5.18(1.77) .54** -- -.65**
3. Risky choice 4.04(16.57) 3.52(13.88) 21.25(10.37) 17.82(14.54) -.39** -.43** --
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01; † mean (between conditions within a vignette) is significantly higher at p < .05; 1= cognitive condition, 2 =
affect condition; correlations of both conditions in the Airplane sample are shown above the diagonal; those of both conditions in
the Exams sample are shown below the diagonal. The possible range of the different scales is explained in the text.
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Figure 3.3 Standardized estimates in the structural residuals model of relations between perceived risk, negative
affect, and risky choice in Study 3 (see text for explanation)
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Table 3.7 Comparison of Fit Indices of different models in Study 3
χ2 df p TLI RMSEA 90% CI p-close PCFI
1. Independent 1506.49 60 .00 .00 .246 .235-.257 .00 .00
2. Unconstrained 90.70 32 .00 .92 .068 .052-.085 .04 .51
3. Constrained
  a) Measurement weights (λ’s) 112.78 41 .00 .93 .066 .052-.081 .03 .65
  b) 3a + Structural weights (2 γ’s free: see text) 136.06 45 .00 .92 .071 .058-.085 .01 .70
  c) 3b + Structural (co)variances (Φ) 154.55 54 .00 .92 .068 .056-.081 .01 .84
  d) 3c + Structural residuals (Ψ) 160.47 57 .00 .92 .068 .055-.080 .01 .88
  e) 3d + 2 γ’s constrained 175.01 59 .00 .92 .070 .058-.082 .00 .90
  f) 3e + Measurement residuals (Θδ) 233.05 71 .00 .91 .076 .065-.087 .00 1.05
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In Figure 3.3, again the leftmost value of the standardized structural paths is associated
with the cognitive condition, the rightmost value with the affect condition. Except for the
structural path in the affect condition from perceived risk to risky choice (γ=-.13, p=.09),
all of the values reported are significant at p<.01. In the cognitive condition the
standardized path coefficient linking perceived risk and risky choice (γ=-.50) was stronger
than in the affect condition (γ=-.13). Additionally, in the cognitive condition the
standardized path coefficient linking negative affect and risky choice (γ=-.24) was weaker
than in the affect condition (γ=-.50). Because the model in which the parameters were
freed up across experimental conditions (model 3d, see Table 3.7) performed significantly
better than the model in which these parameters were constrained to be equal (model 3e),
we can conclude that our expectations were confirmed.
CONCLUSION
Analogous to the results of Study 1 and Study 2, the results of Study 3 showed both
negative affect and perceived risk to be related to risky choice. Furthermore, in line with
the results of Study 2, in the affect condition negative affect was more strongly related to
risky choice than perceived risk, whereas in the cognitive condition, perceived risk was
more strongly related to risky choice than negative affect.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this chapter we examined the influence of perceived risk and negative affect on risky
choice in different ways and found support for a dual-process model of risky choice based
on affective and cognitive considerations. In Study 1, we found negative affect and
perceived risk to simultaneously influence risky choice. These findings were replicated in
Study 2 and Study 3. Although the findings are important in their own right, from Study 1
alone it cannot be ascertained under what specific circumstances cognitions and affect are
related – or not – to risky choice. For that purpose we designed two more studies. Study 2,
in which cognitions and affect were manipulated, showed that making affect salient by
adding affective information to the description of a risk leads to increases in negative
affect as a predictor of risky choice, whereas adding cognitive information makes
perceived risk more predictive of risky choice. Study 3 showed that the way a risk is
processed can also be influenced by unobtrusively activating a cognitive or affective
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processing mode, which, in correspondence with the processing mode activated, increases
the relative weight of either perceived risk or negative affect as predictors of risky choice.
In other words, Studies 2 and 3 show that it is possible to influence the strengths of
cognition and affect as predictors of risky choice, and in different – obtrusive and
unobtrusive – ways.
These findings extend previous research in various ways. As was mentioned in the
introduction, both cognitive considerations and affective reactions separately have been
demonstrated to influence risk perception and risky choice. Furthermore, the theoretical
underpinnings of dual-processing models have also acquired empirical basis. Yet, evidence
for separate modes of information processing with respect to risk evaluation and risky
choice has not yet been reported in the literature, nor has been examined to what extent
people can be made to rely on a ‘risk-as-feelings’ or ‘risk-as-analysis’ strategy. Even though
studies have shown the nature of presented information (e.g. statistical versus anecdotal or
abstract versus specific) can influence risk perception and/or risky choice, the affect versus
cognition distinction used in our study has not been examined before. Finally, the
unobtrusive priming of cognitive and affective processing strategies has been done in the
context of attitudes and the valuation of stimuli, but is new with respect to risk processing.
Considered in conjunction the results of the three studies make a strong case not
only for taking up affect in models of risky choice but also for considering risky decision
making as subject to dual modes of information processing. The findings show that people
can be made to rely more on either their feelings or their thoughts through the addition of
cognitive or more affective information to a description of a risk when making a choice.
Furthermore, the results of Study 3 demonstrate that it is possible to influence the way risk
information is processed unobtrusively by means of a priming task unrelated to the risk. In
other words, the mode in which risk information is processed can be influenced both in
subtle and also relatively straightforward ways. The findings from Study 2 and Study 3 also
demonstrate that affect-based and cognition-based modes can be manipulated
independently from each other. This, additionally, extends previous research on attitudes
(Van den Berg, Manstead, Van der Pligt & Wigboldus, 2006) and the valuation of stimuli
(Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004), and shows that processing mode can also be related to risk.
Finally, participants were not inclined to make riskier or less risky choices when evaluating
risk in either processing mode, implying that it is possible to influence the way in which
risk is processed without influencing actual risky choice behaviour. In sum, these findings
provide the first direct support for dual-process models of risky choice.
When considering these results, it should be noted that this study used vignettes,
which are unlikely to trigger very strong emotions. Real-life situations may invoke stronger
affective reactions that may override cognitive considerations. Sunstein (2003), for
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example, showed that when strong emotions are involved, people tend to ignore the
likelihood of occurrence of a negative event and focus only on the bad outcome itself.
Also, the impact of visceral states could reduce the influence of cognitive considerations to
a minimum or eliminate them altogether (see e.g. Loewenstein, 1996). Therefore, future
research may use situations that trigger more intense emotions to evaluate their influence
on risk perception and -choice. Loewenstein et al. (2001) argue that “[e]liciting powerful
emotions in normal populations is certainly problematic; perhaps the best opportunities
for such research occur in naturalistic settings in which emotions reliably run high (e.g.,
just before parachuting, or in the courtroom). But even under ‘normal’ circumstances the
question what characteristics of the context make either cognition or affect dominant in a
decision making situation deserves more investigation. We agree with Finucane et al.
(2000, p. 14) who argued that the “[r]eliance on affect probably ebbs and flows according
to various contextual factors, including the extent to which stimuli evoke images that are
tagged clearly with positive or negative feelings”. Future research should therefore focus
on the influence of contextual factors on risk perception and risky choice in order to
increase our understanding of how they influence cognitions, feelings and, our behaviour.
A particularly interesting future line of inquiry with regard to dual-process models
and risky choice concerns the comparison of well-defined situations with known
probabilities and information about risk magnitude versus more ambiguous situations
where these parameters are unclear or unknown. Risk research and decision theory has
tended to favour the former kind, yet most real-world situations tend to be of the latter
variety. It may well be that cognition-based processing tends to dominate in well-defined
risk situations. The question that remains is how we can pursue a risk-as-analysis strategy
when the input for analysis is vague, unreliable or even absent.
Another question regards how we can optimally benefit from both modes of
processing and in what situations we should give more importance to either our feelings or
our thoughts (see e.g. Damasio, 1994). Triggering or activating processing mode by means
of the presentation of information may prove especially relevant with respect to informing
the general public about risk and trying to optimize the impact of campaigns to this end.
To return to the question posed in the introduction of this chapter: when should appeals
be directed to cognitive considerations and be aimed at changing beliefs by means of
statistics and probabilities? And when should efforts rather be directed at changing the
feelings associated with risks and risky behaviour? Discussing policy against terrorist
threat, Sunstein argues: “(…) government is unlikely to be successful if it attempts to
reduce fear by emphasizing the low likelihood of another terrorist attack. It might do
better if it changes the subject or instead stresses the affirmative social values associated
with running the risk” (2003, p. 122). Implicit in this example are again the two separate
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processing modes and the limited use of appealing to cognitive considerations when a risk
is evaluated on an affective basis. Terrorist threat appears to be a paradigm example of
such a risk due to the strong affective imagery this type of risk evokes and appeals to ‘use
one’s head’ will indeed be unlikely to generate much effect in this case.
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APPENDIX
Airplane
Imagine the following: You are going on holiday to a destination on the Mediterranean Sea
with a group of friends. You just heard on the news that the airline you are supposed to fly
with has been warned for the bad maintenance of their aircraft. Last week one of the
planes of the airline had a problem and had to make an emergency landing. This incident
has led the French government to issue a prohibition to land for the aircraft of the airline
until they meet the safety requirements. Inquiries at the travel agency where you booked
the flight make it clear that it is impossible to cancel your flight and get a refund because
the flight is still normally scheduled for departure.
Exams11
Imagine the following: You are about to leave your house one morning to take an important
exam and you are running late. On the radio you hear the weather forecast by the National
Meteorological Institute, which issues a warning that the roads are very slippery due to
icing and strongly advices people not to go on the road unless absolutely necessary. It’s
about fifteen minutes cycling to the place where you have to take your exam. Just before
mounting your bike you notice that the street is indeed extremely slippery. Due to the
weather, public transportation is disrupted and there is no way of getting a taxi on short
notice. If you walk you’ll be late for sure. The only possible way to get to there in time is
by bicycle.
Going Out
Imagine the following: You are on your way on your bike to a café where you are supposed to
meet some friends. From your house it is about half an hour cycling to the café. Just
before arriving at your destination one of your friend calls you on your cell phone and
warns you that there are preventive ID checks at different locations in the city and also
around the café. You had not anticipated this and therefore do not carry an ID with you.
As a rule there are no exceptions made and everybody who gets checked and does not
carry his ID has to pay a fine of 50 euro.
11
 When reading this vignette one should take into account that in the Netherlands most people
own bikes and that in the city of Amsterdam, where the study was conducted, bikes are the
principal mode of transportation and estimates of the number of bikes equal the number of
inhabitants of that city.
71
4 TRAITS AND STATES: INTEGRATING PERSONALITY
AND AFFECT INTO A MODEL OF CRIMINAL
DECISION MAKING12
Abstract
We propose and test a model of criminal decision making that integrates the individual
differences perspective with research and theorizing on proximal factors. The individual
differences perspective is operationalized using the recent HEXACO personality structure.
This structure incorporates the main personality traits, but it carries the advantage of also
incorporating Self-Control within its personality sphere, and an additional trait termed
Honesty-Humility. Furthermore, the model offers a new perspective on proximal
predictors, “states,” of criminal decisions by adding affect to the rational choice–crime
equation. The proposed model is tested among a representative sample of the Dutch
population (N = 495). As predicted by the model, personality was both directly and
indirectly related to criminal decision making. Specifically, the traits Emotionality, Self-
Control, and Honesty-Humility were mediated by both affect and rational choice variables.
Conscientiousness operated only indirectly on criminal decision making via rational choice.
Together, the findings support a trait-state model of criminal decision making.
12 Based on Van Gelder & De Vries (2012a)
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Extant literature on personality and crime reveals consistent correlations between the two
(e.g., Agnew et al., 2002; Caspi et al., 1994; Eysenck, 1977, 1996; Miller & Lynam, 2001;
Jones, Miller & Lynam, 2012). There is also ample evidence that the perceived costs and
benefits of crime, as suggested by rational choice and deterrence theorists, influence
decisions to offend (e.g., Becker, 1968; Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001;
Paternoster & Pogarsky, 2009). Both lines of thought have a restricted focus; one is
confined to individual characteristics, whereas the other tends to limit itself to proximal
variables that pertain directly to the crime situation. That is, although personality trait
research can identify individual differences in predispositions to offend, it does little to
explain what proximal variables may influence offending behavior. Conversely, deterrence
and rational choice-based theories can help detect factors that alter the balance in cost-
benefit analyses, but generally they do not examine individual differences in criminal
propensity.
However, as Nagin and Paternoster (1993) noted, a belief that variation in offending
is reflective of differences in criminal propensity between individuals does not preclude the
possibility that would-be offenders are insensitive to the attractions and deterrents of
crime. Therefore, instead of being distinctively separate, these perspectives complement
each other and the joint consideration of both perspectives can significantly enhance our
understanding of criminal decision making. In the words of Miller and Lynam (2001, p.
781), in order to truly understand relations between personality and crime, the mechanisms
underlying them must be identified, which requires an examination of the intervening or
mediating processes that connect the distal and the proximal levels. Developing and testing
an integrative model that does so is the goal of the present study.
Beyond integrating these perspectives in a comprehensive model of criminal decision
making, we also extend them separately. We contribute to the individual differences
perspective by using a recent and more encompassing structure of personality, the
HEXACO model, than models that have been used in crime research thus far. We extend
proximal approaches by adding feelings, or affect, to the rational choice-crime equation
drawing from dual-process models of information processing.
To denote stable individual dispositions related to offending, we use the term
“traits”. Proximal factors, which operate in the moment of decision making, are referred to
as “states”. Below, we first deal with the trait component of the model followed by a
discussion of the state component. Subsequently, we discuss their integration and the
hypotheses before presenting the results of the study.
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TRAITS: PERSONALITY AND CRIME
Arguably the most important individual-level correlate of delinquent behavior is self-
control. An abundance of research has shown that people with difficulty controlling their
impulses and considering the broader consequences of their actions are more prone to
offend than those who do not (Pratt & Cullen, 2000). Although not rooted in personality
psychology, the self-control concept essentially implies a personality trait as it refers to
stable individual differences in the propensity to act, think, and feel in certain ways. In the
words of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, p. 87), “individual differences in the tendency to
commit criminal acts (…) remain reasonably stable with change in the social location of
individuals and change in their knowledge of the operation of sanction systems.” Self-
control is therefore “well within the meaning of ‘personality trait’” (Gottfredson &
Hirschi, 1990, p. 109).
The success of the self-control concept in explaining crime and delinquent behavior
is likely to have overshadowed findings from research drawing from psychological models
of personality, which has established consistent relations between personality traits other
than self-control and delinquent behavior (e.g., Caspi et al., 1994; Eysenck, 1977, 1996;
Miller & Lynam, 2001; Moffitt et al., 2000; Tellegen, 1985). Indeed, as Caspi et al. (1994)
suggested, crime-proneness is not likely to be defined only by self-control, but instead by
multiple psychological components.
Models of personality
While various multi-dimensional models of personality have been proposed over the years,
there has been increasing agreement among researchers that a handful of main dimensions,
or traits, together cover the human personality. The so-called Big Five consensus
distinguishes the following traits: Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness to
Experience, Agreeableness, and (Emotional Stability versus) Neuroticism (e.g., Costa and
McCrae, 1990, 1992; Goldberg, 1990McCrae & Costa, 1990). The Big Five traits are also
represented in, and referred to as, the Five-Factor Model (FFM) (Costa & McCrae, 1992).
Each of the five main traits is, in turn, made up of lower level factors or “facets”. For
example, Conscientiousness, which refers to the ability to exert self-discipline and control
impulses, and the tendency to think carefully before acting, is composed of facets such as
competence, achievement striving, self-discipline, and deliberation (Costa & McCrae,
1998). Besides Conscientiousness, the traits Agreeableness, which regards individuals’
interpersonal relationships and their tendency to be trusting, straightforward, and
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empathic, and Neuroticism, which refers to people’s emotional adjustment and stability,
have emerged as consistent correlates of antisocial behavior in crime research (Jones,
Miller & Lynam, 2012; Miller & Lynam, 2001).
Together, the Big Five/FFM personality traits and their constitutive facets were
thought to embody the overarching structure behind all personality traits. However, recent
reanalyses of the same data that have led to the development of the Big Five suggest that
there is a sixth main dimension of personality (Ashton & Lee, 2008; Ashton et al., 2004).
The new structure, the HEXACO model, that emerged from these analyses builds on, and
is in many ways similar to, the Big Five and FFM models, but extends and refines them in
ways that may be particularly relevant for criminological research (for an overview of
similarities and differences, see: Ashton et al., 2004).
Three of the six HEXACO dimensions, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and
Openness to Experience, are identical to their equally named Big Five/FFM counterparts.
Two other HEXACO dimensions, Agreeableness and Emotionality, are modified versions
of Big Five/FFM Agreeableness and Neuroticism. That is, apart from the fearfulness and
depression facets, FFM Neuroticism contains a hostility/anger facet, which, in the
HEXACO model, has shifted to Agreeableness. At the same time the sentimentality
component of Big Five Agreeableness has shifted to HEXACO Emotionality.
These shifts may explain the paradoxical finding that both high and low Big
Five/FFM Neuroticism have been found to be correlated with crime (see Miller & Lynam,
2001). The paradox is resolved by the described shift of facets between the dimensions:
When reframed in terms of the HEXACO model, both low Agreeableness (i.e., high Big
Five/FFM Neuroticism), through its association with anger and hostility, and low
Emotionality (i.e., low Big Five/FFM Neuroticism), through its association with lack of
fearfulness and lack of empathy, are personality traits that may predispose individuals to
different kinds of criminal offenses.
The most significant departure of the HEXACO model from its five-dimensional
predecessors, however, and the most relevant one for crime research, is the addition of a
sixth dimension of personality, Honesty-Humility (Ashton et al., 2004; De Vries, Ashton,
& Lee, 2009). This dimension refers to individual differences in the tendency to be
interpersonally genuine, to avoid fraud and corruption, to be uninterested in status and
wealth, to be modest and unassuming, and the reluctance to take advantage of others to
satisfy one’s own needs (Lee & Ashton, 2004). Individuals scoring low on Honesty-
Humility tend to feel a strong sense of self-importance, are motivated by material gain, feel
tempted to “bend” laws for personal profit, and flatter others when this is instrumental in
the pursuit of their own goals. We argue that these individuals are more likely to violate
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rules both because they have lower moral standards and because they care less about the
well-being of others who may be affected by their behavior.
Recent empirical research has shown that by virtue of the inclusion of Honesty-
Humility in the HEXACO structure, it outperforms both the FFM and the Big Five model
with respect to a number of behavioral criteria related to offending such as psychopathy,
Machiavellianism, egoism, immorality, pretentiousness, unethical decision making, and
employee integrity (Ashton & Lee, 2008; De Vries, De Vries, De Hoogh, & Feij, 2009; De
Vries & Van Kampen, 2010).
Finally, the HEXACO model yields another important advantage over other models
of personality, which is its ability to integrate the psychological personality perspective
with the criminological self-control paradigm. Within the HEXACO personality space,
self-control can be viewed and operationalized as an interstitial trait based on a set of
facets pertaining to several of the main dimensions of the model. Essentially, self-control
as defined by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) is a broad dimension of individual
disposition that consists of more specific elements such as self-centeredness, risk-seeking
behaviour and impulsivity. These elements are also represented as facets in the HEXACO
model and therefore a self-control scale can be derived from the model (see the Method
section for further explication).
In other words, the HEXACO model offers a broad conceptualization of personality
that encompasses and extends five-factor models in important ways, but also incorporates
self-control. Thereby the model is able to locate the latter within the broader personality
structure of individuals and integrate the psychological personality perspective with the
most important individual disposition paradigm in criminology. In sum, we believe the
HEXACO model has much to contribute to crime research and therefore use it as the
operationalization of the trait component of the trait-state model of criminal decision
making. Next, we discuss the other constitutive component of the model, “states”.
STATES: RATIONAL CHOICE AND AFFECT
Rational choice theories posit a reasoning actor who balances costs against benefits in
order to arrive at a decision. The assumption is that, when faced with several possible
courses of action, people will gravitate towards the option they believe is likely to have the
best overall outcome (Elster, 1989). According to rational choice theory’s punishment
corollary, deterrence theory, people will offend when they perceive the potential benefits
to exceed the anticipated costs, and will refrain from doing so when costs outweigh gains.
Perceived costs such as the severity and certainty of punishment are therefore central
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inputs to the criminal choice calculus. According to this perspective, a criminal act
essentially implies taking a risk (i.e. making a decision with an uncertain outcome and a
possibility of loss).
Although rational choice and deterrence models tend to be largely cognitive in nature
(i.e. based on thinking), various authors have noted that feelings may also play an
important role in decisions to commit a crime (e.g., Agnew, 1992; Athens, 2005; Katz,
1988; Wright & Decker, 1994 1997). We argue that adding feelings to the rational choice-
crime equation is likely to generate a more encompassing picture of the criminal decision
making process, compared with focusing only on cognition or feelings. One important
reason for differentiating between cognitive and affective (i.e. feeling-based) reactions to
risk and criminal decision making, is the different operative logic underlying each. That is,
cognitive appraisals and emotional reactions to risk have different determinants. For
example, emotions respond differently to probabilities and outcomes, the two central input
variables of rational choice and deterrence models, than cognitive evaluations of riskiness
(see Loewenstein et al., 2001). As Frijda (1988, p. 355) noted “emotions know no
probabilities. They do not weigh likelihoods. What they know, they know for sure.”
Emotions are, however, influenced by variables that play only a minor role in cognitive
evaluations, such as the time interval between the decision and the realization of outcomes
and the degree to which a risk is known or controllable (Loewenstein et al., 2001). In
short, because feelings have determinants that differ from cognitions about a risk, and can
therefore cue different behavioral responses, we believe them to be an important addition
to models of criminal decision making.
In this chapter, we focus on feelings of fear and insecurity, which we denote as
“negative affect”, evoked by decision making situations and examine these feelings in
conjunction with perceived severity and certainty of punishment to examine how both are
related to criminal decisions. We do so by drawing from so-called dual-process and dual-system
models of information processing (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999; Smith & Neumann, 2005; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; ; Van Gelder, 2012; Van
Gelder et al., 2009). The central assumption of these models is that there are two separate
modes or systems of mental processing that operate simultaneously when we engage in
acts such as making judgments, considering risky prospects, valuing stimuli and processing
information. One mode, which we will refer to as the cool mode, is largely cognitive in
nature and based on more deliberate and analytical considerations. The cool mode,
therefore, operates roughly according to the precepts of rational choice theory. The other
mode, the hot mode, relies more on intuitive, automatic and affect-based processing (e.g.,
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Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Van Gelder et al., 2009; Van Gelder, 2012), and has a proper
operative logic.13
When it comes to evaluating risky prospects, dual-process notions assume the two
modes of processing to respond to different characteristics of a situation (Kahneman,
2003; Slovic et al., 2002; Van Gelder et al., 2009). The cool, thinking-based, mode is
sensitive to risk considerations such as probabilities. The hot mode is relatively
unresponsive to probabilities of decision outcomes, but instead responds to properties of a
situation that play only a minor role in cognitive evaluations, such as the vividness with
which the outcomes can be imagined and their temporal or spatial proximity (Loewenstein
et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2002). Importantly, the hot mode is tied to the here and now,
whereas the cool mode can also consider the future. For example, emotions such as fear or
anger alert us of imminent threat and ready us to respond immediately to a situation, while
cognitions take delayed consequences into account.
The potential divergence in behavioral responses cued by the hot mode and the cool
mode explains why we can think about something one way (e.g., “I really shouldn’t do it
because it is too risky”), but feel about it differently (e.g., “I crave it, so I’ll just take my
chances”). Precisely because the way individuals think about a situation may differ from
how they feel about it, as implied by dual-process models, it makes sense to study
cognition and affect in conjunction as proximal predictors of delinquent behaviour. See
Van Gelder et al. (2009) for evidence for a dual-process model on the basis of this
distinction with respect to (non-criminal) risky decision making.
Anticipated versus immediate affect
Even though emotions have occasionally been included in models of criminal decision
making, our approach differs from those taken in previous studies. When addressing
affect, previous research has incorporated emotions such as anticipated shame and
expected guilt (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster &
Simpson, 1996; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996). These anticipated emotions enter the decision
calculus as costs that can be taken into account as such by the decision maker
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). However, the emotions themselves are expected to be felt only
once outcomes have materialized, instead of at the time of decision. I am, for example,
unlikely to feel guilty about or ashamed of something I have not done (yet). In other
13
 Note that not all dual-process models that have been proposed characterize the dividing line
between the two modes as one of cognition versus affect. Even though the models share several
characteristics, they differ on other, subtler, points.
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words, this type of emotion essentially regards predictions about future emotional states
rather than emotions experienced at the moment of deciding on a course of action. In
terms of the dual-process approach, the consideration of potential future regret, guilt and
shame, like estimates of probability and severity, belongs to the domain of the cool,
cognitive, mode as they, at the time of decision, primarily regard thoughts about feelings
instead of feelings themselves. For example, note the fundamental difference between the
following two considerations that may be relevant when facing a criminal choice: “If I do
this now, I will regret it later” versus “The thought of apprehension scares me”. Although
the regret is expected to materialize after a certain course of action has been chosen, the
fear of apprehension operates in the moment of decision making. Recall in this respect the
difference between the hot mode which operates in the here-and-now, whereas the cool
mode can also consider factors that do not pertain to the immediate present.
The immediate visceral reactions to risks and uncertain situations, such as fear, so-
called anticipatory emotions, are experienced at the time of decision (Loewenstein et al.,
2001). Therefore, these emotions imply processing by the affect-based, hot mode. While
immediate affect includes a wide range of feelings, such as anger and greed, but also
positive affect such as thrill, excitement, relief and satisfaction, we limit ourselves to
feelings of fear and anxiety triggered by a decision situation in this chapter. We think this is
a particularly productive point of departure with respect to criminal decision making as
these feelings form the affective counterpart of cognitions about risk and deterrence (i.e.
the perceived probability and severity punishment).
INTEGRATING TRAITS AND STATES
The general assumption underlying the proposed model is that taking into account both
individual traits and proximal, state, variables offers a more complete picture of criminal
decision making than looking at either component in isolation. At the basis of this
assumption is the hypothesis that different aspects of personality are differentially related
to the proximal variables under study. We therefore examine the HEXACO model of
personality as a predictor of criminal choice while drawing from dual-process models by
distinguishing perceived risk of sanction from the state affect evoked by a situation. In this
study, we focus on the role of one specific type of state affect, i.e. the negative feelings of
fear and worry evoked by a situation, which is henceforth referred to as “negative affect”.
We hypothesize that negative affect and perceived risk mediate the relationship between
personality and criminal choice. The proposed trait-state model is presented in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1 Hypothesized Relations between HEXACO Agreeableness, Emotionality, Honesty-Humility, Self-Control,
Conscientiousness, Negative affect, Perceived Risk and Criminal Choice
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In line with the reasoning above, we believe HEXACO Honesty-Humility, Emotionality,
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Self-Control to be important predictors of criminal
choice. We hypothesize Emotionality to operate both through negative affect (i.e. feelings
of worry and fear), and through state cognition (i.e. perceived risk) in preventing or
provoking criminal decisions. That is, people low in Emotionality tend to be less fearful in
nature, are less anxious about possible consequences of their actions, and lack feelings of
dependence on - and sentimentality towards - other people. Lack of fearfulness has been
shown to be the most important predictor of thrill and adventure seeking (De Vries, De
Vries, & Feij, 2009), and is therefore expected to result in lower levels of negative affect in
situations that carry risk. At the same time, a lack of anxiety about the possible
consequences of one’s actions is also likely to result in lower levels of anticipation of the
severity and likelihood of the consequences of criminal actions. That is, to reverse the
argument, people high in Emotionality are probably more likely than people low in
Emotionality to be able to imagine what may happen to themselves (anticipated
punishment) and others (anticipated empathy) in case they would opt for the criminal
option, and consequently, are less inclined to choose it.
In a similar vein, people low on Agreeableness, who are more likely to experience
anger and hostility when feeling “wronged”, are more likely to have a lower threshold for
offending. Their impatience and quick loss of temper may crowd out feelings of fear and
insecurity that may be evoked by the decision situation which consequently lose their
deterrent potential. But in contrast to Emotionality, we expect their response to potential
crime situations to be mediated only by negative affect and not by cognitions that may
temper their impulsive responses. That is, although Agreeableness has been found to be
only weakly (negatively) related to sensation seeking and risk-taking behaviors (De Vries,
De Vries, & Feij, 2009), we believe that higher or lower levels of Agreeableness do not
make much of a difference with respect to the levels of anticipated consequences of one’s
actions.
In contrast to Agreeableness, we believe Conscientiousness to operate mainly
through perceived risk. People high in Conscientiousness are more inclined to carefully
assess the consequences of their actions, whereas people low on Conscientiousness are less
likely to perceive the risks involved and to evaluate the long-term implications of their
actions, and they are thus more likely to commit criminal acts. That is, although people
low in Conscientiousness are more impulsive and disinhibited when it comes to risky
situations (see De Vries, De Vries, & Feij, 2009) and are consequently less likely to think
about the risks associated with theft, embezzlement, fraud or other criminal activities,
people high on Conscientiousness are more prudent and more likely to carefully
contemplate the long-term risks associated with these activities, and to more extensively
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consider the potentially negative consequences (e.g., fines, social disapproval, jail and
ostracism) of their actions. Note that the impulsivity implicated in low levels of
Conscientiousness does not signify that people low in Conscientiousness are often in a
“hot” mode. Impulsivity may be unrelated to feelings of fear, worry or anger, although the
reverse may also be true (i.e., lack of control over these emotions may cause someone to
act impulsively).
Honesty-Humility is expected to operate both directly on criminal decisions, through
automatic (learned) behaviors, and indirectly by impacting on both negative affect and
perceived risk. The direct effect of Honesty-Humility on criminal choices may come about
because people low on Honesty-Humility are more likely to have acquired, from an early
age on, the ability to automatically detect criminal opportunities - such as opportunities for
theft – and act on them once they arise and as a consequence, these behaviors may have
become habitual in nature. Honesty-Humility is also expected to be associated with
negative affect. That is, people high in Honesty-Humility are more prone to experience
negative emotions associated with various kinds of criminal activities, as a consequence of
which they are less likely to commit them. At the same time, they are more likely to think
about the possible negative consequences of criminal decisions. In contrast to
Conscientiousness, which regards thinking through the possible consequences for oneself,
people high in Honesty-Humility are also more likely to consider the consequences of
criminal activities for other people and society as a whole. That is, the contemplated
anticipated unfairness and negative implications, not so much for themselves, but mainly
for others and for society, are more likely to play a more important role for people high in
Honesty-Humility than they do for people low in Honesty-Humility.
Finally, in accordance with the conceptualization of Self-Control as an interstitial trait
which is aligned with Conscientiousness, Honesty-Humility, and Emotionality, we assume
Self-Control to operate both directly and indirectly, through negative affect and perceived
risk on criminal choice. That is, people low on Self-Control are more likely 1) to engage in
impulsive risky behaviors associated with crime and, as a consequence, are more prone to
habitually commit criminal acts, 2) to have lower levels of fearfulness, which is
characteristic of people who exhibit less negative affect, and 3) to have lower levels of
prudence and “fair play” attitudes, associated with lower levels of mental activity used for
planning and thinking about the potential costs of criminal decision and hence perceived
risk. The hypothesized relations, which are described earlier, are shown in Figure 1 and
tested using different scenario’s featuring criminal dilemmas and Structural Equation
Modeling (SEM).
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METHOD
Respondents and Procedure
Data were gathered through a large-scale internet panel, set up strictly for research
purposes.14 The panel consists of approximately 20,000 members and is representative of
the Dutch population with respect to gender, age, education level and province of
residence. To ensure representativeness, data from Statistics Netherlands are used. Panel
members are invited to complete online surveys various times a year.
Data were gathered over two different waves. In the first wave, a randomly selected
subsample of 2,000 Dutch adult ( 18 years) citizens was drawn from the panel and
approached through email. In this wave, which was conducted in April 2008, HEXACO
personality data were gathered. In the second wave, which was conducted 1.5 years later,
in October 2009, data regarding the state and criminal choice variables were collected.
In the first wave, 68.9% of the sample (1,377 respondents; 50.2% women) responded
to the call. The second wave targeted the respondents of the first wave of which 52%
responded to the call. This sample therefore consisted of 716 Dutch citizens (52.8%
women) ranging from 19 to 88 years with a mean age of 50.8 (sd = 14.4) who had also
participated in the first wave. We decided to restrict the upper age limit for inclusion to 60
years as we felt that people beyond this age would be beyond the life stage of those whose
criminal decision-making is of most interest to criminologists.15
By restricting ourselves to adult participants up until 60 years old, the second wave
consisted of a final sample of 495 respondents (57.4% female) in the age range of 19-60
who participated in both waves. The mean age of the respondents was 43.8 (sd = 10.6) and
their educational levels ranged from primary education (2.2%), lower-level secondary
education (17.8%), higher-level secondary education (18.8%), lower-level tertiary education
14 The panel is certified by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a non-
governmental organization that sets worldwide industrial and commercial standards. ISO
certification refers to a quality mark that testifies to the adherence to a set of strict standards and
norms for research panels with respect to the design and execution of research. Panel members
are recruited through send-to-a-friend campaigns among existing panel members, newsletters, and
lists of addresses from third parties taking part in surveys. The panel also grows autonomously by
word-of-mouth. In exchange for participation, respondents received credits which can be saved
and, at a later moment, be exchanged for goods.
15 Even though the choice of 60 years is somewhat arbitrary, and an age limit of around 40 may
seem more appropriate given the decline in offending over the life course, we found no
differences in correlations between the independent and dependent variables for these age groups.
Furthermore, we deliberately drafted scenarios that were relevant to both younger and older
adults (see the discussion in the next section).
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(6.1%), medium-level tertiary education (25.9%), higher-level tertiary education (17.6%), to
university level education (11.7%).
To check for sample loss, we compared the original targeted sample with the final
sample on a number of variables. The results indicate differences between both samples
only with respect to gender; women were significantly over-represented in our sample
(57.4% versus 50.2% in the original sample, p < .001). No differences in education were
found between the two samples. In terms of province, the breakdown also closely follows
that of the original sample. Finally, there were no differences on the scores on the
HEXACO personality traits between the first wave and the final sample.
Scenarios
To test the trait-state model, a scenario design comprising four different scenarios was
developed. The scenarios were presented as ‘dilemmas’ in a short introduction to the
study. Each of the four dilemmas featured a description (8–12 lines) of a criminal choice
situation. Respondents were asked to imagine that they were in the described situation and
to answer several questions pertaining to it. To optimize ecological validity an attempt was
made to design scenarios that were personally relevant to the respondents and that
described relatively common, everyday criminal choice situations (e.g., illegal downloading
and purchase of stolen goods). To optimize external validity, multiple scenarios were used.
One of the scenarios, “A new computer”, reads as follows (for the other scenarios, see
Appendix):
Imagine the following: You need a new computer. One of your colleagues
mentioned that he bought his computer through an acquaintance for a very
attractive price, about 40% below the retail value. Your colleague told you
that the acquaintance has more new computers for sale that meet your
criteria and that come in the original packaging. Your colleague also
mentioned that the computers probably “fell off a truck” somewhere, so
there is no receipt. However, you are being assured, in case problems arise
with your computer within two years after purchase it will be replaced by a
new one without cost so that you don’t need to worry about the guarantee.
Buying, possessing or selling goods of which one knows or could know that
these have been obtained through a criminal act is illegal in the Netherlands,
and the fine for complicity can be quite high.
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Independent Variables
Each scenario was followed by items measuring anticipated punishment probability
(henceforth “probability”), anticipated punishment severity (henceforth “severity”),
negative affect, and the dependent variable criminal choice. For each of the constructs, we
aggregated the responses on all of the scenarios to arrive at more reliable and valid
measures. We used all scenarios to reduce as much as possible the influence of individual
experiences, feelings, and/or cognitions vis-à-vis particular scenarios on the responses
provided. Aggregating the responses on all scenarios reduces error variance and ensures a
more valid estimate of the typical response to a potentially criminal situation than
responses to a single scenario.
Perceived Risk Perceived Risk is a composite measure of punishment probability times
punishment severity. Two items per scenario, using 7-point scales, measured punishment
probability (e.g. “How likely is it that you will be caught when you buy the potentially
stolen computer?” [very unlikely-very likely] and “How big do you think is the chance that
you will be found out if you buy the computer of your colleague’s acquaintance?” [very
small-very large]). Rather than experimentally manipulating probability, respondents were
asked to give their own estimate to avoid the artificiality of furnishing probabilities that
respondents could find unrealistic (see Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001). The same approach
was apllied to punishment severity, which was also measured by two items using 7-point
scales (e.g., “How serious do you consider the possible consequences of being caught to
be?” [not at all serious-very serious] and “How annoying do you find the potential negative
consequences of buying the computer through your colleague’s acquaintance?” [not at all
annoying-very annoying]). A perceived (sanction) risk measure that reflected both probability
and severity (Probability x Severity) was constructed by multiplying the mean scores of the
probability items with the mean scores of the severity items (see Nagin & Paternoster,
1993).16 The composite Perceived Risk measure for the four different scenarios consisted
of eight items (two per scenario) each based on the Probability x Severity multiplication
(multiplying the scores of the first with the second item, and the third with the fourth
item). The scale, for which scores could range from 1 to 49, had an alpha reliability of .86.
Negative Affect Negative Affect was measured with five items per scenario using 7-point
scales (strongly disagree-strongly agree). The items were preceded by the sentence: “Imagine you
decide to commit/do [the offense]”: “Would this situation make you feel insecure?”, “Do
16 As an alternative measure of perceived risk, we also computed a variable based on the mean
scores of the probability and the severity items and correlated this sum measure and the original
multiplicative measure with the other variables. The patterns are nearly identical for both
measures with the multiplicative measure doing slightly better. We therefore retained the
multiplicative measure for the analyses.
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you find the situation frightening?”, “Would you be worried?”, “Would you be nervous?”,
and “Does the situation evoke negative feelings in general?” (not at all-very much). A negative
affect scale was computed based on the averaged responses on the negative affect items of
the four scenarios, which resulted in a score range of 1-7. The scale had an alpha reliability
of .96.
HEXACO Personality Inventory Personality was measured using the 200-item version of the
HEXACO Personality Inventory Revised (Ashton & Lee, 2008; De Vries, Ashton, & Lee,
2009).17 Each of the six HEXACO dimensions is measured by 32 items, eight per facet, on
five-point (strongly disagree–strongly agree) scales. One interstitial facet represents Altruism. In
previous studies, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the 24 facets representing the
six dimensions revealed six main factors with eigenvalue >1, a clear break of eigenvalues
after the sixth factor, and highest loading of the facets on their intended factors (De Vries,
Ashton, & Lee, 2009; Lee and Ashton, 2004).18 The HEXACO-PI-R factor scales are
computed on the basis of the averaged item scores and hence have a range of 1-5. All of
the alpha reliabilities of the factor scales exceeded .84 and none of the absolute
correlations between the factor scales exceeded .28.
HEXACO Self-Control According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), self-control is a
broad individual disposition that contains impulsivity, lack of diligence and persistence,
preference for physical (as opposed to cognitive) activities, risk-seeking, self-centeredness,
and low frustration tolerance. This conceptualization lies at the basis of the self-control
scale developed by Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik and Arneklev (1993), which is the most
commonly used operationalization of the concept in crime research. In this study, we will
follow this conceptualization of self-control and operationalize it as an interstitial trait in
the HEXACO personality space based on various facets of different main dimensions of
the HEXACO model.19
17
 The 100-item version of the HEXACO Personality Inventory can be freely obtained (for
research purposes) from www.hexaco.org. For information on the 200-item version, please
contact the authors.
18
 Because five items of the Fairness facet of the Honesty-Humility dimension were tautological
in nature for the purposes of the present research, i.e. showed predictor-criterion overlap (e.g., “I
would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large”), these items were omitted from the
analyses.
19 The reason for basing the analyses on the HEXACO Self-Control operationalization instead of
the Grasmick et al. (1993) scale, beyond demonstrating how self-control can be incorporated
within the HEXACO personality sphere, is that when tested simultaneously in a regression
analysis, the HEXACO Self-Control measure turned out be a better predictor of criminal choice
(= .23, p < .01) than the Grasmick measure (=.12, p= .03), R2 = .10, F(1, 492) = 27.68, p <
.001.
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This is done following the approach suggested by De Vries, De Vries, and Feij (2009)
consisting of three steps. First, we selected the HEXACO facets that correlated most
strongly with the Grasmick et al. (1993) Self-Control scale. Second, we ran regressions
using these facets with Grasmick et al. Self-Control as a dependent variable. Third, we
simplified the regression to the following formula in which multiplication terms were
assigned to the facets on the basis of the value of the standardized regression coefficients
of each facet: HEXACO Self-Control = (3*Prudence + 2*(Fairness + Modesty +
Fearfulness + Flexibility) + (Social Self-esteem + Patience + Inquisitiveness + Diligence +
Altruism))/16. That is, HEXACO Self-Control is interstitial in the six-dimensional
personality sphere consisting of the Conscientiousness facet Prudence, the Honesty-
Humility facets Fairness and Modesty, the Emotionality facet Fearfulness, and the
Agreeableness facet Flexibility, and to a lesser extent of the Extraversion facet Social Self-
esteem, the Agreeableness facet Patience, the Openness to Experience facet
Inquisitiveness, the Conscientiousness facet Diligence, and the interstitial facet Altruism.
Dependent Variable
Criminal Choice The dependent variable, criminal choice, was measured with three items.
Two items inquired about the likelihood that the respondent would choose the criminal
option. In one of these items, respondents were asked to give a percentage estimate of this
likelihood. The other item also inquired about likelihood, but used a 7-point scale (e.g.,
“How likely is it that you would decide to buy the computer of your colleague’s
acquaintance” [very unlikely–very likely]). The third item measured the degree of certainty of
the criminal choice (i.e., “How certain are you about this?” [not at all–completely]). The 7-
point likelihood item was recoded to a scale that ranged from -3 to +3, and a criminal
choice score was computed by multiplying the recoded likelihood item with the certainty
item, so that the scores could range from -21 to +21. Together with the percentage
estimate item, this resulted in a composite criminal choice measure based on eight items
(two per scenario) with a reliability of .96.
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Table 4.1 Correlations of the HEXACO-PI-R scales and HEXACO Self-Control with Perceived Risk, Negative Affect,
and Criminal Choice
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Mean 3.80 3.14 3.35 3.05 3.44 3.21 3.42 34.06 4.66 19.66
Sd .49 .47 .47 .44 .40 .47 .27 20.08 1.36 9.22
1. Honesty-Humility -
2. Emotionality .13** -
3. Extraversion -.04 -.28** -
4. Agreeableness .28** -.15** .12** -
5. Conscientiousness .08 -.03 .18** .05 -
6. Openness to Experience -.10* -.17** .24** .06 .08 -
7. HEXACO Self-Control .63** .13** .13** .58** .45** .07 -
8. Perceived Risk .26** .21** -.09* .12** .16** -.04 .24** -
9. Negative Affect .31** .35** -.18** .09* .03 -.03 .28** .66** -
10. Criminal Choice -.29** -.06 .03 -.17** -.10* -.04 -.24** -.52** -.58** -
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01; N= 495
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RESULTS
To test the trait-state model, we first computed the bivariate correlations between the
HEXACO personality dimensions, Negative Affect and Perceived Risk, and the
dependent variable Criminal Choice for the combined score of the four scenarios (Table
4.1). Honesty-Humility, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Self-Control were
significantly correlated with Criminal Choice. No significant correlations between
Emotionality, Openness to Experience, and Extraversion on the one hand and Criminal
Choice on the other were found. Both Perceived Risk (i.e. Probability x Severity) and
Negative Affect were strongly related to Criminal Choice.20 Furthermore, Honesty-
Humility, Agreeableness, Emotionality and Extraversion and HEXACO Self-Control were
all significantly correlated with both Perceived Risk and Negative affect. Conscientiousness
was related only to Perceived Risk.
Subsequently, we tested our prediction that Negative Affect and Perceived Risk
mediated the relations between personality and Criminal Choice. This prediction was
tested over two separate models using Structural Equation Modeling in AMOS (Arbuckle,
2007). In the first Structural Equation Model (SEM), we included the main HEXACO
dimensions as trait variables but not HEXACO Self-Control. In the second model we
included HEXACO Self-Control but omitted the main HEXACO dimensions. The reason
for testing the predictions over separate models instead of combining them into one
model is that if tested simultaneously, the overlap in facets between HEXACO Self-
Control and the other HEXACO dimensions would distort the relationships between the
variables in the model.
We decided to use latent variables in the SEMs in order to obtain better (e.g.,
disattenuated) estimates of the model’s path coefficients. For each of the latent variables
two parallel parcels were constructed that were used as manifest indicators. For the
HEXACO variables, we included items of the half-length (100-item; see De Vries, Ashton,
& Lee, 2009) version of the HEXACO variables into one parcel, and the remaining items
into another parcel. Similarly, for the proximal variables and Criminal Choice, we included
half of the items from the different scenarios into one parcel and the remaining items in a
second parcel.
The decision in favor of the “two parallel parcels” approach instead of using
individual items as manifest variables or –in the case of the HEXACO personality scales–
as personality facets, was based on several considerations. First, items are known to
20
 For each scenario there were also significant correlations (p < .01) among anticipated
punishment probability, anticipated punishment severity and criminal choice.
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contain unique variance and spurious crossloadings, which is parceled out when
combining them, thus ensuring more reliable indicators of a latent construct and a better
approximation of normality in continuous distributed variables. Additionally, using items
in models increases their complexity manifold and raises the number of degrees of
freedom relative to the sample N, leading to poorer model fit (Bentler & Chou, 1987;
Hagtvet & Nasser, 2004). Second, as a result of their interstitial nature, the use of
personality facets often leads to the occurrence of cross-loadings which also results in poor
model fit (Ashton, Lee, Goldberg, & De Vries, 2009). The procedure adopted in this study
prevents cross-loadings and offers a parsimonious way of testing the effects of personality
on the other variables compared with models in which all the personality dimensions are
represented by the original items or facets.
To model the two-way relation between Negative Affect and Perceived Risk, we
decided to allow the errors (ζ‘s) of the two proximal variables to covary. Furthermore, we
also allowed the error terms of the Criminal Choice variable to covary. Given the fact that
the wording of two of the original items was very similar and referred to the likelihood of
making a criminal choice, it was proper to include this error covariance.
Finally, because there is no single measure that identifies a correct model given the
sample data, it is good practice to report various fit indices of structural and measurement
models (e.g., Gibbs, Giever & Higgins, 2003; Hoyle & Panter, 1995; Hu & Bentler, 1999;
Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). For the comparative fit index (CFI), the goodness of fit
index (GFI), and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), values close to .95 indicate good fit (Hu &
Bentler, 1999; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). For the root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA), values equal to or smaller than .05 indicate good fit (Hu &
Bentler, 1999).
Model 1: Main HEXACO dimensions, Negative affect, Perceived Risk, and
Criminal Choice
In Model 1 we included the HEXACO trait variables Honesty-Humility, Emotionality,
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness; the mediating proximal variables Negative Affect
and Perceived Risk; and the outcome variable Criminal Choice on the basis of the
hypothesized relationships (see Figure 4.1). The model, which was based on the product
moment correlation matrix and maximum likelihood (ML) estimation had an adequate fit
2(df=63)=128.50, p<.01; CFI=.95,  GFI=.96, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.05. However, even
though this model had a satisfactory fit, the standardized path coefficient from
Agreeableness to Negative Affect was not significant (=.02, p=.88). We therefore decided
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to remove this path from the model. Note that by removing this path, Agreeableness was
completely removed from the model. The final model, containing the standardized path
coefficients of the main latent and observed, i.e. manifest, variables and the errors and
covariances, is shown in Figure 4.2. Ellipses in Figure 4.2 represent the latent variables,
whereas rectangles represent the observed variables. This final model also had an adequate
fit (2(df=43)=100.70, p<.01; CFI=.95, GFI=.97, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.05) and provided
the most parsimonious representation of the relations between Criminal Choice and both
the trait and state variables.
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Figure 4.2 Structural Paths between the Latent Variables in the Structural Equation Model Involving HEXACO Main
Dimensions, HEXACO Self-Control, Negative affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal Choice
Note. The paths from the latent to the observed variables refer to standardized factor loadings. The double-headed arrow refers to the
covariance between errors (ζ’s). All error terms of the manifest variables have been omitted.
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Table 4.2 Unstandardized and standardized path coefficients and significance
levels for Model in Figure 4.2 (N=495)
Estimates
Unstandardized
coefficients (S.E.)
Standardized
 coefficients
Measurement model
Emotionality - emo1† 1.51(.05)** 1.00
Emotionality - emo2 1.00** .84
Honesty-Humility - hones1 1.10(.09)** .88
Honesty-Humility - hones2 1.00** .91
Conscientiousness - consc1 .84(.03)** .80
Conscientiousness - consc2 1.00** 1.00
Negative Affect - na1 1.00** .98
Negative Affect - na2 .96(.02)** .97
Perceived Risk - pr1 1.00** .91
Perceived Risk - pr2 1.15(.04)** .97
Criminal Choice - CC1 1.00** .68
Criminal Choice - CC2 2.06(.15)** .53
Structural model (direct effects)
Emotionality Negative Affect 1.23(.18)** .31
Emotionality Perceived Risk 4.29(1.12)** .18
Emotionality Criminal Choice 2.15(.94)* .13
Honesty-Humility Negative Affect .93(.15)** .29
Honesty-Humility Perceived Risk 5.01(.96)** .26
Honesty-Humility Criminal Choice -2.74(.80)** -.20
Conscientiousness Perceived Risk 2.83(.73)*  .14
Negative Affect Criminal Choice -2.88(.33)** -.67
Perceived Risk Criminal Choice -.24(.05)** -.33
Negative Affect Perceived Risk 5.91(.55)** .64
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Table 4.2 (Cont.)
Structural model (indirect effects)
Honesty-Humility Criminal Choice -3.86(.72)** -.28
Conscientiousness Criminal Choice -.67(.26)** -.05
Structural model (total effects)
Emotionality Criminal Choice -2.39(1.21)* -.14
Honesty-Humility Criminal Choice -6.59(1.36)** -.49
Conscientiousness Criminal Choice -.67(.26)** -.05
Note. 2(df=43)=100.70, p<.01; CFI=.95, GFI=.97, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.05; † See Figure 4.2
for a graphical explanation of the variables.
As shown in Table 4.2 the main determinants of Criminal Choice were (in order of
predictive importance) Negative affect, Perceived Risk, Honesty-Humility and
Emotionality. Honesty-Humility and Emotionality were both directly and indirectly, via
Negative Affect and Perceived Risk related to Criminal Choice. That is, Honesty-Humility
and Emotionality were positively related to both Negative Affect and Perceived Risk,
which in turn were negatively related to Criminal Choice. However, while Honesty-
Humility had a negative direct effect on Criminal Choice, this effect was positive for
Emotionality. Conscientiousness was only (positively) related to Perceived Risk.
The indirect effects from the personality traits to the outcome variable Criminal
Choice were all significant (see Table 4.2). In other words, the effects of Honesty-Humility
and Emotionality operated both through Negative Affect and Perceived Risk, and directly
on Criminal Choice. Conscientiousness, however, was only indirectly related to Criminal
Choice as its effect operated via Perceived Risk. Note the negative indirect of Emotionality
on Criminal Choice that is countered by a positive direct effect which leads to a total effect
that is near zero.
The (total) indirect effects do not speak to whether the effect between a trait and the
outcome variable is mediated by either Negative Affect, Perceived Risk or by both state
variables. In order to test our mediation hypotheses, i.e. to examine whether the specific
indirect effects between the traits Honesty-Humility and Emotionality, and Criminal
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Choice are significant, we use the distribution of products approach (MacKinnon et al.,
2002). This approach involves the conversion of the parameter estimates that comprise a
mediation relation (e.g. from Honesty-Humility to Negative Affect, and from Negative
Affect to Criminal Choice) into z-scores by dividing each unstandardized parameter
estimate by its standard error and multiplying the resulting two z-scores (zαzβ) and using a
critical value based on the distribution of the product of random variables to determine
significance. We find that both state variables are statistically significant mediators of the
relation between both Honesty-Humility and Emotionality, and Criminal Choice (p <
.001).
In sum, not only do Honesty-Humility and Emotionality directly affect criminal
choice, but they also lead to higher levels of Negative Affect and higher Perceived Risk,
both of which, in turn, are negatively related to Criminal Choice. Conscientiousness,
however, only influences criminal choices indirectly through Perceived Risk. Higher levels
of Conscientiousness lead to higher Perceived Risk which in turn leads to less criminal
choice.
Model 2: HEXACO Self-Control, Negative Affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal
Choice
In the second model, we included HEXACO Self-Control as a trait predictor together
with the states Perceived Risk and Negative Affect as mediators of the relation between
HEXACO Self-Control and Criminal Choice (Figure 4.3). We employed an analysis
strategy analogous to the one used for the previous model again basing the SEM model on
the product moment correlation matrix and using ML estimation. This model showed a
very good fit (2(df=14)=38.20, p<.01; CFI=.99, GFI=.98, TLI=.99, RMSEA=.06).
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Figure 4.3 Structural Paths between the Latent Variables in the Structural Equation Model Involving HEXACO Self-
Control, Negative Affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal Choice
Note. The paths from the latent to the observed variables refer to standardized factor loadings. The double-headed arrow refers to the
covariance between errors (ζ’s). All error terms of the manifest variables have been omitted.
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Table 4.3 Unstandardized and standardized path coefficients and significance
levels for Model in Figure 4.3 (N=495)
Estimates
Unstandardized
coefficients (S.E.)
Standardized
 coefficients
Measurement model
Self-Control - HEXSC1† 1.23(.12)** .96
Self-Control - HEXSC2 1.00** .81
Negative Affect - na1 1.00** .97
Negative Affect - na2 .97(.02)** .98
Perceived Risk - pr1 .86(.03)** .90
Perceived Risk - pr2 1.00** .98
Criminal Choice - CC1 1.00** .65
Criminal Choice - CC2 2.08(.15)** .51
Structural model (direct effects)
Self-Control Negative Affect 1.87(.27)** .32
Self-Control Perceived Risk 10.88(1.94)** .26
Self-Control Criminal Choice -4.40(1.41)** -.18
Negative Affect Criminal Choice -2.88(.32)** -.68
Perceived Risk Criminal Choice -.18(.05)** -.31
Negative Affect Perceived Risk 7.71(.67)** .65
Structural model (indirect effects)
Self-Control Criminal Choice -7.39(1.28)** -.30
Structural model (total effect)
Self-Control Criminal Choice -11.79(1.94)** -.48
Note. 2(df=14)=38.20, p<.01; CFI=.99, GFI=.98, TLI=.99, NFI=.99, RMSEA=.06; † See
Figure 4.3 for a graphical explanation of the variables.
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The results in Table 4.3 indicate that Self-Control is both directly and indirectly related to
Criminal Choice. Again using the method proposed by MacKinnon et al. (2002) based on
the product of coefficients (zαzβ) as a test for significance of the specific indirect effects,
we find that both state variables are statistically significant mediators of the relation
between Self-Control and Criminal Choice (p < .001). In sum, having more Self-Control
leads to higher Perceived Risk and more experienced Negative Affect which in turn are
negatively related to Criminal Choice. Furthermore, there is also a direct negative effect of
Self-Control on Criminal Choice.
As a final step in the analyses, we compared a model with HEXACO Honesty-
Humility, Emotionality, Conscientiousness, and HEXACO Self-Control (Model 1) with a
model with the three main dimensions but without Self-Control (Model 2) and a model
with only HEXACO Self-Control (Model 3) to examine the parsimony of both the
HEXACO model without Self-Control and the Self-Control model without the other
HEXACO variables. Because HEXACO Self-Control is made up of facets of the other
main dimensions, we included four error covariances between HEXACO Self-Control and
the other manifest variables in the SEM. In Model 2, we set all path coefficients linking
Self-Control to the mediators and the outcome variable to zero. In Model 3, we did the
same for the other HEXACO variables while freeing up the path coefficients from
HEXACO Self-Control. Subsequently, we compared the fit of the three models (Model 1:
2(df=56)=123.16, p<.01; CFI=.95, GFI=.96, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.05; Model 2:
2(df=59)=131.18, p<.01; CFI=.95, GFI=.96, TLI=.92, RMSEA=.05; Model 3:
2(df=63)=188.21, p<.01; CFI=.91, GFI=.95, TLI=.87, RMSEA=.06). The difference
between Model 1 and Model 2 was just significant (Δ2(df=3)=8.02, p=.05), indicating that
the HEXACO model without Self-Control bordered on being better than a model with
Self-Control. However, the Self-Control model without the other HEXACO variables was
significantly worse than a model which included the HEXACO variables
(Δ2(df=7)=65.05, p<.01). Additionally, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which
takes into account the parsimony of the model, was lower in Model 2 (BIC = 416.59) than
in the Model 3 (BIC = 448.80), showing that the HEXACO model without Self-Control
had a better relative fit than a comparable model with Self-Control but without the other
three HEXACO variables.
DISCUSSION
As in previous studies that have examined the relation between individual dispositions and
delinquent behavior (see e.g., Miller & Lynam, 2001), we found Conscientiousness,
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Agreeableness, and Self-Control to be correlated with criminal choice. Furthermore, the
Honesty-Humility dimension of the HEXACO model, which is not represented in other
models of personality, turned out to be the strongest personality correlate of criminal
choice. Honesty-Humility, it will be recalled, refers to individual differences in the
proactive willingness to use others for personal gain and includes self-enhancing and
immoral behaviors, such as greed and immodesty and active violations of social norms
through insincerity and unfairness.
This finding ties in with research that links morality (i.e. reflections of what is right
and wrong with respect to values and conduct [e.g., Wikström, 2004]), and egoism (i.e. the
excessive concern with one’s own pleasure or advantage at the expense of community
well-being [De Vries, Ashton, & Lee, 2009; De Vries, De Vries, De Hoogh, & Feij, 2009;
Weigel, Hessing, & Elffers, 1999]), to criminal behavior. However, Honesty-Humility
carries the advantage over these other measures in that it is integrated in a broader
structure of personality, instead of being an isolated trait. This finding provides insight into
how it is related to personality in general, which implies greater precision in terms of the
psychological processes at stake compared with isolated measures.
A similar point can be made regarding the HEXACO operationalization of Self-
Control. An important strength of the HEXACO model is that it offers a broad
conceptualization of personality that encompasses both the Big Five/FFM dimensions and
Self-Control and locates the latter within the broader personality space. Although it has
been shown previously that the main crime-related element of Self-Control is primarily
associated with Big Five/FFM Conscientiousness (Romero, Gómez-Fraguela, Luengo, &
Sobral, 2003), common operationalizations of Self-Control in crime research suggest that it
is actually an interstitial trait based mainly on facets from Honesty-Humility,
Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness (cf. De Vries, De Vries, and Feij, 2009 – see also
the correlations in table 1 of HEXACO Self-Control with the other HEXACO scales).
The results of the present study support this broader notion of Self-Control and as such
contribute to our understanding of the precise nature of this concept.
We hypothesized perceived risk of sanction and negative affect to mediate the
personality-crime relation drawing from dual-process models of information processing.
Indeed, both variables were found to mediate the effects of the personality dimensions
Emotionality, Honesty-Humility, and Self-Control on criminal choice. Individuals scoring
high on Honesty-Humility were both more inclined to feel negatively about the
consequences of a criminal choice and to perceive risk of sanction as higher than low
scorers. The same effect was found for Emotionality. For Self-Control too, high scorers
reported higher levels of negative affect, and perceiving higher risk of sanction. In terms of
the dual-process model discussed in the introduction, this means that Honesty-Humility,
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Emotionality and Self-Control operate both through the hot mode and the cool mode of
information processing. For Conscientiousness, only perceived risk of sanction mediated
the relation with criminal choice. Note that while Conscientiousness was only indirectly
related to Criminal Choice, Honesty-Humility, Emotionality and Self-Control also
operated directly on it. One remarkable finding with respect to Emotionality should be
noted. As hypothesized, we found an indirect negative effect of Emotionality on Criminal
Choice. However, the direct effect of Emotionality on Criminal Choice was positive in
nature. Although caution is advised when interpreting the positive effect, we speculate that
people scoring high on Emotionality, i.e., who exhibit a greater tendency to be worried,
fearful, sentimental and dependent, may –out of fear of criminal-minded others or to
please them– in some instances be more likely to engage in certain types of illegal
behavior.
It could be argued that the high correlation between perceived risk and negative
affect suggests that these are highly similar constructs. Note, however, that there are
differences in the extent to which personality explains both and also in the extent to which
Criminal Choice is explained by each. These differences underscore our argument
regarding the fact that these are different variables and the necessity of differentiating
between the two in models of criminal decision making. The stronger relation between
negative affect and criminal choice compared with perceived risk of sanction suggests that
the former may more often cue the ultimate behavioral response in a criminogenic
situation than the latter.
It is interesting to note that these effects were found using scenarios describing
criminogenic situations that actually invite deliberation and the making of cost-benefit
assessments (e.g., insurance fraud and illegal downloading). Future studies should address
situations where this is less likely or evident and in which divergence between emotional
appraisals and cognitive risk assessments is more plausible and larger. It seems, for
example, likely that impulsive “hot” crimes (i.e. crimes associated with a high level of
affective arousal, such as certain sexual offenses [e.g., date rape], violence-related offenses
[e.g., road rage, retaliation], hot-blooded murders [e.g., crimes of passion], and offenses
committed by craving drug addicts [e.g., street robbery] make poor candidates for
deterrence precisely because they require individuals to take into consideration the long-
term consequences of their actions whereas intense emotional states, drugs and sexual
arousal all operate to confine attention to the immediate present. In each of these
situations, the immediate benefits and long-terms costs of behavior are negatively
correlated and the benefits appeal to and work on feelings (e.g., sexual gratification and
quenching a thirst for revenge) whereas the consideration of the potential costs of rule
violation is a cognitive exercise for the most part. For example, Wright and Decker (1994,
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p. 61) in their study on burglars and street life write that “the offenders, at the time of
actually contemplating offenses, typically perceived themselves to be in a situation of
immediate need [which] has at least two important implications. First, it suggests a mind-
set in which they were seeking less to maximize their gains than to deal with a present
crisis. Second, it indicates an element of desperation which might have weakened the
influence of threatened sanctions and neutralized any misgivings about the morality of
breaking into dwellings”. Conversely, crimes committed in an emotionally neutral state
belong to the domain of rational, cold, processing and should be, we believe, more
susceptible to be influenced by anticipated sanctions.
One of the advantages of an approach, such as the hot/cool approach advocated in
this study, that can examine the influence of feelings alongside rational and cognitive
considerations is its ability to shed light on what specific delinquent behaviors can be
deterred by altering the balance in the cost-benefit equation of such behaviors, and what
kinds of behavior are less susceptible to such influence. For crimes that are intimately
related to feelings, impacting the cost-benefit calculus is unlikely to generate much effect
as affect, which implicates hot processing, is relatively irresponsive to rational and
cognitive considerations such as punishment probability and severity.
Examined in conjunction with a structural model of personality, such as the
HEXACO model, it becomes clear that questions regarding what aspects of personality
are particularly susceptible to what type of influence, and what aspects of personality are
not, can be addressed. For example, individuals dispositionally low in Emotionality are
unlikely to be deterred by simply increasing the severity of a sanction or its probability. For
these individuals, behavioral interventions that also aim to sensitize them to experiencing
negative affect and the risks associated with their unlawful actions may form a productive
complementary strategy. A similar point can be made for Honesty-Humility and Self-
Control, which operate both indirectly and directly on Criminal Choice. Furthermore, if
Honesty-Humility is the main correlate, interventions should also be aimed at instilling
(moral) awareness, promoting greed avoidant behaviors, and diminishing self-
centeredness. For Conscientiousness, the reverse appears to be the case: as willful
offenders, individuals low in Conscientiousness may be sensitive only to sanction severity
and probability.
In criminology, trait and state factors have generally been examined in isolation. Most
situational, or state, perspectives, such as rational choice theory, routine activities theory
(Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2006), deterrence, and situational crime prevention
(Clarke, 1997), are based on behavioral models that posit a rational offender but generally
do not address offender characteristics or affect, let alone scrutinize the ways in which they
may be interrelated. A similar point can be made about theories that look at individual
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differences; only rarely do proximal factors receive extensive treatment in these
perspectives. Yet, as was remarked in the introduction, the fact that there may be stable
differences between individuals in terms of their criminal propensity does not exclude the
possibility that potential offenders are insensitive to the perceived attractions and
deterrents of crime (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). Furthermore, it is unlikely that situational
factors exert the same influence on individuals regardless of their psychological make-up.
In other words, instead of incompatible, trait and state perspectives are actually
complementary and therefore the two need to be integrated in models that attempt to
explain crime. Previous models (e.g., Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Piquero & Tibbetts,
1996) focusing on differences in individual disposition in combination with proximal states
were generally restricted to rational choice variables and self-control. The trait-state model
presented and tested in this chapter broadens our current knowledge by using a new model
of personality, the HEXACO model, and by including state affect next to rational choice
considerations as predictors of crime.
Having said that, we consider this study to be only an initial step in the development
of a comprehensive trait-state model of criminal decision-making. As such the study was
also prone to a number of limitations that should be kept in mind when considering the
results. Firstly, we opted for a scenario method as this allowed us to link personality to
state variables and intentions to offend in a single model. We recognize that a weakness of
this method is that it measures behavioral intentions rather than actual behavior. However,
provided certain conditions are observed there is a high correlation between a person’s
intention to perform a behavior and his actual performance of that behavior (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975, see also: Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). These conditions are the degree to
which the intention to behave is measured with the same specificity as the behaviour that
is being predicted, the stability of the expressed intention, and, the degree to which the
individual is able to wilfully carry out the intention (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, pp. 473-
474). The scenarios we developed for this study were developed with these criteria in
mind.
Another limitation of this study is that the research population consisted of a
community sample, instead of an offender population, which implied that the scenarios
were not about severe antisocial behavior, but about relatively common everyday crimes
instead.  This poses limits on the generalizability of the results, such as how personality
plays out in the case of persistent offenders. As a next step, it is commendable to test the
model among an offender population instead of a community sample, and for offenses
more serious than the ones used in this study. Determining whether the structural
properties and correlates of the variables used are similar in offender and community
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samples can shed light on whether similar or dissimilar psychological processes are at play
in these different populations (Ručević, 2010).
Additionally, this study addressed a prevalent and important type of affect with
respect to criminal decision making, i.e. feelings of fear and insecurity triggered by the
decision situation, but not other types of affect that are also likely to play a role such as
excitement, thrills, and anger. The correlations between personality, affect and crime will
depend on the type of affect under study. Therefore, in order to generate a more
encompassing view of the role of feelings on criminal decision making, future research
should address other types of affect.
To conclude, we concur with Miller and Lynam (2001) that more specificity in the
outcome variable is also warranted in future research on the personality-crime relationship,
which should examine what particular aspects of personality are more strongly related to
what specific type of crime. For example, even though some authors have contended that
a lack of self-control is equally related to virtually all types of crime (Gottfredson and
Hirschi, 1990), and that beyond self-control few dimensions of personality are useful in the
explanation of crime (Hirschi, 2004), it is not unlikely that Honesty-Humility is more
strongly correlated with those types of crime in which financial self-enhancement plays a
role, such as fraud and white-collar crimes, whereas self-control is a more important
correlate of crimes in which impulsivity and intense emotions are at stake.
Furthermore, disentangling the different elements of self-control implies that future
research can obtain a better grasp of what specific aspects are related to which specific
types of crime and at what point during the life-cycle certain aspects bear stronger relations
than others (see also Jones, Miller & Lynam, 2012). The use of different traits in an
encompassing model of personality instead of one unitary personality concept opens up
the possibility of differentially predicting specific types of offenses, something that the
single self-control concept has been unable to do. Establishing meaningful relationships
between specific traits and specific types of offenses could, besides providing important
theoretical input, also imply an important step forward in the treatment of offenders.
Exploring these questions in more detail, we think, will make for a productive line of
future empirical inquiry and a welcome step in the further development of trait-state
models of criminal decision making.
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APPENDIX
Summer holiday
Imagine the following: You are on holiday with friends at a sunny destination on the
Mediterranean Sea and are greatly enjoying your stay there. Your new fancy camera was
stolen when you were distracted upon arrival in your hotel, but you immediately reported
the theft to the local authorities and sent the police report to your insurance company. The
company let you know that theft is fully covered and immediately transferred the money to
your bank account.
The friends with whom you are on holiday have decided to stay a week longer before
returning home. You would very much like to stay too, but you financial situation doesn’t
really allow it. Then, at the end of your holiday, your camera is returned to you by hotel
staff. Even though you should report this to your insurance company and transfer the
money back to them, you can stay a week longer on holiday if you don’t, since you would
have enough money to cover the additional holiday expenses. If your insurance company
detects fraud, this will lead to legal prosecution. You are faced with the choice to either
report to your insurance company that you got your camera back and transfer the money
you have received in compensation for the theft back to the company, or not to do so and
stay on at your holiday destination for one more week.
Downloading
Imagine the following: You need a particular computer program for a personal project. The
program costs about €100. You consider buying the program but you think you won’t be
using it anymore after finishing the project, and therefore hesitate about buying it. A
colleague has explained to you where and how you can easily, though illegally, download
the program. Imagine that there is a new government policy to clamp down on illegal
downloading. According to this policy, internet providers have to track down illegally
downloaded software through random sampling and report it to the authorities. This has
already led to the prosecution of a significant number of individual users.
Leak
Imagine the following: A part of your house needs a rather urgent paint job due to a leak. You
have asked for various quotations from different painting businesses and these turned out
to be rather high; about twice your household’s monthly income. When you mentioned
this to one of your colleagues recently, he told you about some experienced illegal Polish
painters who would be able to do the work illegally for about half the money and offer the
same quality as the regular Dutch painting businesses. The Polish painters do not have a
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work permit in the Netherlands and the work would therefore have to be done illegally.
Because part of the work has to be done on the outside of your house, it could be noticed.
The labor inspection has recently announced that it will check more intensively for illegal
labor with private individuals and the number of inspectors in your area has been
increased. If the labor inspection ascertains that you have employed illegal workers, it leads
to a fine, and taxes are added to the work. In short, you face the choice to have the work
done illegally by the Polish painters or legally by a Dutch firm.
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5 RATIONAL MISBEHAVIOR? EVALUATING AN
INTEGRATED DUAL-PROCESS MODEL OF CRIMINAL
DECISION MAKING21
Abstract
Drawing from recent research and theorizing (Van Gelder, 2012; Van Gelder & De
Vries, 2012a), we tested and found support for the hypothesis that dispositional self-
control and morality relate to criminal decision making via different mental processing
modes, a ‘hot’ affective mode and a ‘cool’ cognitive one. In Study 1, negative state affect,
i.e. feelings of fear evoked by a criminal prospect, and perceived risk of sanction were
found to mediate the relations between both dispositions and criminal choice. In Study
2, processing mode was manipulated by having participants rely on either their thinking
or on their feelings when deciding on whether or not to make a criminal choice. We
found processing mode to moderate the relations between negative affect and perceived
risk and criminal choice. In conjunction, these results contribute to a new and emerging
integrative approach to criminal decision making linking stable individual traits to
proximal states that operate in the moment of decision making.
21 Based on Van Gelder & De Vries (2012b)
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According to Nagin and Paternoster (1994, p. 581), criminological theorizing has
progressed along two distinct and largely segregated tracks. One track has focused on the
distal level, examining relatively stable characteristics that make people conducive to
offending, while the other has looked at proximal factors that operate more closely to
the moment of decision making. Their separation has meant that each track offers a view
on offending that is somewhat restricted by default. For example, while it is evident that
there are important individual differences in people’s propensity to engage in crime,
differential predisposition to criminal activity does not explain why two individuals with
similar dispositions do not offend equally, why individuals without the assumed risk
factor also offend, and why individuals determined to abstain from crime at one
moment, become determined to commit it the next (Jacobs & Wright, 1999, p. 150).
Conversely, proximal accounts of crime that focus on the event itself, fall silent when it
comes to explaining the growing number of individual dispositions found to be
predictive of offending (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001).
In recent years, however, several studies have attempted to bridge the divide
between these two strands of research to arrive at a more comprehensive framework of
criminal behavior (e.g. Laub & Sampson, 1993; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993, 1994; Nagin
& Pogarsky, 2003; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996; Van Gelder & De Vries, 2012a). In this
chapter we intend to contribute to these emerging integrative perspectives by using
insights from personality psychology and information processing theories common in
the cognitive sciences.
In particular, we extend proximal, ‘state’, perspectives on crime by also examining
the role of negative feelings in the decision process drawing from the recently proposed
hot/cool perspective on criminal decision making (Van Gelder, 2012). We add to the
distal, ‘trait’ perspective by examining not only crime’s most commonly researched
individual-level correlate, self-control, but by also looking at the role of morality in crime
causation. Specifically, we examine the psychological pathways through which these two
dispositions operate on criminal choice, specifying both direct and indirect, via perceived
risk of sanction and negative affect, relations.
THE STATE PERSPECTIVE: RATIONAL CHOICE, COGNITION AND
AFFECT
Traditionally, rational choice-based theories of crime posit a reasoning actor who
balances costs against benefits in order to arrive at a decision regarding whether or not to
engage in crime (e.g. Becker, 1968; Clarke & Felson, 2004; Cornish & Clarke, 1986;
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Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). The behavioral model underlying these theories is based on
the notion that people will offend when they perceive the potential benefits of their
offending, e.g. material gain, status, sexual gratification, to exceed the potential costs, e.g.
punishment, regret, shame, but will refrain from doing so when costs outweigh gains.
Situational crime prevention, for example, tends to focus on opportunities to play out
criminal intent starting from the idea that everybody is able to imagine the anticipated
benefits of rule transgression (cf. Clarke, 1997). Opportunities with lower costs will be
preferred over opportunities with higher costs, and for some opportunities anticipated
cost may be outweighed by the benefits and hence result in decisions to commit crime.
In a similar vein, routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) also assumes offenders
to make calculations regarding the likelihood of success in criminal acts (Clarke &
Felson, 2004). Focusing on the cost side of the equation, deterrence frameworks assume
that would-be offenders can be dissuaded from committing crime by increasing its costs,
and are therefore also consistent with the central premises underlying rational choice
(Nagin, 1998).
While these approaches envision the decision process as a largely cognitive
enterprise in which feelings play little role, examples that suggest that affect is a likely
correlate of delinquency easily come to mind. Acts of vigilantism, road rage, lashing out
at someone following a derisive remark, sexual assault and crimes of passion, are all acts
that tend to be committed in states of emotional arousal, potentially leading individuals
to lose control up to the point of acting directly contrary to their self-interest. The
notion that some behaviors are more emotional and less volitional than others has also
intuitively been grasped by our criminal justice systems. The ‘crime passionel’, for
instance, tends to be less severely punished than premeditated, cold-blooded murder.
In two studies we intend to demonstrate that feelings also play a fundamental role
in situations that do not evoke intense emotions and may also guide behavior in
seemingly calculating crimes. We will argue that by explicitly incorporating feelings
alongside rational considerations such as benefits and costs, models of criminal decision
making can significantly enhance their explanatory scope. A first step in understanding
how feelings operate with respect to criminal decision making is by distinguishing
affective from cognitive appraisals.
Affect and cognition
Part of the merit of differentiating between cognitive and affective evaluations of a
criminal prospect resides in the fact that feelings operate according to a different logic
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than, and may decouple from, cognitive estimates (Van Gelder, 2012). Emotions, for
example, are much less sensitive to changes in probabilities and outcomes of a prospect,
the two central input variables of rational choice and deterrence models, than cognitive
evaluations (Frijda, 1988; Loewenstein, et al., 2001). One’s emotional reaction to a
potential fine of $50, for instance, may not differ much from that to a fine that is 50%
higher. Emotions are, in turn, influenced by variables that play only a minor role in
cognitive evaluations, such as the time interval between the decision and the realization
of its outcome, or the degree to which a risk or situation is familiar or perceived as
controllable (Loewenstein, et al., 2001). For example, a first-time delinquent will
probably experience more fear than a persistent offender when contemplating a robbery
(regardless of the actual chance of apprehension). Another crucial difference regards the
fact that while cognitions can be evaluated for their correctness, i.e. tradeoffs between
costs and benefits may be considered as ‘bad’ or inadequate, affect cannot be tested in
terms of its accuracy or validity (Zajonc, 2000). Emotions simply feel valid (Frijda, 1988).
Indeed, if feelings are predictive of human decision making, this could provide at
least part of the explanation of why deterrence only has a modest effect (cf. Nagin, 1998)
and why rational choice and utility models often have limited predictive value (cf.
Loewenstein, 1996). It could also add to our understanding of the rather paradoxical
finding that people who commit certain types of crime engage in behavior that yields
only modest benefits at the risk of incurring much more serious costs, something that is
generally attributed to individual differences in the ability to exert self-control (Hirschi &
Gottfredson, 2001).
THE TRAIT PERSPECTIVE: SELF-CONTROL AND MORALITY
Self-control
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), individuals low in self-control tend to
place little weight on the, generally long-term and potentially serious, consequences of
their criminal actions and to overvalue the, mostly immediate and modest, benefits (see
also: Hirschi & Gottfredson, 2001; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). In this sense, the self-
control perspective is compatible with rational choice-based perspectives as both assume
the choice for crime to result from cost-benefit tradeoffs, the difference being that the
latter is a state perspective explaining crime, whereas self-control theory is a trait
perspective explaining criminality (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Conceptually, this
means that the self-control-crime relation operates at least in part indirectly on crime
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through altered perceptions of the associated costs and benefits of criminal action.
Empirical support for the assertion that low self-control reduces the effects of
anticipated formal and informal sanction costs, comes from Nagin and Paternoster
(1993, 1994), Piquero and Tibbetts (1996), Nagin and Pogarsky (2001), and recently, Van
Gelder and De Vries (2012a).
We think that self-control may also operate on crime in another indirect way, and
that is by reducing negative feelings evoked by a criminogenic situation that normally
operate as a constraint on delinquent behavior. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), for
instance, argue that individuals low in self-control find criminal acts exciting and thrilling
and enjoy taking risks. Therefore, we assume these individuals to experience less feelings
of fear when considering a criminal prospect which makes them more likely to engage in
delinquent behavior also for this reason (Van Gelder & De Vries, 2012a). Indeed
fearfulness has been shown in research to be an important predictor of sensation seeking
behavior (De Vries, De Vries & Feij, 2009). Other psychological research has also
highlighted the affective dimension of self-control (e.g. Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996;
Loewenstein, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996;
Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Furthermore, the insensitivity to the suffering of
others associated with low self-control is also likely to mute feelings of fear and worry
when contemplating an offense. In short, we expect individuals low in self-control to
experience less negative emotions associated with various kinds of offenses, compared to
individuals with high self-control and therefore to operate on criminal decision making
through this pathway as well.
Beyond its indirect effects, several of self-control’s subcomponents, e.g.
impulsivity, risk seeking and self-centeredness, also suggest a direct relation with criminal
choice. The impulsivity component, for example, is manifested in the tendency not to
engage in deliberation prior to acting but to act on impulse instead (Lynam & Miller,
2004). The need for thrill and the tendency to be sensation seeking that characterizes
individuals low in self-control also links it directly to the tendency to take (criminal) risks.
Furthermore, the self-centeredness and the urge for immediate gratification that typifies
individuals low in self-control is also reflective of time-stable habitual responses to
engage in crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).
Morality
While self-control has been extensively researched by criminologists (see e.g. Pratt &
Cullen, 2000), another important, yet less researched, correlate of criminal behavior is
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morality (Antonaccio & Tittle, 2008; Van Gelder & De Vries, 2012a; Wikström, 2006).
Various studies employing rational choice and deterrence frameworks have, for example,
found moral emotions such as anticipated regret or shame to be negatively related to
offending (Bachman, Paternoster, & Ward, 1992; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Nagin &
Paternoster, 1993, 1994; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996).
Furthermore, various scholars have noted (e.g. Etzioni, 1990; Hart, 1961/1994), rules
may be followed out of a moral conviction to obey them, largely irrespective of
associated benefits and also in the absence of potential sanctions upon violation of the
rule.
Our approach to morality differs somewhat from these approaches. We examine
morality as an enduring individual disposition to think, feel and behave according to a set
of implicit and explicit moral guidelines. As a dispositional measure of morality we use
the Honesty-Humility personality trait, which is incorporated in the recent six-factor
HEXACO personality structure (Lee & Ashton, 2004).22 Honesty-Humility refers to
individual differences in the proactive willingness to use others for personal gains, which
includes self-enhancing and immoral behaviors such as greed and immodesty and active
violations of social norms through insincerity and unfairness (Lee & Ashton, 2004).
Van Gelder and De Vries (2012a) argued that individuals low in Honesty-Humility
are more likely to violate rules because they have lower moral standards, but also because
they care more about their own well-being than about the well-being of others who may
be affected by their behavior. Honesty-Humility has been found predictive of a number
of behavioral criteria related to crime such as psychopathy, Machiavellianism, egoism,
immorality, pretentiousness, unethical decision making, and employee integrity (Ashton
& Lee, 2005; De Vries, De Vries, De Hoogh, & Feij, 2009; De Vries & Van Kampen,
2010; Lee & Ashton, 2004). Recently, Honesty-Humility was also found to be an
important predictor of criminal choice and self-reported delinquency (De Vries & Van
Gelder, 2012; Van Gelder & De Vries, 2012a).
We expect Honesty-Humility to be directly related to individuals’ tendency to make
criminal choices as individuals high in Honesty-Humility are committed to following
rules out of conviction and their moral perspective on what is right and what is not. We
also expect Honesty-Humility to be indirectly related to criminal choice by impacting
both the perception of risk and the negative feelings evoked by a situation. That is, we
expect individuals low in Honesty-Humility to be more focused on the material benefits
of a (criminal) prospect to the detriment of considering the potential negative
22
 The properties of the HEXACO personality structure are elaborated on in the Method
section.
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consequences of their actions and hence to impact the cost-benefit calculation that
precedes criminal decisions. Furthermore, we assume Honesty-Humility to be associated
with negative affect because the strong sense of self-importance of individuals low in
Honesty-Humility and their motivation for personal gain feeds feelings of greed and
entices them to break and bend rules to get what they want, while subduing the negative
affect evoked by a criminal prospect. Additionally, and similar to self-control, people
high in Honesty-Humility are more prone to experience negative emotions associated
with various kinds of criminal activities, as a consequence of which they are also less
likely to commit them (Van Gelder & De Vries, 2012a).
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
In two studies we test the hypothesis that dispositional self-control and morality relate to
criminal decision making via different mental pathways, a cognitive one and a more
affective one. In Study 1, using a vignette design comprised of two scenarios describing
different types of crime, insurance fraud and illegal downloading, we examine the effects
of the traits Honesty-Humility and self-control on criminal choice hypothesizing that
both are directly as well as indirectly, via the states perceived risk of sanction and
negative affect, related. Study 2 replicates these findings but additionally examines the
hypothesis that the state mediators operate via different mental processing paths, a ‘cool’
cognitive mode and a ‘hot’ affective mode as suggested by Van Gelder (2012). In other
words, Study 2 examines to what extent processing mode moderates the relations
between negative affect and perceived risk on the one hand, and criminal choice on the
other. Both studies employ Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to model and test the
hypothesized relations.
METHOD
Participants and procedure
A total of 153 undergraduate psychology students (69.9% female, Mage = 20.4, age range:
17-34 years) participated. The students were approached by email and asked to
participate in a short study about dilemmas. Clicking on a link in the email took them
directly to the survey. In exchange for participation, they were entered in a raffle in
which they could win €50,-. Personality data of the participants had been gathered prior
to the study as part of a course requirement.
112
Materials
Honesty-Humility. Both Honesty-Humility and self-control were measured through the
Dutch 100-item version of HEXACO personality inventory revised (De Vries, Ashton &
Lee, 2009; Lee & Ashton, 2004). The HEXACO model builds on and extends the well-
known Big Five and Five-Factor models (Goldberg, 1990; Costa & McCrae, 1992). With
several modifications (see Lee & Ashton, 2004), the HEXACO model incorporates the
same five main personality dimensions as the Big Five and Five-Factor models, i.e.
Emotionality Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to
Experience but also contains the additional trait Honesty-Humility (Ashton et al., 2004;
Ashton & Lee, 2008; De Vries, Ashton, & Lee, 2009). 23
Each of the six main HEXACO dimensions consists of four facets (i.e. lower-order
factors). For example, the Honesty-Humility dimension is composed of the facets
Sincerity, Fairness, Greed Avoidance and Modesty.24 Each facet is measured by four
items on 1-5 (completely disagree-completely agree) scales. One interstitial facet represents
Altruism.
Previous studies using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the 24 facets
revealed a clear six-factor structure with eigenvalues >1,  a clear break after the sixth
factor, and highest loading of the facets on their intended factors (De Vries et al., 2009;
De Vries et al., 2008; Lee and Ashton, 2004). Internal consistency alpha reliabilities
ranged from .79 (Extraversion) to .83 (Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience).
None of the absolute correlations between the factor scales exceeded the .30 level. Scale
descriptives are presented in Table 5.1.
23 Emotionality and Agreeableness are rotational variants of the Neuroticism and
Agreeableness dimensions of the Big Five model respectively (see Lee & Ashton, 2004).
24 The four items of the Fairness facet of the Honesty-Humility dimension, which is also
represented in the HEXACO Self-Control scale (see below), showed predictor-criterion overlap
(e.g. “I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large”), which raises questions
regarding the tautological nature of this facet. While we think this kind of overlap is best
avoided, for several reasons we decided to retain the items in both the Honesty-Humility and
HEXACO Self-Control scales. Most importantly, excluding the four items would eliminate the
entire facet from the analyses, which may lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the direct
and indirect effects of both personality variables on criminal choice. Furthermore, it should be
noted that the items are attitudinal, not behavioral in nature and the measurement of personality
was independent from the measurement of the mediator and outcome variables which reduces
the peril of tautology. Note too that excluding them led to weaker effects, but both Honesty-
Humility and HEXACO Self-Control remained significant predictors of criminal choice. Future
research is advised, however, to use the 200-item version of the HEXACO personality
inventory. This version includes additional Fairness items that do not show this overlap.
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HEXACO Self-Control. Self-control is not represented as one of the main dimensions of
the HEXACO personality structure. However, Van Gelder and De Vries (2012a)
showed that self-control can be conceived of as an interstitial construct, i.e. pertaining to
blends of various factors, in the six-dimensional personality space of the HEXACO
model. We followed the procedure used by Van Gelder and De Vries (2012a) to
construct a HEXACO Self-Control measure, which is based on the self-control scale
developed by Grasmick et al. (1993), which in turn takes the six core elements of the
self-control concept as described by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) as a point of
departure. These elements are impulsivity, desire for simple tasks, risk seeking,
preference for physical activity, self-centeredness, and temper.
To construct HEXACO Self-Control, Van Gelder and De Vries (2012a) first
selected those HEXACO facets that correlated most strongly with the Grasmick et al.
self-control scale in a community sample representative of the Dutch adult population.
Subsequently they ran regressions using these facets with Grasmick et al. self-control as
the dependent variable. Following this procedure, they arrived at the HEXACO Self-
Control measure which is based on the regression weights expressed in the following
formula: HEXACO Self-Control = (3*Prudence + 2*(Fairness + Modesty + Fearfulness
+ Flexibility) + (Social Self-esteem + Patience + Inquisitiveness + Diligence +
Altruism))/16. The HEXACO Self-Control scale had an alpha reliability of .74.
Scenarios Two scenarios, adapted from Van Gelder and De Vries (2012a), were used to
measure the mediating and outcome variables. The scenarios were preceded by a short
introduction stating that the participant would read about two dilemmas and asked to
answer the questions following each of them. Both scenarios described illegal behavior
that can be classified as common, minor crime, i.e., illegal downloading and insurance
fraud. The illegal downloading scenario read as follows:
Imagine the following: You need a particular computer program for a statistics
course that you are taking. The program costs about €100,-. You think you
will not be using it anymore after finishing the course, and therefore hesitate
about buying the program. A fellow student has explained to you where you
can easily, though illegally, download the program. Imagine that there is a new
government policy to clamp down on illegal downloading. According to this
policy, internet providers have to track down illegally downloaded software
through random checks and report it to the authorities. This has already led
to the prosecution of a significant number of individual users.
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Table 5.1 Correlations of the HEXACO-PI-R, HEXACO Self-Control, Perceived Risk, Negative Affect and Criminal Choice
(Study 1)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Mean 3.38 3.28 3.57 2.99 3.35 3.29 3.28 13.43 3.89 .01
Sd .56 .54 .46 .50 .55 .60 .32 7.55 1.33 3.16
1. Honesty-Humility -
2. Emotionality .18* -
3. Extraversion -.02 -.13 -
4. Agreeableness .28** -.14 .04 -
5. Conscientiousness .19* .11 .06 .02 -
6. Openness to Experience -.01 -.14 .03 .17* .12 -
7. HEXACO Self-Control .66** .24** .10 .44** .61** .06 -
8. Perceived Risk .19* .07 .12 .07 .14 .11 .23** -
9. Negative Affect .25** .23** .01 .10 .23** -.00 .32** .68** -
10. Criminal Choice -.38** -.17* -.10 -.02 -.16* -.04 -.32** -.57** -.60** -
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01; N= 153
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Both scenarios were followed by a set of items measuring anticipated sanction
probability, anticipated sanction severity, negative affect, and the outcome variable,
criminal choice. For each of these constructs, we aggregated the responses to both
scenarios in order to reduce error variance.
Probability and Severity Anticipated sanction probability and severity were each measured
by two items per scenario, using 7-point Likert scales, e.g. ‘How likely is it that you will
be caught when you download the program?’ (very unlikely-very likely) and ‘How severe do
you consider the possible consequences of getting caught to be?’ (not at all serious-very
serious). For each scenario, two perceived (sanction) risk scales were constructed by
multiplying the scores of the probability items with the mean scores of the severity items
(multiplying the scores of the first with the second item, and third with the fourth item
(Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Van Gelder & De Vries, 2012a). The composite Perceived
Risk scale for the two scenarios consisted of the mean scores of 4 items (2 per scenario)
each based on the probability x severity multiplication. Higher scores on the scale reflect
higher perceived risk. The alpha reliability of the scale was .81.
Negative Affect Negative affect was measured with five items per scenario using 7-point Likert
scales. The items, preceded by the sentence: ‘Imagine you decide to do [the offense]’, were:
‘Would this situation make you feel insecure?’, ‘Would you find the situation frightening?’,
‘Would you be worried?’, ‘Would you be nervous?’, and ‘Does the situation evoke negative
feelings in general?’ (not at all-very much). The alpha reliability of the negative affect scale
consisting of 10 items (5 per scenario) was .92. Higher scores on the scale reflect higher
experienced negative affect.
Criminal Choice Following Van Gelder and De Vries (2012a), three items per scenario
measured criminal choice. The first item inquired about the likelihood that the respondent
would choose the criminal option using a 7-point Likert scale, e.g. ‘How likely is it that you
would download the program?’ (very unlikely–very likely). The second item measured the
degree of certainty of the choice: ‘How certain are you about this?’ (not at all–completely). The
third item used a percentage estimate to measure the likelihood of choosing the criminal
option. The 7-point likelihood item was recoded to a scale that ranged from -3 to +3, and a
criminal choice score was computed by multiplying the recoded likelihood item with the
certainty item, so that the scores on this multiplicative scale could range from -21 to +21.
Both this scale and the percentage estimate item were transformed into z-scores and
subsequently summed into a composite Criminal Choice measure which had an alpha
reliability of .80.
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RESULTS
We first computed the bivariate correlations between HEXACO personality, Perceived Risk
Negative Affect, and Criminal Choice (Table 5.1). For HEXACO personality, means and
standard deviations were highly similar to the means and standard deviations obtained in
previous samples (see De Vries et al., 2008; De Vries & Van Kampen, 2010). Honesty-
Humility, Emotionality, Conscientiousness, HEXACO Self-Control, Perceived Risk and
Negative affect were significantly negatively correlated with Criminal Choice, which also
corresponds with findings reported in prior research (Miller & Lynam, 2001; Van Gelder &
De Vries, 2012a).
Table 5.2 Stepwise Regression in the Prediction of Criminal Choice using the
HEXACO-PI-R Main Dimensions and HEXACO Self-Control (Study 1)
 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2
Honesty-Humility -.38** -.28**
Emotionality -.11 -.02
eXtraversion -.12 -.07
Agreeableness .09 .12
Conscientiousness -.07 .02
Openness to Exp. -.06 -.04 HEX. Self-Control -.32** -.14*
Perceived Risk -.27** Perceived Risk -.30**
Negative Affect -.36** Negative Affect -.35**
R2 .18** .48** R2 .11** .43**
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01;  N= 153
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Figure 5.1 Structural Paths between the Latent Variables in the Structural Equation Model Involving HEXACO Honesty-
Humility, Negative Affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal Choice (Study 1)
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Note. The paths from the latent to the observed variables refer to standardized factor loadings. The double-headed arrow refers to the covariance
between errors (ζ’s). All error terms of the manifest variables have been omitted.
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To further examine the relations between HEXACO personality and Criminal Choice, we
ran two regression analyses (Table 5.2). In the first regression, we entered the six HEXACO
main dimensions in Step 1, and Perceived Risk and Negative affect in Step 2. In the second
regression, we entered HEXACO Self-Control in Step 1, and Perceived Risk and Negative
affect in Step 2.25 As can be seen in Table 5.2, in the first regression Honesty-Humility was a
significant predictor of Criminal Choice in both steps, whereas none of the other personality
variables was in either step.
In the second regression, HEXACO Self-Control significantly predicted Criminal
Choice in both steps. We conclude that of the six main dimensions of the HEXACO model,
Honesty-Humility is the most important predictor. The subsequent analyses will therefore
regard Honesty-Humility and HEXACO Self-Control as trait predictors of Criminal Choice.
To examine the direct and indirect effects of Honesty-Humility and HEXACO Self-
Control we employed Structural Equation Modeling using AMOS 18 (Arbuckle, 2009).
Because the Self-Control dimension consists of facets from the HEXACO main dimensions,
including the Modesty and Fairness facets from the Honesty-Humility dimension, this
results in overlap that may distort the structural paths in the model if both Honesty-Humility
and HEXACO Self-Control are included in the same structural model. We therefore
constructed separate models for Honesty-Humility and HEXACO Self-Control.
In order to reduce the complexity of the structural equation models (SEMs), we
created two parcels as indicators of each latent variable instead of using individual items. For
Honesty-Humility, Self-Control, Perceived Risk and Negative affect, we included half the
items into one parcel, and the other half into another parcel. For the Criminal Choice
variable, we entered the multiplicative items (see Method section) into one parcel and the
other items in the other parcel. To model the two-way relation between Negative affect and
Perceived Risk, we allowed their errors (ζ‘s) to covary. Furthermore, we also allowed the
error terms of the Criminal Choice variable to covary. Given the fact that the wording of
two of the original items was very similar and that both items referred to the likelihood of
making a criminal choice, we deemed it proper to include this error covariance.
25
 Note that the overlap in content between HEXACO Self-Control and the other HEXACO
dimensions would result in multicollinearity if entered in the regression analysis
simultaneously. Hence, the other HEXACO main dimensions were omitted.
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Table 5.3 Unstandardized and standardized path coefficients for Model in Figure 5.1
Estimates
Unstandardized
coefficients and S.E.
Standardized
coefficients
Measurement model
Honesty-Humility - HH1† 1.18(.19)** .94
Honesty-Humility - HH2 1.00** .80
Negative Affect - na1 1.00** .97
Negative Affect - na2 .90(.05)** .93
Perceived Risk - pr1 .82(.05)** .87
Perceived Risk - pr2 1.00** .99
Criminal Choice - CC1 1.00** .91
Criminal Choice - CC2 .97(.08)** .86
Structural model (direct effects)
Honesty-Humility Negative Affect .81(.24)** .29
Honesty-Humility Perceived Risk 8.41(2.85)** .25
Honesty-Humility Criminal Choice -.84(.22)** -.27
Negative Affect Criminal Choice -.40(.11)** -.36
Perceived Risk Criminal Choice -.03(.00)** -.31
Negative Affect Perceived Risk 13.73(2.05)** .69
Structural model (indirect effects)
Honesty-Humility Criminal Choice -.57(.24)* -.18
Structural model (total effect)
Honesty-Humility Criminal Choice -1.41 (.31)** -.45
Note. 2(df=14)=12.97, p=.53; CFI=1.00, GFI=.98, TLI=1.00, RMSEA=.00; N=153; † See
Figure 5.1 for a graphical explanation of the variables
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Model 1: Honesty-Humility, Negative affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal
Choice
The SEM containing the standardized structural coefficients linking the predictor variables
with the outcome variable is displayed in Figure 5.1. The model, which is based on
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, had a more than adequate fit 2(df=14)=12.97, p =.53;
CFI=1.00, TLI=1.00, RMSEA=.00. Table 5.3 displays the standardized and unstandardized
direct, indirect and total effects. As can be seen, Negative Affect and Perceived Risk were
almost equally strongly related to Criminal Choice (p<.01). Furthermore, Honesty-Humility
was significantly related to both mediator variables and also directly to Criminal Choice
(p<.01).
To test our mediation hypotheses, i.e. to examine whether the specific indirect effects
between Honesty-Humility and Criminal Choice are significant, we used the distribution of
products approach (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). This
approach involves the conversion of the parameter estimates that comprise a mediation
relation, e.g. from Honesty-Humility to Perceived Risk, and from Perceived Risk to Criminal
Choice, into z-scores by dividing each unstandardized parameter estimate by its standard
error and multiplying the resulting two z-scores (zαzβ) and using a critical value based on the
distribution of the product of random variables to determine significance. In support of our
hypothesis, we found that both state variables significantly mediated the relation between
Honesty-Humility and Criminal Choice with p<.01 for Negative Affect, and p<.05 for
Perceived risk.
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Figure 5.2 Structural Paths between the Latent Variables in the Structural Equation Model Involving HEXACO Self-Control,
Negative Affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal Choice (Study 1)
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Note. The paths from the latent to the observed variables refer to standardized factor loadings. The double-headed arrow refers to
the covariance between errors (ζ’s). All error terms of the manifest variables have been omitted.
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Model 2: HEXACO Self-Control, Negative affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal
Choice
The second SEM we tested included HEXACO Self-Control together with Perceived Risk
and Negative affect and Criminal Choice (Figure 5.2). The same procedure and constraints
as for Model 1 apply to this model. Furthermore, we again used ML estimation. The model
also showed a very good fit (2(df=14)=11.04, p=.68; CFI=1.00, GFI=.98, TLI=1.00,
RMSEA=.00). As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the standardized structural coefficients linking
HEXACO Self-Control to Negative Affect and Perceived Risk were both significant (p <
.01). The structural path from HEXACO Self-Control to Criminal Choice was marginally
significant (p = .07). Finally, the standardized structural coefficients linking Negative Affect
to Criminal Choice and from Perceived Risk to Criminal Choice were both significant (p <
.01).
We again used the distribution of products approach (MacKinnon, et al., 2002) to test
whether the specific indirect effects between HEXACO Self-Control and Criminal Choice
were significant. The results support our hypothesis, as both state variables significantly
mediated the relation between HEXACO Self-Control and Criminal Choice (p < .01).
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION
This study examined the direct and indirect relations between Honesty-Humility and
criminal choice and between self-control and criminal choice. We hypothesized that both
traits would be directly as well as indirectly, via perceived risk and negative affect, related to
the outcome variable. This hypothesis was supported by the results. Furthermore, we found
both perceived risk and negative affect to be negatively related to criminal choice. In other
words, people do not necessarily conform to the image of the rational decision makers they
are often taken to be but are also led by how they feel, even in situations that are unlikely to
trigger strong emotions, such as illegal downloading and insurance fraud. However, this
study did not include any manipulations of processing mode, and consequently, it is yet
unclear whether perceived risk and negative affect pertain to two different modes of
information processing as we suggested in the introduction. This hypothesis will be
addressed in Study 2.
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Table 5.4 Unstandardized and standardized path coefficients for Model in Figure 5.2
Estimates
Unstandardized
coefficients and S.E.
Standardized
coefficients
Measurement model
Self-Control - HEXSC1† 1.46(.31)** .93
Self-Control - HEXSC2 1.00** .71
Negative Affect - na1 1.00** .97
Negative Affect - na2 .89(.05)** .92
Perceived Risk - pr1 .81(.05)** .86
Perceived Risk - pr2 1.00** .97
Criminal Choice - CC1 1.00** .88
Criminal Choice - CC2 1.00(.08)** .86
Structural model (direct effects)
Self-Control Negative Affect 2.04(.50)** .36
Self-Control Perceived Risk 21.47(5.81)** .32
Self-Control Criminal Choice -.86(.47) -.14
Negative Affect Criminal Choice -.41(.11)** -.38
Perceived Risk Criminal Choice -.03(.01)** -.33
Negative Affect Perceived Risk 12.79(1.99)** .67
Structural model (indirect effects)
Self-Control Criminal Choice -1.48(.57)** -.25
Structural model (total effect)
Self-Control Criminal Choice -2.33(.63)** -.39
Note. (2(df=14)=11.04, p=.68; CFI=1.00, GFI=.98, TLI=1.00, RMSEA=.00; N=153; † See
Figure 5.2 for a graphical explanation of the variables.
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STUDY 2
Recent theorizing argues that how people feel about a risk and the way they think about it
may be under the control of separate, and partially independent, systems or modes of
information processing (Kahneman, 2003; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004;
Van Gelder, De Vries, & Pligt, 2009). In other words, there may be two, instead of one,
mental modes in which risks can be evaluated; one based more on deliberate and analytical
considerations, the other based on intuitive, relatively fast and affect-based processing. A
recent review (Weber & Johnson, 2009) documents how these so-called dual-process models
can account for a large variety of judgment and decision making phenomena.
Van Gelder (2012) took the dual-process hypothesis as the basis for developing a
hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making arguing that if criminal acts are envisioned
as taking a risk, the idea of two separate modes of mental processing that guide behavior can
also prove to be informative for understanding criminal decision making. The model posits a
‘cool’ cognitive processing mode responsible for processing probabilistic information,
weighing costs against benefits and making projections about the long-term consequences of
decisions. This mode operates largely in accordance with the basic assumptions underlying
rational choice theories. The other mode the hot/cool perspective assumes is an affect-
based ‘hot’ mode that accounts for non-volitional and automatic processing (Van Gelder,
2012). Whereas the cool mode is the seat of self-regulation, the hot mode is under stimulus
control (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). This latter mode lacks representation in current
criminological models of decision making.
The hot/cool perspective on criminal decision making assumes behavior to be the
result of an interaction between the two modes. In other words, people are assumed to rely
both on cognitive cost-benefit analyses and their feelings when making criminal choices.
However, the modes do not necessarily operate in concert. Of particular relevance are
situations in which the hedonic properties of immediate and long-term consequences of a
prospect are negatively correlated (e.g. what I think is the best option, is not be the option I
feel like). In these cases the hot mode and the cool mode may trigger opposite behavioral
responses. If this happens and the hot mode determines the response, seemingly irrational
or self-defeating behavior is the result.
Its ability to explain this kind of behavior reflects an explanatory scope of the hot/cool
perspective that exceeds that of strictly cognitive models of decision making, as the latter
can only designate it as ‘irrational’ but are forced to stop short of explaining why it occurs.
The hot/cool perspective explains this behavior through the fact that cognitive appraisals of
a (criminal) risk, which implicate the cool mode, can diverge from emotional reactions to it,
which are associated with the hot mode. The affective hot mode does not weigh
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probabilities but evaluates in a more intuitive way. It is tied to the here-and-now and
responds to elements such as the vividness with which decision outcomes can be imagined
and their immediacy (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
As was also mentioned earlier, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) remark that most crime
carries immediate benefits while costs tend to be more long-term. It is easy to see how the
hot/cool perspective explains this. As the hot mode operates in the here-and-now and is
under stimulus control, it is insensitive to the delayed costs, the consideration of which
belongs to the operational domain of the cool mode. Hence, if the cool mode is not able to
override the response generated by the hot mode, criminal and potentially self-defeating
behavior ensues. In other words, if the hot mode is responsible for cueing the behavior,
such as in circumstances that trigger strong affect, appeals to sanction severity and
probability lose their deterrent effect.
Activating processing mode
We rely on extant social psychological literature on priming to induce processing mode (e.g.
Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Innes-Ker & Niedenthal, 2002; Srull & Wyer, 1979).
Priming temporarily increases the activation level of a processing mode which results in
short-term effects on behavior (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Van
Gelder, et al., 2009). The idea underlying priming is using apparently unrelated prior tasks
that include content that activates the relevant processing mode (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999;
Frankish & Evans, 2009). The mode that is targeted is expected to subsequently affect
judgments and choices that follow the prime (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977).
In this study, processing mode is primed by presenting a task in which participants
have to unscramble sentences that either contain words related to affect or to cognition
(Srull & Wyer, 1979). Subsequently, in a supposedly unrelated experiment, participants are
presented the same vignettes used in Study 1. We expect negative affect to be a stronger
predictor of criminal choice for participants in the hot processing condition in which they
have to unscramble sentences with affect-related words. In the cool processing condition,
we expect perceived risk to more strongly predict criminal choice.
METHOD
Participants & procedure
Hundred twenty-nine undergraduate psychology students (59.7% female, Mage = 20.4, age
range: 17-38 years) participated in the study in exchange for either course credit or monetary
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compensation. Participants were seated in separate cubicles where they filled out the
materials for this study, which were included in a larger unrelated data collection.
Materials
Priming task Participants were presented with strings of five words in random order and
instructed to create a grammatically correct sentence using all five words. Whereas this
sentence unscrambling task is a common way of priming concepts, no such task yet existed
for inducing either hot or cool processing mode. The task used was therefore developed
specifically for the purposes of this study
Two different versions of the task were created. In the affect version, each string of
five words contained one word related to affect, e.g., mood, sensation, feeling, emotions.
One of the strings in this version was ‘talks, her, mood, about, she’, which is to be
unscrambled as “she talks about her mood”. In the cognition version, participants were
presented the same strings, however, the affect-related words were substituted for cognition-
related words, e.g., thinking, rational, reasoning, calculation. For example, the unscrambled
sentence in the above example read in the cognition condition: “she talks about her logic”.
In total, participants were presented 28 sentences to unscramble, 21 of which containing
either cognition or affect-related target words and seven of which intended as fillers
containing no words related to either cognition or affect (e.g. “bakery to went she the”). The
complete task appears in the Appendix. All statements were neutral in the sense that they
contained no value references (e.g. good, bad, excellent), references to specific emotions, or
emotionally valenced words (e.g. happy, sad, fearful).
Personality Equal to the previous study, we used the 100-item Dutch revised version of the
HEXACO personality inventory to measure Honesty-Humility and HEXACO Self-Control.
The alpha reliability of the Honesty-Humility dimension was .77. HEXACO Self-Control
was created analogously to the previous study and had an alpha reliability of .75. Means and
standard deviations for both scales were also similar to the previous study with mean values
of 3.38 (sd = .50) for Honesty-Humility, and 3.28 (sd = .33) for HEXACO Self-Control.
Negative Affect, Perceived Risk and Criminal Choice The mediating variables and the outcome
variable were also measured and constructed identically to the previous study. Alpha
reliabilities were slightly lower than the values in Study 1, but adequate with .86. for Negative
affect, .76 for Perceived Risk, and .73 for Criminal Choice. Means and standard deviations
were similar to the previous study with mean values of 3.99 (sd = 1.11) for Negative affect,
14.34 (sd = 7.86) for Perceived Risk, and .00 (sd = 2.96) for Criminal Choice.
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Table 5.5 Correlations of HEXACO-PI-R, HEXACO Self-Control, Perceived Risk, Negative Affect and Criminal Choice
(Study 2)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Mean  3.38 3.14 3.54 2.99 3.38 3.12 3.28 14.34 3.99 .00
Sd  .50 .65 .52 .53 .58 .62 .33 7.86 1.11 2.96
1. Condition -
2. Honesty-Humility .06 -
3. Emotionality .08 .16 -
4. Extraversion -.02 -.15 -.21* -
5. Agreeableness .08 .20* -.19* .13 -
6. Conscientiousness .06 .18* .20* -.13 .03 -
7. Openness to Experience -.02 .20* -.04 .09 .08 -.03 -
8. HEXACO Self-Control .03 .68** .32** -.09 .44** .60** .10 -
9. Perceived Risk -.02 .20* .30** -.22* -.05 .21* .08 .29** -
10. Negative Affect -.07 .18* .35** -.19* -.15 .09 -.04 .19* .48** -
11. Criminal Choice .12 -.23* -.25* .22* .18* -.21* -.02 -.28** -.58** -.55** -
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01; N= 129
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RESULTS
Table 5.5 shows the correlations, means and standard deviations of HEXACO personality,
Perceived Risk, Negative Affect and Criminal Choice. Equal to the results of Study 1,
Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Conscientiousness, HEXACO Self-Control, Perceived
Risk and Negative Affect were all significantly correlated with Criminal Choice. However,
Extraversion and Agreeableness were also significantly correlated with Criminal Choice in
this sample. Prior to testing the hypotheses, we examined whether the mean scores on the
mediator variables and the outcome variable differed for the two experimental conditions.
The results of t-tests revealed no significant differences on any of the variables. From this
we conclude that any possible differences between the groups on the mediator and outcome
variables cannot be attributed to differences in the intensity of the manipulation.
Mediation effects
Prior to examining the effect of our manipulation, we first tested for mediation effects of
Perceived Risk and Negative Affect for the complete sample to replicate the findings of
Study 1. That is, we tested the core models comparable to those reported in Study 1, using
the same analysis strategy and restrictions, and again using AMOS 18 (Arbuckle, 2009).
The (unconstrained) Model for Honesty-Humility showed adequate fit
2(df=16)=31.65, p=.01; CFI=.98, TLI=.96, RMSEA=.09. The (unconstrained) Model for
HEXACO Self-Control showed slightly better fit 2(df=16)=21.19, p=.17; CFI=.99,
TLI=.99, RMSEA=.05.26 Different from the results obtained in Study 1, the direct effects
from both Honesty-Humility to Criminal Choice and from Self-Control to Criminal Choice
were both not significant in this sample (p >.05), implying only indirect, i.e. mediated, effects
of both dispositions on Criminal Choice.
Moderation effects
In order to test for differences in the relative strengths of the relations between Negative
Affect and Criminal Choice and Perceived Risk and Criminal Choice for the two
experimental conditions, we again modeled two separate SEM’s.
26 The ML estimation for this model gave rise to one Heywood case (i.e. negative error
variance) which prevented a solution from being generated. The occurrence of the Heywood
case was dealt with by setting its variance to zero as suggested by Dillon, Mulani and Kumar
(1987).
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Figure 5.3 Structural Paths between the Latent Variables in the Structural Residuals Model Involving Honesty-Humility,
Negative Affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal Choice (Study 2)
.19
.96/1.00
-.57/-.15
.53
-.07
1.00/1.09
.67/.66
.89/.90
.97
-.14/-.62
.94/.90
.86/.86
.96/1.00
.25
.95/.91
HH1
.18
HH2
pr1 pr2
CC1
CC2
na2na1
Criminal
Choice
Negative
Affect
Perceived
Risk
Honesty-
Humility
Note. The paths from the latent to the observed variables refer to standardized factor loadings. The double-headed arrow refers to the covariance
between errors (ζ’s). All error terms of the manifest variables have been omitted.
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Analyses for both the Honesty-Humility model and the HEXACO Self-Control model are
presented in two steps. In the first step we compare the fit of different models (constrained
versus unconstrained) using multi-group modeling. In the second step we examine the
strength of the structural paths between Negative Affect and Criminal Choice and between
Perceived Risk and Criminal Choice for both conditions. Standardized coefficients appear in
Figure 5.3 (Honesty-Humility Model) and Figure 5.4 (HEXACO Self-Control model). For
space considerations, unstandardized coefficients are not reported.
In the first step, we consider eight different models. In some of these models, we free
up the structural paths linking the latent endogenous variables Negative Affect and
Perceived Risk to the outcome variable Criminal Choice to examine whether these models
show better model fit than models in which these paths are constrained to be equal across
the experimental conditions. Through the specification of equality constraints, differences
between conditions can be tested as they force the AMOS program to derive equal
unstandardized estimates of that parameter within both samples. The fit of the constrained
model is compared with that of the unconstrained model. If the fit of the constrained model
is significantly worse than that of the unconstrained model, we conclude that the parameters
are not equal in both conditions.
Model 1: Honesty-Humility, Negative affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal
Choice
We compared the following SEM models (Table 5.6): (1) a model in which none of the
variables were related to each other (the independent model), (2) a model in which the
hypothesized relations between the variables were allowed to vary between the two
experimental conditions (the unconstrained model), (3) a model in which the measurement
weights were fixed to be equal across the conditions, but the rest of the parameters were free
(the measurement weights model (3a)), a model in which we allowed the structural paths
between Negative affect and Criminal Choice and the structural paths between Perceived
Risk and Criminal Choice in the Hot Processing Condition to be different from the
structural paths in the Cool Processing Condition (structural weights model 3b)). Models 3c
(structural variance model) and 3d (structural residuals model) were equal to model 3b but
now with an additional structural variance (3c) or a structural variance plus structural
residuals (3d) fixed to be equal across the conditions. Model 3e (constrained model) was
equal to model 3d, but now the two parameters which were freed up across the two
conditions in models 3b, 3c, and 3d were fixed to be equal. In the last model (measurement
residuals model (3f)), all parameters were constrained to be equal across conditions.27
27
 One Heywood case was dealt with by setting its variance to zero.
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Table 5.6 Comparison of Fit Indices of different models in Study 2 for Structural Equation Model with
Honesty-Humility
χ2 df p TLI RMSEA 90% CI p-close PCFI
1. Independent 793.20 56 .00 .00 .32 .30-.34 .00 .00
2. Unconstrained 57.51 32 .00 .94 .08 .05-.11 .08 .55
3. Constrained
  a) Measurement weights (λ’s) 65.85 36 .00 .94 .08 .05-.11 .05 .62
  b) 3a + Structural weights + 2 β’s free (see text) 71.15 39 .00 .94 .08 .05-.11 ..05 .67
  c) 3b + Structural variance (Φ) 73.97 40 .00 .94 .08 .05-.11 .04 .68
  d) 3c + Structural residuals (Ψ) 78.59 44 .00 .94 .08 .05-.11 .05 .75
  e) 3d + 2 β’s constrained 85.67 46 .00 .93 .08 .06-.11 .03 .78
  f) 3e + Measurement residuals (Θδ) 102.83 53 .00 .93 .08 .06-.11 .01 .88
Note. The structural residuals model is selected as the ‘best’ model (see text) and is represented in Figure 5.3.
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We compared the eight models using a significance test of the increase in χ2 when
additional parameters were fixed. A significant increase in χ2 signifies that constrained
(nested) models are significantly worse. Applied to the nested models in Table 5.6, we found
that model 3a was not significantly worse than model 2 (Δχ2(df=4)=8.34, p= .08), that model
3b was not significantly worse than model 3a (Δχ2(df=3)=5.30, p= .15), that model 3c was not
significantly worse than model 3b (Δχ2(df=1)=2.82, p=.09), that model 3d was not significantly
worse than model 3c (Δχ2(df=4)=4.62, p=.33), but that model 3e was significantly worse than
model 3d (Δχ2(df=2)=7.09, p=.03). On grounds of parsimony in combination with the other fit
indices (see Table 5.6), the structural residuals model (model 3d) appears to be the ‘best’
model. This model is shown in Figure 5.3. Note that a better fit of a model in which the two
relevant paths were freed up, i.e. allowed to differ, compared to a model where they are
constrained is in line with our expectations.
We therefore take this model as the basis for comparing the relative strength of the
standardized structural paths from Negative affect to Criminal Choice and from Perceived
Risk to Criminal Choice for both experimental conditions and test our hypotheses. Recall
that we expected that the structural path from Negative affect to Criminal Choice would be
stronger in the Hot Processing Condition compared to the Cool Processing Condition,
whereas the path from Perceived Risk was expected to be stronger in the Cool Processing
Condition relative to the Hot Processing Condition.
In support of our hypotheses, the standardized path linking Negative Affect to
Criminal Choice was significant in the Hot Processing Condition (β=-.52, p < .001), but not
in the Cool Processing Condition (β=-.17, p=.15). Conversely, the standardized path linking
Perceived Risk to Criminal Choice was significant in the Cool Processing Condition (β=-.59,
p < .001), but not in the Hot Processing Condition (β=-.16, p=.18).
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Figure 5.4 Structural Paths between the Latent Variables in the Structural Residuals Model Involving HEXACO Self-Control,
Negative Affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal Choice (Study 2)
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Note. The paths from the latent to the observed variables refer to standardized factor loadings. The double-headed arrow refers to the covariance
between errors (ζ’s). All error terms of the manifest variables have been omitted.
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Table 5.7 Comparison of Fit Indices of different models in Study 2 for Structural Equation Model with HEXACO
Self-Control
χ2 df p TLI RMSEA 90% CI p-close PCFI
1. Independent 793.97 56 .00 .00 .32 .30-.34 .00 .00
2. Unconstrained 52.51 34 .02 .96 .07   .03-1.00 .21 .59
3. Constrained
  a) Measurement weights (λ’s) 53.62 38 .05 .97 .06 .01-.09 .35 .66
  b) 3a + Structural weights + 2 β’s free (see text) 54.31 41 .08 .98 .05 .00-.08 .46 .75
  c) 3b + Structural variance (Φ) 55.13 42 .08 .98 .05 .00-.08 .48 .74
  d) 3c + Structural residuals (Ψ) 57.13 46 .13 .98 .04 .00-.08 .59 .81
  e) 3d + 2 β’s constrained 64.69 48 .05 .97 .05 .00-.08 .43 .84
  f) 3e + Measurement residuals (Θδ) 78.59 53 .01 .96 .06 .03-.09 .24 .91
Note. The structural residuals model is selected as the ‘best’ model and is represented in Figure 5.4.
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Model 2: HEXACO Self-Control, Negative affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal
Choice
For the model containing HEXACO Self-Control, we followed a similar two-step analysis
strategy.28 We again compared eight different structural models and used the same indices to
examine and compare model fit (Table 5.7). Applied to the models that appear in Table 5.7,
we found that model 3a was not significantly worse than model 2 (Δχ2(df=4)=1.12, p=.89),
that model 3b was not significantly worse than model 3a (Δχ2(df=3)=.69, p=.88), that model
3c was not significantly worse than model 3b (Δχ2(df=1)=.81, p=.37), that model 3d was not
significantly worse than model 3c (Δχ2(df=4)=2.00, p=.74), but that model 3e was significantly
worse than model 3d (Δχ2(df=2)=9.57, p=.02). Equal to the Honesty-Humility model, on
grounds of parsimony in combination with the fit indices reported in Table 5.7, we conclude
that the structural residuals model (model 3d) is the ‘best’ model. The graphic for this model
is presented in Figure 5.4.
Consequently, we take this model as the basis for comparing the relative strength of
the standardized structural paths from Negative affect to Criminal Choice and from
Perceived Risk to Criminal Choice for both experimental conditions and test our
hypotheses. The standardized path linking Negative Affect to Criminal Choice was
significant in the Hot Processing Condition (β=-.52, p< .001), but not in the Cool
Processing Condition (β=-.17, p=.15). Conversely, the standardized path linking Perceived
Risk to Criminal Choice was significant in the Cool Processing Condition (β=-.59, p< .001)
but not in the Hot Processing Condition (β=-.16, p=.18). These results by and large overlap
with the results of the Honesty-Humility model. We conclude that our hypotheses are
supported.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In Study 1, we examined how dispositional self-control and morality, which was
operationalized through the Honesty-Humility trait, relate to criminal choice. It was shown
that these relations are both direct and indirect, via the state variables negative affect and
perceived risk. In Study 2, we replicated these findings and additionally provided evidence
for the existence of two independent modes of information processing that influence
criminal choices: a ‘cool’ cognitive mode and a ‘hot’ affective one. Processing mode was
found to moderate the relations between both state variables and criminal choice.
28
 In the ML estimation for this model, three Heywood cases were dealt with by fixing their
variances to zero.
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These findings extend what we know from previous research in different ways. First,
they add to our knowledge of the psychological mechanisms underlying the personality-
crime relationship by revealing the different pathways through which individual traits relate
to criminal choice. As such they integrate the proximal with the distal level and provide a
more encompassing picture of the criminal decision making process. Second, besides
considering the commonly used cognitive factors, such as the costs and benefits of crime,
we also addressed the role of feelings as predictors of criminal choice, showing that they are
equally predictive as perceptions of sanction risk. Third, we provided empirical evidence for
the hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making suggested by Van Gelder (2012) by
showing that there are two different modes in which criminal prospects are processed.
Taken together, these findings suggest that an extension of rational choice-based models
along the lines suggested in the present research could significantly enhance their predictive
scope.
However, when interpreting the results a number of considerations should be kept in
mind. One case in point is the fact that the research sample consisted of university
undergraduates and not active offenders, which poses limits to the generalizability of the
results. While we acknowledge this, we have reason to believe that the mechanisms at stake
are general and extend across populations. Findings reported by Van Gelder et al. (2009)
who tested a dual-process model of (general) risky choice correspond with the results of the
present research. Furthermore, Van Gelder and De Vries (2012a) found similar mediation
patterns in a representative sample of the Dutch population.
A second consideration that prompts caution with respect to the interpretation of the
results regards the fact that this study used vignettes instead of actual reactions to criminal
situations. While vignettes are useful tools to capture individuals’ behavioral intentions, they
may not always accurately reflect actual decisions made in real-life situations (cf. Exum &
Bouffard, 2010). We have attempted to maximize the correlation between reported intention
and actual behavior by using vignettes that were both relevant to and familiar for the target
group which is likely to increase the correlation between intention and actual behavior
(Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Additionally, vignettes carry the advantage over
conventional self-report methods that they are detailed in terms of the description of the
offense and its circumstances (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994, p. 590). Given these points and
the fact that the possibilities for measuring the hypothesized relationships during the
performance of an actual crime are limited, we think our design was appropriate for
examining the phenomena under study and that the reported behavioral intentions
approximate decisions in the real-world.
While this research showed that it is possible to activate processing mode through
priming, the relevance for crime research lies primarily in the influence of emotions engaging
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the hot mode and influencing criminal behavior. It should be noted that our manipulation
did not actually intend to invoke emotions in participants but only the way information is
processed. In case the hot mode is triggered through emotional arousal, we also expect
differences in criminal choice, not just the strength of the paths operating on it. Note,
however, that the fact that affective processing was a strong predictor of criminal choice
even in a context in which emotions are unlikely to run high and for crimes that can be
characterized as calculating, cool, offenses supports –rather than undermines– our argument
regarding the importance of affect as a predictor of criminal choice. To venture further into
the studied relationships between affect, personality and crime, we recommend researchers
to focus on situations that trigger (intense) emotions to evaluate their influence on crime and
delinquency. This research could also examine the expected relationships for more serious
offenses and among populations of active offenders and/or at-risk populations to address
the limitations of the present studies.
The results of this research also carry policy implications. When offenses are intimately
associated with affect, e.g. road-rage, hooliganism, domestic violence, bar fights, offenders
may be relatively unaffected by increasing punishment or attempting to reduce the
associated benefits, even when they are motivated to abstain from offending. In these
situations, affective processing ties their focus to the immediate present and encourages
making those (criminal) choices that yield immediate gratification. If the cognitive mode is
unable to override the response generated by the hot mode, the latter dominates and risky or
impulsive behavior ensues. The assumption is that lapses in self-control occur when the hot
system temporarily takes over, which leads behavior to be determined by the immediate
associations generated by stimuli and their hedonic properties, rather than the assessed
valence and probability of future consequences. Note that this implies that individual
differences in the ability to exert self-control are at least partially rooted in the strength of
the cool and hot modes.
Policies that stress cost-benefit considerations are unlikely to be successful when
offenses are particularly associated with affect and this will be even more prominent for
offenders who suffer from low (dispositional) self-control. To effectively alter patterns of
self-defeating behavior, it is necessary to address the automatic construals and reflexive
affective reactions underlying them so that they can be brought under volitional control
(Mischel, Cantor & Feldman, 1996). In other words, it requires a cool mode able to inhibit
the response cued by the hot mode. For crime theorists, it is therefore important to focus on
the interaction between the two modes and how and to what extent volitional processes in
the cool mode can be used to inhibit or channel impulses from a hot mode that seeks
immediate gratification. Not surprisingly, cognitive behavioral interventions often promote
emotion regulation skills through effortful overriding impulsive and automatic response
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tendencies (Mischel, 2004). By making offenders aware of how their perception and
behavior are influenced by their own state of arousal they can learn to compensate for such
influences (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006). Furthermore, priming can also be used as a tool in
therapeutic contexts to enhance self-control, by diverting attention away from the hot mode
and activating the cool mode in response to a problematic arousal eliciting stimulus
(Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).
Even though we see this research only as an initial step in testing the hot/cool
perspective –integrated with individual dispositions–, we think it has much potential for the
study of crime. Further empirical support for a ‘criminal dual-process’ hypothesis is
important as it could shed new light on a series of fundamental issues that challenge crime
researchers, such as why and when offender behavior deviates from what are rational
courses of action, under what circumstances deterrence is likely to be most effective, and
through which strategies and interventions recidivism can be more effectively prevented.
Hopefully, the studies reported here will entice criminologists to use the hot/cool
perspective as a point of departure for future research that addresses these and other related
issues.
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APPENDIX
1. Just go with your feeling/brain
2. He is a[n] emotional/rational boy
3. He shared his deepest feelings/thoughts
4. She went to the bakery
5. You should really experience/analyze it
6. You must train your intuition/brains
7. She could really sense/understand it
8. The television brings the news
9. This does influence my mood/thinking
10. It is all about emotions/knowledge
11. She talks about her mood/logic
12. They sat at the table
13. He is a sensitive/sensible person
14. She made an affective/analytical impression
15. I had a certain sensation/insight
16. I took out the trash
17. My gut-feeling/calculation says it’s correct
18. He spoke from his heart/conviction
19. I could experience/understand it myself
20. Discussing the matter once again
21. According to his own experience/reasoning
22. Our choice was very impulsive/reasoned
23. He listened to the sentiment/analysis
24. They did the dishes later
25. It keeps engaging our emotions/minds
26. I sensed/realized it very quickly
27. They shared a certain temper/understanding
28. He wrote in his agenda
Note. In bold are the words related to emotion/cognition respectively. Note that the
original sentences were phrased in Dutch. An attempt was made to translate literally into
English while preserving the original meaning of the sentences as much as possible.
Translation may have caused some changes in meaning and syntax.
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6 DISCUSSION
The preceding chapters have examined the role of cognition and affect in risky and
criminal decision making. Drawing from social psychology and judgment and decision
making research, a model was proposed that assumed both cognitive perceptions of risk
and feelings evoked by the situation to influence people’s choices. The influence of
feelings was shown to stretch far beyond what has been assumed to be their role by
traditional decision making models. It was demonstrated that also in seemingly
calculating, white-collar type, offenses affect plays a fundamental role alongside cognitive
considerations. This dissertation concludes by reviewing these findings in a broader
perspective, discussing limitations and strengths of the research approach employed, and
addressing open questions that need to be addressed in future research. We begin,
however, by discussing the main findings.
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
This dissertation started out with a brief description of a dilemma that could potentially
result in a criminal choice. You were asked to imagine that you had bought some
valuable items during a holiday abroad. You had not considered that importing the items
was actually not allowed without an export license from the country where you bought
them. While you wait for your baggage to arrive on the conveyor belt you realize you are
faced with the dilemma of whether or not to report them to the customs authorities.
Reporting them would imply their confiscation; not doing so would mean not only
risking confiscation but also a hefty fine.
Following the description, several key questions were posed that subsequent
chapters were to address. The first question regarded whether you, if you would find
yourself in this situation, would try to get past customs even if this implied a legal
sanction in case your baggage would get checked. Another question regarded whether
you thought your behavior in this case would be guided more by your deliberations or by
what your feelings tell you. Furthermore, it was asked whether your reliance on cognition
or affect could be influenced, even without you realizing it. Finally, you were asked to
what extent you think your personality would influence your choice.
As will be clear by now, the description of the dilemma you read bears quite some
resemblance to the scenarios that were used in the various studies reported in the
preceding chapters. On the basis of their results, we should therefore now be able to
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answer the above questions with some confidence, except for the first one –i.e. would
you do it?– the answer to which only you know. Instead of following the typical chapter-
by-chapter review of key findings, I will take these questions as a guide for reiterating the
results.
What you think about it or how you feel about it?
Are risky choices determined by thoughts, reasoning and ‘cold’ calculation as assumed by
rationalist decision perspectives and utility models, or is it all about emotions and gut
feelings? This question was central to all chapters. In Chapter Two, the theoretical case
was made for the joint influence of thinking and feeling on how we make risky and
criminal choices. This hypothesis was supported by each of the empirical studies in all
three subsequent chapters. The first set of studies, which was presented in Chapter
Three, showed that both perceived risk and negative affect are important predictors of
risky choice in general. The studies reported in Chapters Four and Five replicated these
findings for criminal choice.
Additionally, it was shown that both cognition, operationalized as the perceived
risk of sanction, and negative affect, i.e. the feelings of fear and worry that are generated
by the criminal prospect, are roughly equal in predictive strength. To revert back to the
question posed earlier, both thinking and feeling appear to influence criminal choice.
The merit of a dual-process perspective in comparison to single-process perspectives in
this respect resides in its ability to move beyond the oft-assumed binary opposition
between reason and emotion, but instead to be inclusive and to accommodate the
influence of both thinking and feeling on decisions.
Can reliance on thinking or feeling be influenced?
Another question that was posed regarded whether reliance on thinking or feeling when
deciding on a risky or criminal action can be influenced. Recall that in Chapter Two it
was argued that according to the dual-process assumption underlying the hot/cool
perspective of criminal decision making, the cool cognitive and hot affective modes
operate relatively independently of each other. To provide evidence for this assertion it
was necessary to demonstrate that both modes could separately be influenced. To this
end, we employed different techniques to activate processing mode. In Study 2 of
Chapter 3 we did so by adding affective or cognitive information to risk descriptions.
This led to respective increases in the strength of negative affect and perceived risk as
143
predictors of risky choice. In the third study in this Chapter, we provided further support
for the existence of two relatively independent modes of processing by which risks can
be evaluated using a priming task. This task consisted of a puzzle containing either
affect-related words, e.g. emotion, feeling, sensation, or cognition-related words, e.g.
thinking, reasoning, calculate. It was found that processing mode can indeed be
activated. In a subsequent task, the predictive weight of perceived risk increased in the
cognition condition relative to the affect condition. In the affect condition the relative
weight of negative affect increased as a predictor of risky choice.
In Study 2 of Chapter 5, these findings were replicated for criminal choice using an
alternative priming task to influence processing mode. In this study, prior to being
presented criminal choice vignettes, participants were presented a task in which they had
to form correct sentences from series of five words. Similar to the puzzle manipulation,
in the affect condition, the sentences that had to be ‘unscrambled’ contained affect-
related words, whereas in the cognition condition they contained cognition-related
words. The results of this study coincide with those of Chapter 3; activating a cool
cognitive processing mode led to an increase in the relative weight of perceived risk as a
predictor of risky choice, whereas activating a hot affective processing mode led to an
increase in the relative weight of negative affect.
In conjunction, these results provide evidence for the existence of two separate
modes of mental information processing, a largely cognitive one and another one that is
affect-based, that influence how individuals make criminal choices and risky decisions in
general. In other words, these findings support the theoretical case made in Chapter Two
for a hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making.
Do people differ?
The last question that needs to be addressed prior to reverting back to the general
research question is whether interpersonal differences play a role in the sense that people
with different personality characteristics evaluate the risks involved differently. This
question was addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, we proposed what was
termed a ‘trait-state’ model of criminal decision making that investigated how the
different personality traits incorporated in the HEXACO personality structure were
related to criminal choice among a representative sample of the Dutch adult population.
We hypothesized both direct and indirect relationships, via perceived risk and negative
affect, between personality and criminal choice.
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In line with our hypotheses, we found that the HEXACO traits Emotionality and
Honesty-Humility, and an interstitial Self-Control trait based on the HEXACO
personality structure, were all directly and indirectly, via both perceived risk and negative
affect, related to criminal choice. Scoring high on these dimensions led to more negative
feelings about the consequences of a criminal choice and a higher perceived risk of
sanction. Each of these three personality variables was also directly related to criminal
choice, i.e. unmediated by either perceived risk or negative affect. Conscientiousness
was, as we had hypothesized, a largely cognitive trait and related to perceived risk only.
In Chapter 5, we replicated these findings for Honesty-Humility and HEXACO Self-
Control, which were by far the strongest personality predictors of criminal choice. In
conjunction, these findings support our hypothesized trait-state model of criminal
decision making.
Research question revisited
We are now able to answer the overarching research question of this dissertation:  Can a
dual-process perspective that incorporates both thinking and feeling –and individual
dispositions– better explain and predict criminal decisions than the existing single-
process perspectives that currently dominate criminal decision making research and
theorizing? The answer to this question, it will now probably be evident, is: Yes it can.
The studies presented in the preceding chapters show that feelings play a very significant
role in a wide variety of criminal decision processes, even in seemingly calculated ones.
Furthermore, the findings show that an integrated perspective that includes both
proximal factors that operate in the moment of making a choice, i.e. states, and enduring
individual dispositions related to crime, i.e. traits, presents a more encompassing picture
of why crime occurs than examining either traits or states in isolation.
STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS& IMPLICATIONS
Strengths
In the study of crime, the dominant decision making models have been rational choice-
based perspectives which posit a reasoning actor who engages in some type of cost-
benefit calculation, however rudimentary, to arrive at a decision of whether or not to
commit a crime. This has meant that the study of criminal decision making has largely
remained confined to cognitive approaches that pay little interest to the potential role of
145
feelings as inputs in the choice process. In doing so this research has remained
somewhat oblivious to insights that have been handed down for centuries, such as the
passion versus reason dualism discussed in the introduction. This has led to an
incomplete perspective on human decision making. As phrased by sociologist Norbert
Elias (1939/1994, p. 486): “Every investigation that considers only the consciousness of
men, their “reason” or “ideas”, while disregarding the structure of drives, the direction
and form of human affects and passions, can from the outset be of only limited value”.
In this dissertation it was shown that ‘human affects’ and ‘passions’ are indeed
fundamental inputs in risky and criminal decision processes.
Of course many criminologists have pointed out this limitation of criminal decision
theory and suggested that passions too are germane to the study of crime. Most of our
knowledge of how feelings influence crime derives from narrative and interpretative
approaches (e.g. Anderson, 1999; Athens, 2005, 1997; Collins, 2008; De Haan & Loader,
2002; Katz, 1988; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Shover, 1996; Shover & Honaker, 1992;
Wright & Decker, 1997, 1994). While invaluable to our understanding of crime, studies
that rely on self-reports are unlikely to give full insight into the psychological
mechanisms underlying choice. Retrospective biases pose limits to the reliability of
personal accounts. Furthermore, people are likely to underestimate the effect of
emotional states and other visceral drives on their prior behavior (Loewenstein, 1996;
Nordgren, Van der Pligt & Harreveld, 2006) or may alter what was an emotion-laden and
impulsive decision process into a balanced and calculated one, for example after the
sobering experience of spending time in prison (Shover & Copes, 2010; see also
Cromwell, Olson & Avary, 1991). Most importantly, relying on what people say about
their motivations does not constitute (direct) evidence for the actual precursors of
behavior. Therefore, the existing studies that have noted the influence of feelings on
offender decision making, while highly informative, are limited in their ability to explain
the actual psychological processes at stake.
To unveil the mental mechanisms through which both affect and cognition, in
combination with individual dispositions, operate on people’s tendency to make risky or
criminal choices, this dissertation took a different and more direct approach using
quantitative and experimental methods. Nonetheless, this approach is also prone to a
series of shortcomings, that narrative approaches do not suffer from, and that require
discussion.
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Limitations
While in terms of theory, this dissertation has referred to affect and cognition in a
general fashion, both have been operationalized in specific ways. Whereas affect includes
moods, specific emotions and visceral drive states, we have opted for a restricted
operationalization as the feelings of fear and worry that emerge when individuals face a
criminal choice prospect. In other words, we addressed only one particular type of
(negatively valenced) affect. However, a variety of other feelings that have been
associated with crime, such as thrill, excitement, resentment, rage and anger, sexual
arousal and craving for drugs have not been dealt with. These different types of affect,
even though all implicating the hot mode, do not have to trigger the same behavioral
response. Even different types of negatively valenced emotions can trigger opposite
responses. Fear, for example, which involves uncertainty about one's ability to withstand
or handle a given threat, leads to higher perceptions of risk and inhibits criminal
behavior. Anger, on the other hand, is associated with lower risk perception (Lerner &
Keltner, 2000, 2001) and therefore facilitates crime (e.g. Wortley, 2008).
In a similar vein, cognition was also operationalized in a restricted way, i.e. as the
perceived risk of sanction. By focusing on thoughts about perceived costs of the potential
negative outcome, the operationalization essentially mirrored its affective counterpart,
which regarded the feelings evoked by the potential negative outcome. This carries the
advantage of a relatively straightforward comparison between the hot and cool
processing modes, which was our goal. However, our operationalization of cognition
was limited to the formal cost side of the equation. Different types of benefits associated
with the crime were not considered, nor were informal costs such as anticipated regret
and shame.
Arguably the greatest limitation in this dissertation, in spite of all its talk about
emotions, is the fact that in none of the studies affect was actually induced. Instead we
relied on the subconscious activation of a processing mode that was assumed to be
activated in a similar way as when emotions are experienced (see also: Lieberman, 2009).
Of course, the crucial point here, and the main difference with the actual experience of
emotions, is that we expect the latter to also actually influence decisions, and not just the
strength of the path leading from predictor to outcome variable. More specifically, the
actual experience of a crime-relevant emotion will increase or decrease an individual’s
tendency to make a criminal choice. In some cases it will inhibit it, such as in the case of
fear or feelings of empathy with a potential victim, in others it will facilitate it, such as
when rage is experienced or in states of sexual arousal (cf. Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006;
Mackenzie, 2006; Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). We will return to this point in the next
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section, but it can already be noted that crime research that explicitly addresses the role
of emotions is compatible with the predictions of the hot/cool perspective and the
results reported in this book.
From these limitations emerge several suggestions for future research. For one
thing, research should examine the effect different types of (induced or naturally
occurring) affect. Some research to this end is currently already being undertaken.
Together with my colleagues Henk Elffers and Danielle Reynald, for example, we have
recently started researching the question to what extent induced feelings of (immediate)
anger mute the impact of (anticipated) shame on decisions to offend. Whereas the first is
assumed to increase the likelihood of offending, the latter has been shown to function as
a deterrent. This research can also shed light on the interaction between the hot and the
cool mode because anger, it will be recalled, pertains to the hot mode, while anticipated
shame refers to a prediction of a future emotional state, and hence thinking about feeling
rather than the actual experience of the emotion itself. Future research should
additionally examine the role of informal costs, e.g. social disapproval, and also the
perceived material and immaterial benefits of crime. The influence of positively valenced
affect, such as thrill and excitement, on the propensity to engage in crime is another
interesting avenue for future research to explore. Together with Reinout de Vries I intend
to undertake a number of exciting studies in this direction in the near future.
Each of the empirical chapters in this thesis relied on scenarios to make its case.
This method of investigation has its strengths and drawbacks which have already been
discussed in detail in the various chapters themselves and therefore do not require
elaborate reiteration here. A number of short observations will suffice. The two main
limitations of this approach are the assumption that people’s intention to perform a
crime is reflective of their actual behavior, and restrictions regarding the type and
severity of crime that can be measured through it. A related limitation of the studies
reported is that most of them have used undergraduate students as research subjects,
which poses challenges to the generalizability of the results. This latter point plays out in
two different ways. For one thing, student samples consist of higher educated and
mostly young people. As most crime is committed between late adolescence and early
adulthood, the age of the sample is not too problematic. However, it is clear that the
average student deviates in important ways from the typical delinquent in terms of
education, gender (most delinquents are male), intelligence, socio-economic background,
ethnicity, level of self-control, etc.
The use of specialized samples like this one also restricts the type of scenario that
can be used, which excludes the more serious offenses. However, it should be noted that
one of the studies employed a community sample representative of the Dutch adult
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population (below the age of 60) and the results of this study coincided with those of the
other studies. Furthermore, results of research among squatters facing the risk of
eviction in the city of Buenos Aires were highly similar to the results of the present
studies (Van Gelder, 2009). It was shown that both their perception of the risk of
eviction and the negative affect triggered by their uncertain housing situation were
predictive of the extent to which the squatters were willing to invest in their dwellings,
and hence take risks. The fact that the findings seem to hold across settings, cultures and
for different types of risks, i.e. criminal and general, bolsters confidence in the assertion
that they are generalizable across populations and risk behaviors.
Another issue that should be mentioned here regards to strong correlation between
perceived risk and negative affect. The reader may argue that the high correlations
(between .50 and .70) between the two variables pulls into doubt the validity of claims
regarding their relative independence. My reply to this critique is twofold. Firstly, the
high correlation between these two constructs can hardly be surprising: both regard
reactions to risk, the difference being that one regards the way we contemplate risk and
the other how we feel about it. Hence the absence of a strong correlation here would be a
source of concern regarding the validity of measurement and the theory underlying it,
and not vice versa. Secondly, it was repeatedly shown that the hot affective and cool
cognitive processing modes could be primed independently, that is without influencing
the other mode, which is a clear indication of their independence. Indeed, as Zajonc
(1980) notes, even though feeling is generally not entirely free of thought, and thought
free of feelings, affect is always present as a companion to thought, whereas the converse
is not true for cognition (Zajonc, 1980). Neuroscientific research supports this claim as
the hard-wiring of the brain allows for an emotional reaction without the participation of
a cognitive appraisal (LeDoux, 1996; Zajonc, 1998, p. 597).
EXPLAINING THE BEHAVIOR OF PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: RATIONAL
MISBEHAVIOR?
If the hot/cool perspective is indeed as ‘general’ as it purports to be, and for it to live up
to its claim that it is capable of explaining criminal behavior that is hard to accommodate
by rationalist perspectives, we should relate it to other findings in criminology and
examine to what extent the hot/cool perspective shows ‘better fit’ with the data than
other perspectives. Also in the light of the limitations regarding the samples and the
scenario approach used, and the fact that emotions were not actually induced in this
dissertation, there is much to be gained from using the hot/cool framework to explain
149
the behavior of persistent offenders. These individuals with extensive track records of
what seems to be almost habitual crime seem an appropriate sample to ‘test’ the
hot/cool framework against. The argument I will make is that even in the offending
behavior of these individuals, affect plays a crucial role. Below, I will discuss several
important findings from narrative and interpretative approaches on hardened criminals
committing serious offenses and tentatively sketch out how they can be explained in
terms of the hot/cool perspective. It is important to stress that this is a speculative
attempt serving exploratory purposes only.
Life as party
One thing that has puzzled criminologists for some decades now is that the behavior of
offenders sometimes appears to be conforming to the basic premise underlying rational
choice, i.e. when faced with several possible courses of action, people weigh costs against
benefits and go for the option they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome, but
at other times their misbehavior seems to be rather at odds with this description and
appears to be irrational because it is self-defeating.
Shover and Honaker (1992, p. 283) note that it is instructive to examine the
decision making of persistent (property) offenders in the context of the lifestyle that is
characteristic of many in their ranks; a lifestyle the authors refer to as life as party (see also:
Copes & Vieraitis, 2009; Jacobs & Wright, 1999; Katz, 1991; Shover, 1996; Wright &
Decker, 1994, 1997). Life as party refers to a cycle of expensive, self-indulgent activities
on which criminal proceeds are spent (e.g. gambling, drug use, drinking, partying, non-
essential consumption, display of luxury) and that feed on themselves and call for more
of the same. In the words of Wright and Decker (1997, p. 35), this lifestyle resembles
“an open-ended quest for excitement and sensory stimulation”. Rationality and long-
range planning are eschewed in these cycles in favor of enjoying the moment (Shover &
Honaker, 1992, p. 287). To be able to perpetuate this cycle of self-indulgence and
pleasure offenders need money, generally a lot, and the approach they employ to get it is
crime. Legitimate options are rarely considered.
In their books Burglars on the job (1994) and Armed robbers in action (1997), Richard
Wright and Scott Decker explain that the crimes committed by these offenders are hard
to envision as one-off discrete and deliberate choices but instead seem to emerge out of
a natural flow of events:  [i]t is not so much that these actors consciously choose to
commit crime, as they elect to get involved in situations that drive them toward
lawbreaking” (1994, p. 40). Burglars that were interviewed made conscious choices
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throughout their crimes but at the same time their offending “did not appear to be an
independent, freely chosen event so much as it was part of a general flow of action
emanating from and shaped by their involvement with street culture.” In their book on
armed robbers, Wright and Decker (1997, p. 61) write that the offenders they
interviewed did not pick their targets in a calm, deliberate manner, but rather in a state of
perceived desperation. In the throes of such a state, they were not inclined to weigh
carefully the pros and cons of each target. Comparable findings are reported by
Cromwell, Olson and Avery (1991) who argue that the burglars they studied only tended
to attend to the present and that future events or consequences did not weigh heavily in
their risk assessments. In a similar vein, Shover and Honaker (1992), in their study on
incarcerated persistent property offenders, found that they not only failed to consider the
formal risks of crime, but that they gave no thought to legitimate alternatives either.
Copes and Vieraitis (2009) in their study on identity theft report similar results for the
offenders in their sample.
Wright and Decker (1997) note that the motivation of the armed robbers in their
sample to commit a stickup “emerged during a period of intense self-indulgence and
from a growing sense of frustration and anger because they felt themselves to be locked
into a cycle of events that was leading them nowhere. The following quote taken from
Shover and Honaker (1992) reflects this:  “It … gets to the point that you’re into such a
desperation. You’re not working, you can’t work. You’re drunk as hell, been that way
two or three weeks. You’re no good to yourself, and you’re no good to anybody else.
Self-esteem is gone [and you are] spiritually, mentally, physically, financially bankrupt.
You ain’t got nothing to lose” (p. 288).
How to explain this behavior which at times shows clear patterns of informed cost-
benefit tradeoffs, yet at other times appears to directly contradict sound deliberation?
Accommodating it is arguably possible in a rational choice framework, provided a
sufficiently broad definition of rationality, but as Wright and Decker (1994, p. 205) note,
it is doubtful whether this would substantially advance our understanding of the way in
which criminals decide to commit offenses. Additionally, rational choice frameworks
could account for a preference for option A, e.g. burglary, over option B, e.g. robbery,
but not the events that lead up to the actual moment of choice, which implicate the
motivation to commit crime. Indeed, as noted by Shover and Honaker (1992), offenders’
target selection decision making appears more rational in the conventional sense than do
crime commission decisions. Rational choice-based models simply posit a motivated
offender as one of their assumptions (cf. Cohen & Felson, 1979; Cornish & Clarke,
2006). Hence a crucial part in the analysis of offending behavior appears to be missing in
these models.
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In terms of the hot/cool perspective
How then might these findings be accommodated by the hot/cool perspective? Recall
first that the hot/cool framework does not assume that rational considerations such as
costs and benefits not to play a role in criminal decision making. Instead it argues that
feelings play an important role alongside rational or, better said, cognitive considerations.
Costs and benefits are processed, but situations that trigger strong affect make careful
assessments less likely.29 More importantly, the ultimate behavioral response in these
situations is more likely to be dictated by the hot mode instead of the cool mode. While
feelings of stress, desperation, anger and frustration typical of the life-as-party lifestyle,
potentiate the hot mode, at high levels they render the cool mode increasingly
dysfunctional (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). These intense levels of stress and affect that
are experienced in situations of ‘desperate partying’ (Wright & Decker, 1997) when
offenders are confronted with the ‘necessity’ to engage in crime can therefore explain the
self-defeating behavior of these individuals.
Another explanatory element of the hot/cool perspective is the difference in time-
orientation between the two modes. Recall the operative logic of the hot mode which is
triggered by stimuli in the immediate environment and whose temporal horizon is tied to
the present. The cool mode, on the other hand, is responsible for making projections
regarding the future which allows for an evaluation of different alternative courses of
action. As the cool mode can take into account both short-term and long-term payoffs, it
enables individuals to resist immediate rewards and strive for more valuable future
outcomes. Legitimate alternatives, for example, require a long-term perspective as their
yields are typically temporally remote. However, in situations of intense arousal, attempts
at self-control are directly undermined and the hot mode encourages making the
(criminal) choice that offers immediate benefit at the risk of incurring much more
serious delayed costs.
Anecdotal evidence from persistent property offenders supports this idea. For
example, Wright and Decker (1994, p. 61) note that at the time of actually contemplating
their crimes, offenders typically perceived themselves to be in a situation of immediate
need, which led to a mind-set in which they were seeking less to maximize their gains
than to deal with a present crisis. Furthermore, it indicates an element of feelings of
29 It is possible, I assume, that they completely fail to recognize their behavior is self-defeating
and to process costs and benefits. But perhaps it is even more likely that they do recognize the
self-defeating nature of the tradeoff, but are simply unable to translate this perception into an
abstention from criminal behavior. This is another unresolved yet highly relevant topic for
future research to address.
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desperation which might have weakened the influence of threatened sanctions and
neutralized any misgivings about the morality of breaking into dwellings.” Several
decades earlier, Lofland (1969, pp. 50-54) offered a very similar perspective arguing that
the pressure of their immediate situation attenuates the perceptual link between
offending and the risk of incurring sanctions; offenders enter a state of ‘encapsulation’ in
which all that matters is dealing with the present crisis. Evidence from social psychology
supports this view. Baumeister and Heatherton (1996), for example, note about the
interrelation between emotion and self-control that emotions increase the salience of
whatever produces them. Most commonly, something in the immediate situation is the
cause and so emotion tends to have the effect of concentrating in the here and now,
thereby thwarting transcendence and making self-regulation difficult. The fact that the
hot mode is only partially under cognitive control and operates largely non-volitional
also explains the oft-reported finding that offenders may experience and define
themselves as propelled by forces beyond their control (Katz, 1988; Shover & Honaker,
1992).
An offender may try to alleviate his negative mood, such as feelings of frustration
born out of failure at legitimate activities, through crime as it provides him with the
opportunity to establish himself as a competent individual and to (re)gain some sense of
control over his life (Shover & Honaker, 1992; Wright & Decker, 1994). The link
between negative mood alleviation and risky behavior is also supported by experimental
research which shows that people may give in to their impulses to make themselves feel
better (Tice, Bratslavsky & Baumeister, 2001). Leith and Baumeister (1996) found that
people’s negative moods were related to lower self-control, which in turn led to riskier
choice behavior. They explain this finding by arguing that “[p]eople who are upset seem
merely to seek out the best possible outcome and grab for it, without being deterred by
rational cost-benefit calculations or even by the prospect of possible unpleasant
consequences” (Leith & Baumeister, 1996, p.  1264).
In short, the notion of separate modes of processing that each operate
according to a different set of principles and respond to different elements of a situation,
can contribute much to our understanding of the behavior of persistent offenders too.
The automatic, affect-based hot mode of processing tends to respond to immediate
considerations, and operates in the here and now, while the controlled, cognitive cool
mode is capable of abstract thinking and contemplating the future. When the hedonic
properties of immediate and long-term consequences are negatively correlated, the
responses of the two modes are likely to contradict each other and ‘irrational’ or self-
defeating behavior, may ensue. A perspective that perceives decision processes as solely
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based on cognition can only call this behavior ‘irrational’, and remains silent as to how to
explain them and why they occur.
IMPLICATIONS
In the introduction of this dissertation, I briefly touched upon the historical context of
the dual-process hypothesis arguing that its core idea dates back to the ancient Greeks
who saw ‘passion’ as an unruly and potentially harmful independent source of conduct,
and ‘reason’ coming to the rescue after a potentially undesirable course of action was
instigated by the passions (Zajonc, 2001, p. 31). Even though history has known periods
which reversed the primacy of reason over passion, such as during the romantic era and,
arguably, the 1960s (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994), the binary opposition between thinking
and feeling itself seems to have always been around in one form or another. These
notions pointing towards the importance of feelings in virtually all forms of human
behavior were for a long time ignored in decision theory and social psychology.
Behavioral economist George Loewenstein eloquently summarizes this point:
“The decision-making paradigm, as it has developed, is the product of a
marriage between cognitive psychology and economics. From economics,
decision theory inherited, or was socialized into, the language of preferences
and beliefs, and the religion of utility maximization that provides a unitary
perspective for understanding all behavior. From cognitive psychology,
decision theory inherited its descriptive focus, concern with process, and
many specific theoretical insights. Decision theory is thus the brilliant child of
equally brilliant parents. With all its cleverness, however, decision theory is
somewhat crippled emotionally, and thus detached from the emotional and
visceral richness of life.” (1996, p. 289).
The neglect of the affective side of our mental operations with respect to crime
causation is also characteristic of criminological research albeit for a different reason.
Bouffard, Exum and Paternoster (2000, p. 159) argue that this neglect was due to the
strict disciplinary boundaries in the field and scholars’ desire to first carve out and
protect their own intellectual turf. As many sociologists first attempted to capture the
study of crime, the idea for a focus on the individual level of analysis did not sit well with
them. Instead they held to the belief that any cause of crime must be social, i.e. supra-
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individual (Bouffard, Exum & Paternoster, 2000). Consequently, with few exceptions,
the role of affect has systematically been downplayed by criminologists.
However, over the past two decades, decision theorists and behavioral economists
have come to realize that virtually all human decisions involve some form of affect. In
social psychology, and social cognition in particular, the dual-process hypothesis has
established a solid theoretical and empirical basis in recent years and nowadays
represents mainstream thinking (Smith & Neumann, 2005).30 The idea that feelings
influence (criminal) decisions is still far from being accepted in criminology, and the idea
of two different modes of mental information processing that guide our behavior, and
by implication also our criminal inclinations, is altogether absent in the crime literature.
This dissertation should therefore be seen, at least in part, as a modest attempt to
introduce these insights to criminology.
Two minds or a single metaphor?
One issue that has not been dealt with so far regards to what extent there actually are
exactly two independent modes or systems of information processing in the human
mind. While it seems clear that there is more than one, this does not exclude the
possibility of more than two processing modes. Why not three, 18 or more? Gilbert
(1999, p. 3) notes that the answer to this question may vary depending on the
disciplinary perspective of the beholder: “The neuroscientist who says that a particular
phenomenon is the result of two processes usually means to say something unambiguous
–for example, that the inferior cortex does one thing, that the limbic system does
another and that together the electrochemical activities of these two anatomical regions
produce a feeling of ennui, the aroma of stale cabbage, or the sneaking suspicion that
one’s spouse has been replaced by a replica.” The social psychologist can’t make such
claims because there are no tangible referents for the processes specified by the
psychologist’s talk of dual processes. By definition, then, any serious attempt to answer
the question as to how many processes there are is beyond the scope of this book.
The way I see it, the ‘take home message’ of this dissertation in this respect is that
making the conceptual step from one to two modes of mental processing opens up the
30
 Note that while passion and reason, or emotion and ratio, have often been pitted against each
other and the former was often seen as merely a destructive force, current psychological
perspectives tend to stress the adaptive function of emotions, which are deemed necessary for
our functioning and survival (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Frijda, 1986).
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possibility of explaining a wide variety of behaviors in more straightforward and
plausible ways than single process accounts can. Precisely this is its merit. One such issue
was dealt with earlier in this discussion and regards how behavior that seems to conform
to the basic requirements of rationality on one moment, can turn into a self-defeating
course of action just moments later. The dual-process idea, as we saw, solves this
behavioral puzzle by positing two forces each of which operating according to a distinct
set of principles that may contradict each other depending on their levels of activation.
Some dual-process theorists even go so far as to posit two separate minds that
sometimes enter into conflict with each other (Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2004).
Crime policy & criminal justice implications
Frankish and Evans (2009, p. 24) argue that the notion of dual processes, only one of
which corresponding to personal volitional cognition, has wide implications beyond the
cognitive sciences. Indeed, these authors note, the fact that much of our thought and
behavior is controlled by automatic, non-volitional, and inaccessible cognitive processes
challenges some of our most fundamental and cherished notions about personal and
legal responsibility. I think dual-process theorizing can in the long run also have major
implications for various areas related to crime prevention and criminal justice. Instead of
relegating this issue outright to future research and concluding this book, I want to make
a couple of brief remarks on this issue.
One important area for which dual-processing can have implications is crime
prevention and punishment. Because feelings are largely insensitive to changes in
sanction probability and severity, deterrence is unlikely to be effective when
transgressions are intimately associated with affect. If crimes are the consequence of cool
calculation, deterrence-based polices may be a more proper course of action to pursue
but, as was shown in this dissertation, even for seemingly calculating crimes feelings also
play a significant role as precursors of behavior. In this respect there is still a lot to learn
about the interactions between the hot and the cool mode.
A better understanding of the affective and cognitive processes underlying crime,
and their interplay, opens up new possibilities for more effectively reducing delinquency
and offender treatment. As was already remarked in Chapter 2, crimes intimately
associated with affect require a different response from the criminal justice system if they
are to be effectively prevented. At least for offenders that display a motivation to abstain
from future offending and other at-risk groups, it may be crucial to create awareness of
the influence of affect on their behavior and strengthen their ability to resist impulses,
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rather than placing faith in the unlikely assumption that in the future adequate cost-
benefit calculations will be made after having felt the pain of punishment instilled by the
state.
The hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making can also have consequences
for sentencing. One important area regards the serious questions it raises about
culpability and personal responsibility. With a better understanding of the effects and
strength of visceral factors, judges may apply this knowledge in the sentencing process.
Alternative sanctions coupled with treatment of offenders in which they are made aware
of the influence of affect on their behavior and learn to deal productively with it, or learn
to avoid situations that trigger strong affect altogether, seem more effective avenues for
reducing certain types of crime than cries for harsher punishment. In a similar vein,
probation institutions may benefit as insights from the hot/cool perspective can assist in
tailoring interventions that help increase inhibitory processes.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
One of the leading questions which have guided crime research since its genesis –i.e. to
what extent is a certain delinquent behavior ‘rational’ or not?– may have actually
misguided it. This question has obscured a more important, and more fundamental,
question. This question regards the extent to which the behavior is guided by cognition
or affect, each of which, it was shown, operates according to a different set of principles.
In 1985, Clarke and Cornish noted that a “considerable body of recent
psychological research on information processing and decision making has passed largely
unnoticed by criminologists” (p. 158). This led them to draw out a widely influential
cognitive framework of criminal decision making based on this research —the rational
choice perspective— which would form the behavioral foundation of a plethora of
situational crime theories.
Ironically, while crime researchers busied themselves with researching and applying
the rational choice perspective over the past 25 years, major advances in psychological
research on information processing and decision making, the very same traditions that
formed its basis, have been largely neglected in criminology. In other words, the rational
choice perspective fell prey to the same neglect it accused its contemporaries of.
Furthermore, the rational choice perspective and other situational perspectives on crime
have insisted that differences in individual disposition were largely irrelevant for
understanding crime, erroneously to be sure.
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It was my goal in this dissertation to point out some of the omissions and the one-
sidedness of the rational choice perspective and related theories, drawing from recent
insights in social psychology and decision making research. The various studies reported
demonstrate the fundamental role of affect as a driver of risky and criminal decisions,
even absent a state of emotional arousal, and that cognition and affect pertain to two
independent modes of mental information processing. Additionally, the integrative
perspective that was laid out also included personality traits and showed how these are
related to criminal choice. In doing so, this dissertation hopefully provided some new
input for an update of traditional models of criminal decision making and new research
into this undeniably highly exciting field.
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SUMMARY INDUTCH
Stel je voor dat je net op Schiphol bent geland na een reis in het buitenland. Je had de reis
deels ondernomen omdat je graag wat lokale voorwerpen wilde kopen. Je bent echter
vergeten te controleren of je deze voorwerpen eigenlijk wel mag invoeren. Terwijl je
wacht op je bagage bij de band valt je oog op een bord waarop staat dat het verboden is
cultuurgoederen te importeren zonder export licentie van het land waar je ze hebt
gekocht. Dat heb je niet gedaan zodat je je nu geconfronteerd ziet met een keuze. Of je
geeft de voorwerpen aan en ze worden geconfisqueerd of je doet het niet. In het laatste
geval riskeer je niet alleen confiscatie maar ook een behoorlijke boete.
Als jij je in deze situatie zou bevinden, zou je dan overwegen om het aangeven van
de goederen ‘te vergeten’? En zou je beslissing een kwestie zijn van een ‘koude’ afweging
van kosten, baten en kansen, of speelt wat je gevoel je zegt ook een rol? En kan dit
worden beïnvloed in de zin dat je op het ene moment meer naar je gevoel luistert terwijl
je het andere moment aan het rekenen slaat? En in hoeverre denk je dat je
persoonlijkheid een rol speelt bij je keuze? En waarom zou je dit eigenlijk allemaal willen
weten, d.w.z. zijn er eigenlijk praktische implicaties?
Dit zijn de vragen die centraal staan in deze dissertatie. Tezamen dienen ze ter
beantwoording van een bredere onderzoeksvraag: Is een zogenaamde ‘dual-process’
benadering dat zowel denken als voelen en persoonskernmerken omvat beter in staat om
criminele beslissingen te verklaren en voorspellen dan de ‘single-process’ perspectieven
die momenteel domineren in de criminologie? Het antwoord, zo blijkt uit een reeks
studies die wordt gerapporteerd in dit boek, is: jazeker.
De kern van de dissertatie bestaat uit vier hoofdstukken. In het eerste hoofdstuk
wordt gebruikmakend van met name sociaalpsychologische literatuur een ‘hot/cool
perspective of criminal decision making’ geïntroduceerd. De drie hoofdstukken die hierna
volgen zijn empirisch van aard en toetsen (delen van) het hot/cool model voor risicovolle
beslissingen in het algemeen en delinquente beslissingen specifiek.
Het eerste (theoretische) hoofdstuk legt de relatie tussen delinquent gedrag en
beslisgedrag in het algemeen. In de psychologie en verwante gebieden zoals behavioral
economics en de neurowetenschappen wordt steeds meer onderzoek gedaan naar zgn.
dual-process modellen. Deze modellen gaan ervan dat informatie niet op een manier, maar
op twee verschillende manieren wordt verwerkt in onze hersenen. Bij gebrek aan goede
Nederlandse vertaling hou ik hieronder de oorspronkelijke terminologie aan en spreek ik
van ‘modes (of information processing)’. Een van die modes is vergelijkbaar met de
‘traditionele’ calculerende manier van informatieverwerking: het afwegen van kosten en
baten, waarin waarschijnlijkheden van verschillende mogelijke uitkomsten worden
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meegenomen in de afweging en deze overwegingen ‘rationeel’ van aard zijn. De andere
manier van informatieverwerking, die tegelijkertijd opereert, is juist automatisch en
intuïtief  van aard en sterk gerelateerd aan ‘affect’, d.w.z. ons gevoel. Deze mode opereert
deels onderbewust waardoor je je dus van niet bewust van zijn invloed. Ik versta onder
affect trouwens niet alleen emoties, maar ook stemmingen en zgn. ‘visceral drives’. Deze
laatsten verwijzen naar gevoelsstaten zoals honger, behoefte aan verdovende middelen of
alcohol, en seksuele opwinding. Beide ‘modes’, die ik naar Metcalfe en Mischel (1999) de
cool mode en de hot mode noem, opereren volgens een eigen logica. Waar de cool mode
dus gevoelig is voor probabilistische informatie is de hot mode dat juist niet. Dit leidt
ertoe dat we in een bepaalde situatie, soms het ene kunnen denken maar het heel anders
voelen. Denk maar eens aan spreken in het openbaar. Objectief is er weinig risico (cool
mode), toch kan onze angst (hot mode) dicteren dat we ervan afzien hoe belachelijk we
dat misschien ook van onszelf vinden.
Iets vergelijkbaars geldt voor delinquente keuzes. Er wordt vaak aangenomen en
ook bewezen dat veel crimineel gedrag niet loont. Toch bezondigen criminelen zich er
keer op keer aan, hoe vaak ze ook worden opgepakt en gestraft woren. Een rationeel
keuze model is daarmee problematisch want het wordt geforceerd dit gedrag ‘irrationeel’
te noemen maar veel verder komt het niet. In dit hoofdstuk leg ik verder uit dat veel
crimineel gedrag dat niet begrepen kan worden vanuit traditionele modellen, zoals het
rationele keuze perspectief, wel kunnen worden verklaard vanuit het hot/cool model.
In Hoofdstuk 3 test ik het hot/cool model voor risicogedrag in het algemeen. Deze
stap was noodzakelijk omdat een dual-process perspectief voor risicogedrag, hoewel
herhaaldelijk gesuggereerd, nog niet eerder is getoetst. Er was, met andere woorden, nog
geen empirische steun voor. In dit hoofdstuk wordt deze steun gevonden in drie
verschillende studies. Alledrie de studies maken gebruik van scenario’s. Dat zijn korte
beschrijvingen waarin mensen zich moeten inleven en vervolgens worden gevraagd welke
keuze zij zouden maken in die situatie. De introductie van deze samenvatting waarin je
werd gevraagd je in te leven in de ‘Schiphol-situatie’ is daar een voorbeeld van. In de
eerste studie wordt gekeken naar de voorspellende waarde van de gepercipieerde pakkans
en strafzwaarte (de operationalisatie van de cool mode) en negatief affect, d.w.z. de
gevoelens van angst en onzekerheid die de situatie oproept (de operationalisatie van de
hot mode). Beide blijken ongeveer even goed crimineel gedrag te voorspellen en dit kan
dus worden geïnterpreteerd als voorlopige steun van het hot/cool model. Echter, deze
studie betekent nog geen daadwerkelijke steun voor een dual-process hypothese welke
ervan uitgaat dat de hot en de cool mode onafhankelijk  van elkaar opereren. Dit bewijs
wordt geleverd in Studie 2 en Studie 3 van dit hoofdstuk.
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In Studie 2 is ofwel cognitieve informatie ofwel affectieve informatie aan de
scenario’s toegevoegd om vervolgens te kijken in hoeverre dit de voorspellende sterkte
van negatief affect (hot mode) en gepercipieerde pakkans en strafzwaarte (cool mode)
beïnvloedt. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat in het eerste geval negatief affect veel beter
risicogedrag voorspelt terwijl dit in het tweede geval juist pakkans en strafzwaarte is. In
Studie 3 wordt een zgn. unobtrusive maat gebruikt. Respondenten krijgen voordat ze de
scenario’s krijgen gepresenteerd in een zogenaamd ongerelateerde taak een lettersoep
puzzel voorgelegd. In de ene conditie bevat de puzzel cognitieve woorden zoals ‘denken’,
‘analyseren’, ‘rationeel’ etc. In de andere conditie verwijzen de woorden juist naar affect
zoals ‘emotie’, ‘sensatie’, ‘beleving’ etc. De veronderstelling is dat we hiermee de
processing modes kunnen activeren. D.w.z. de cool mode in het eerste geval en de hot
mode in het tweede. Als ze vervolgens de scenario’s krijgen voorgelegd blijkt dat mensen
in de eerste conditie, de cool conditie, inderdaad veel meer worden geleid door pakkans
en strafzwaarte in het bepalen van hun al dan niet criminele keuze dan door hun gevoel.
In de hot conditie is dit, zoals verwacht, precies andersom. Met andere woorden, in het
geval van risicovolle keuzes blijkt zowel gevoel als rationaliteit een rol te spelen en blijkt
de mate waarin dit het geval is ook beïnvloedbaar te zijn.
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt het model uitgebreid met persoonlijkheid en wordt de groep
respondenten gevormd door een representatieve steekproef van de Nederlandse
bevolking. Op een eerder tijdstip was van deze groep respondenten reeds
persoonlijkheidsdata verzameld. Deze data is om een bijzondere reden relevant omdat ze
gebaseerd is op een recent persoonlijkheidsmodel dat nog niet eerder is ingezet in
criminologisch onderzoek. Dit HEXACO model veronderstelt dat de persoonlijkheid
van individuen eigenlijk kan worden onderverdeeld in zes hoofddimensies. Tot voor kort
was de algemene aanname dat er ‘slechts’ vijf hoofddimensies zijn, de zgn. ‘Big Five’. De
zesde dimensie van het HEXACO model heet ‘Integriteit’ (in het Engels: Honesty-
Humility) en lijkt dus bijzonder relevant voor onderzoek op het gebied van criminaliteit.
Er zit echter nóg een belangrijk voordeel aan het gebuik van het HEXACO model en dat
is de mogelijkheid om er een zgn. Zelfcontrole maat uit te herleiden. Zelfcontrole is het
belangrijkste en meest onderzochte correlaat van delinquentie op individueel niveau in de
criminologie. Door de mogelijkheid zowel Zelfcontrole, Integriteit en Big Five
persoonlijkheid in een en hetzelfde model te incorporeren ontstaat dus in potentie een
belangrijke en omvattende nieuwe maat om de relatie tussen individuele disposities en
criminaliteit te meten.
Als gevolg van de beschikbaarheid van de HEXACO persoonlijkheidsdata zijn we
nu in staat niet alleen te kijken naar de invloed van processing modes, welke vooral een
rol spelen op het moment van het nemen van een beslissing, maar ook naar de relatie
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tussen persoonlijkheid en gedrag en ook hoe persoonlijkheid gerelateerd is aan de
processing modes. Met andere woorden, we kunnen ook stabiele verschillen tussen
individuen meenemen in de analyse. Het gebruik van het HEXACO model betekent
bovendien dus een nieuwe kijk op persoonlijkheid als gevolg van de toevoeging van de
Integriteitsdimensie.
De resultaten van deze studie komen, zoals verwacht, overeen met het hot/cool
hypothese en ook met de resultaten van de studies die worden gerapporteerd in
Hoofdstuk 3. Zowel negatief affect als cognitie (strafkans x strafzwaarte) zijn significante
voorspellers van het maken van criminele keuzes. Ook persoonlijkheid blijkt een
belangrijke voorspeller van crimineel gedrag. Emotionaliteit, Conscientieusheid,
Zelfcontrole en Integriteit blijken belangrijke voorspellers. Het lijkt er zelfs op dat
Honesty-Humility een ongeveer even sterke voorspeller is als Zelfcontrole en daarmee
dus een zeer belangrijke toevoeging vormt voor criminologisch onderzoek.
Een andere belangrijke bevinding is dat de genoemde persoonlijkheidsdimensies
(m.u.v. van Conscientieusheid) zowel direct als indirect gerelateerd zijn aan criminele
keuzes. Lage Zelfcontrole leidt bijvoorbeeld tot minder negatieve gevoelens bij het
overwegen van een criminele keuze. Ook schatten mensen met weinig Zelfcontrole de
strafkans en strafzwaarte lager in. Maar tevens is er dus een direct effect van Zelfcontrole
op crimineel gedrag, zonder mediatie van cognitie of affect. Vergelijkbare resultaten
worden gevonden voor zowel Integriteit als Emotionaliteit.
In het vijfde en laatste empirische hoofdstuk worden alle inzichten uit voorgaande
hoofdstukken geïntegreerd. Als persoonlijkheidsdimensies zijn Zelfcontrole en Integriteit
(als sterkste voorspellers) meegenomen. Verder is wederom gekeken naar negatief affect
en cognitie (in de vorm van strafkans x strafzwaarte) die tezamen met persoonlijkheid
worden geïntrigeerd in een model. Echter, in dit hoofdstuk wordt net als in Hoofdstuk 3
ook processing mode gemanipuleerd. Deelnemers krijgen voordat ze de scenarios krijgen
voorgelegd weer een taak waarmee processing mode wordt geïnduceerd.
De resultaten laten een vergelijkbaar beeld zien als de studies uit de andere
hoofdstukken. Zowel cognitie als negatief affect is een belangrijke voorspeller van
criminele keuzes. Voorts zijn zowel Integriteit als Zelfcontrole direct als indirect
gerelateerd aan criminele keuzes. Ook wordt wederom het bestaan van twee
onafhankelijk opererende processing modes aangetoond.
Alles bij elkaar genomen lijkt het erop dat rationele keuzemodellen behoorlijk
moeten worden uitgebreid. Belangrijker, het geïntegreerde hot/cool model dat ook
persoonlijkheid omvat blijkt veel beter in staat te zijn om criminele keuzes te voorspellen
dan bestaande modellen. Ook is de dual-process notie die ten grondslag ligt aan veel
sociaalpsychologisch onderzoek maar ook wordt gebruikt in de neurowetenschappen en
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behavioral economics goed toe te passen goed toe te passen op crimineel gedrag. Het feit
dat de resultaten steeds konden worden gerepliceerd in verschillende studies betekent dat
we redelijk wat vertrouwen kunnen hebben in de robuustheid van het model.
Tenslotte nog enkele opmerkingen/kanttekeningen. Je kunt je bijvoorbeeld
afvragen of het gebruik van scenario’s helemaal adequaat is als proxy van crimineel
gedrag. Het gaat tenslotte om situaties die mensen zich moeten voorstellen, niet situaties
waar ze zich daadwerkelijk in bevinden en bovendien zijn de criminele daden die erin
beschreven worden relatief mild van aard (zoals illegaal downloaden en
verzekeringsfraude). Of de resultaten opgaan voor zwaardere misdrijven zal moeten
blijken uit vervolgonderzoek. Een deel van dat onderzoek wordt momenteel door
Reinout de Vries en mijzelf opgezet. Echter, om het beantwoorden van deze vraag niet
helemaal uit de weg te gaan heb ik in het concluderende hoofdstuk gekeken op basis van
de resultaten van bestaand, met name kwalitatief, onderzoek onder zware en veelvuldig
recidiverende criminelen in hoeverre het hot/cool framework het gedrag van deze groep
kan verklaren. Het lijkt erop dat dat heel aardig lukt.
Belangrijker is om tenslotte op te merken dat het hot/cool model niet alleen veel
beter in staat is dit gedrag te beschrijven en te verklaren maar juist een stap verder kan
gaan dan de bestaande keuze modellen op dit gebied. Deze modellen moet vaak
concluderen dat bepaald gedrag ‘irrationeel’ is omdat de kosten van het gedrag veel hoger
liggen dan de baten ervan of ze moeten hun toevlucht nemen tot vergezochte
verklaringen. Doordat het hot/cool model een veel realistischer beschrijving geeft van de
psychologie van het daadwerkelijke besluitvormingsproces is het in potentie dus een
‘grote stap voorwaarts’ in de criminologie, en criminele besluitvorming in het bijzonder.
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